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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps because of habit or a strong aversion to risks,
purchase a considerable amount of insurance generally, and
purchase property, indemnity, and liability insurance in
Typically, national property and casualty insurers sell property,
and liability insurance contracts. As a result, those insurers'
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revenues increase from year to year.' At the dawn of the 21' t century,
foreign property and casualty insurers are realizing similar successes.2
It is expected that anxious or prudent consumers would insure
themselves and their various property interests against strangers, strange
events, and perils over which consumers have little control or influence.
Ironically, a large number of consumers also insure themselves and their
property interests against familiar and trustworthy fiduciaries. Therefore,
the property and casualty insurance market is huge; both national and
foreign insurers are encouraged to expand and sell a wide variety of coinsured indemnity and liability insurance contracts.3 Under many coinsured contracts, the named insureds are familiar pairs of fiduciaries, such
as estates and trustees, executors and administrators, professionals and
associates, mortgagors and mortgagees, partners and partnerships,
corporations and their officers & directors, business entities and their
independent contractors, joint ventures, employers and employees, sellers
and buyers, parents and children, and husbands and wives.4
1. See, e.g., Bob Graham, Analysis: Property-CasualtyInsurersto See Rates of Combined Ratios
Rise, Aug. 19, 2009, http://ifawebnews.com/2009/08/19/analysis-property-casualty-insurers-to-seertes-or-combined-ratios-rise/ ("Calendar 2008 marked the fourth consecutive year of favorable reserve
releases, a switch from earlier in the decade. During 2008, the property-casualty insurance industry
posted nearly $14.3 billion in favorable reserve development, or about 2.8% of prior year-end carried
reserves").
2. See, e.g., David Pilla, Allianz Sees Double-Digit Premium Growth in "New Europe,"
BESTWiRE, Aug. 26, 2008 (LEXIS) ("Allianz S.E. said its premium growth in 'New Europe' markets
rose 14.3% to more than 1 billion euros (795.2 million pounds) in the second quarter, despite what it
called 'difficult' market conditions. For the first half, New Europe premium growth rose 10.5% to 2.1
billion euros, compared with the previous year. Allianz includes markets in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Ukraine in New Europe ....
The group's property and casualty business saw a 21% rise in gross
premiums, to 1.6 billion euros, in the first half.").
3. Cf. Fran Lysiak, Marsh Forms Insurance Agency Focused on Small and Growing U.S.
Businesses, BESTWIRE, Oct. 24, 2008 (LEXIS) ("Marsh said it formed a new insurance agency focused
on small and growing businesses in the United States that would do business separately from its
brokerage operations ....
The agency will offer commercial property/casualty, directors & officers'
liability, surety, employee benefits and personal lines products to customers through a sales and service
force in retail locations across the United States .... MMC is the second-largest broker in the world,
with $4.5 billion in revenues, according to the Best's Review ranking of top global brokers.").
4. Cf Jackson v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 412 So.2d 1364, 1366 (La. 1982) (concurring Justice observing
"that an insurer may substitute an incontestable clause more favorable to the policyholder with the
commissioner's approval" and that "members of the employee group or their trustees are deemed to be
the policyholder, La.R.S. 22:175(A)"). See Dunn v. Second Nat'l Bank, 113 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1938) ("Fain Carter procured the issuance... insuring his life [and]... designating as
beneficiary in his written application 'The estate of S. F. Carter, Sr., The Second National Bank of
Houston, Texas., and Carrie B. Carter (mother) co-executor and co-executrix and co-trustees.' The
policies when issued promised to pay the amounts stipulated 'to the beneficiary, the executors and
administrators or assigns of Samuel F. Carter, Sr., father of the insured."'); Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. CBL
Ins. Servs., Inc., No. G039051, 2009 WL 1874833, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) ("CBL Insurance
Services, Inc. (CBL) was a life insurance agency owned by its president ... and its vice president ....
American Automobile Insurance Company (American) issued to CBL three annual life insurance
agents' and brokers' errors and omissions liability insurance policies. Under the policies American
agreed '[t]o pay on behalf of the insured, all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to
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Of course, from the perspective of "innocent" co-insured fiduciaries
who have purchased insurance contracts, the prevailing views are these:
(1) Insurers should indemnify innocent co-insureds for the latter's lost
interests when deviant co-insured fiduciaries intentionally or negligently
destroy jointly owned or community property; and (2) on behalf of innocent
co-insured fiduciaries, insurers should pay third-party persons when deviant
co-insureds use jointly owned or community property to destroy thirdpay as damages because of: A. Any act, error or omission of the insured, or of any person for whose
acts the insured is legally liable in rendering or failing to render professional services for others in the
conduct of the.., insured's profession as a: 1.Licensed Life Agent, Broker, Brokerage General Agent,
General Agent or Manager... ; B. Any real or alleged negligence in rendering or failing to render
professional services under: 1) the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 2) the Securities
Act of 1933, 3) the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4) the Investment Company Act of 1940, 5) the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, and 6) any amendment to the above acts, which occurs in the conduct
of the . . . insured's profession ....' ");Atlas Assurance Co. of Am. v. Mistic, 822 P.2d 897, 898
(Alaska 1991) ("Jeannie Mistic and Del Kirk Rutzebeck were married ...The couple purchased real
property... [and] owned the house jointly as tenants in common. First Interstate Bank held a deed of
trust note as mortgagee. The property was insured by Atlas Assurance Company of America for
$42,000, with First Interstate named as loss payee"); Laho v. Century 21 Baltes-Selsberg, 555 N.W.2d
149, 150-51 (Wis. App. 1996) ("Donna Jantz is a real estate salesperson affiliated with Century 21
Baltes-Selsberg. Jantz has been sued by two of her clients because of drainage problems in the land they
purchased. Since the property was previously owned by the sole shareholders in the Baltes-Selsberg
firm, the firm's insurer, Continental Casualty Company, claims that its errors and omissions liability
policy does not cover this occurrence. . . .The first clause [appears in] the 'definitions' section of
Continental's policy; it states that the words 'you' or 'your' mean: A. the entity named on the
Declarations of this policy as the Named Insured; B. any of your: 1) partners, if you are a partnership; or
2) executive officers, directors, administrators, or stockholders if you are a corporation; [or] 3) brokers,
agents, employees, salespersons, or common law or statutory independent contractors ....
");Md. Cas.
Co. v. Reeder, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719, 720 (Cal. Ct. App. [4th Dist.] 1990) ("Samuel Pearlman purchased
three adjoining parcels of vacant land in Carlsbad ....Thereafter Pearlman formed... Roundtree, Ltd.,
a partnership. The partnership in turn formed a joint venture with... Twelve Trees Corporation. The
joint venture was named Roundtree Condominiums. . . .At various stages between 1980 and 1985,
Pearlman, Roundtree, Ltd., Twelve Trees, Roundtree Condominiums and DMF were ...named insureds
on a series of comprehensive general liability policies issued by... Maryland Casualty Company.");
King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 27 S.W.3d 117, 121-22 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 2000) ("King's
commercial general liability policy... provides in pertinent part: ... 'We will pay those sums that the
insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or "property damage" to
which this insurance applies... . 'Employee' includes a 'leased worker.' .. . 'Leased worker' means a
person leased to you by a labor leasing firm under an agreement between you and the labor leasing firm,
to perform duties related to the conduct of your business."); Nev. Ref. Co. v. Newton, 497 P.2d 887, 889
(Nev. 1972) ("the policy with Hartford had been and was in effect when the parties signed the
conditional sales agreement.... [The] parties intended that Nevada Refining Co. (buyer) [to] continue
the insurance already in effect, with Refiners Sales Company (seller) as the named insured, for the
benefit of the seller, Refiners Sales Company, until the full purchase price had been paid. The record
supports that finding. The essence of a conditional sales contract is that the seller shall retain and not
relinquish title to the property the subject of the sale until the buyer pays in full the agreed purchase
price.... The district judge found that... was the intent of the parties ...[and] properly concluded that
the seller had an equitable lien on the insurance proceeds[.]"); Parkview Baptist Church & Sch. v.
White, 971 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (La. App. [1st Cir.] 2007) ("The Farmers' Insurance Exchange policy
provides as follows: 'Insured' means you and residents of your household who are: a) your relatives; or
b) other persons under the age of 21 and in the care of any person named above."); Kulubis v. Tex. Farm
Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. 1986) ("Betty and John Kulubis were married
.... Her parents subsequently gave them a mobile home upon which they purchased a homeowners
insurance policy from Texas Farm. Both Betty and John were named insureds in the policy.").
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parties' persons and property.5 To be sure, in light of innocent fiduciaries'
expectations, the legal controversies surrounding the enforceability of coinsureds contracts are extremely heated, highly litigated, and fairly dated.6
To illustrate, consider the facts and controversy in a Louisiana case
decided in 1845. 7 In Henderson v. Western Marine & Fire Insurance Co.,
the agent for a commercial firm purchased an insurance contract that
insured the firm's property against fire.8 The policy also listed the agent as
a co-insured. 9 While the policy was current, a fire destroyed the firm's
merchandise.' ° The firm asked the insurer to indemnify the firm for the
loss." Western Marine & Fire Insurance Company (Western) denied the
claim, asserting the following: (1) the deviant co-insured fiduciary breached
conditions in the insurance contract; and (2) the deviant co-insured
agent
2
committed fraud by intentionally designing and causing the fire.'
A jury decided in favor of the commercial firm, and Western appealed
to the Louisiana Supreme Court.1 3 Before the Louisiana Supreme Court,
the central question was whether the deviant agent's intentional conduct
prevented the innocent firm from collecting insurance proceeds.' 4 The
court addressed this question without deciding whether the principal and the
agent were co-insured fiduciaries under Western's insurance contract.' 5 To
decide the case, the Supreme Court of Louisiana cited and considered
several fundamental agency rules, including: A principal is liable for an
agent's frauds, deceits, and misrepresentations, if those acts occur within
the course of the agent's employment and without the principal's
knowledge. 16 Furthermore, the agent's liability may impute to the
principal, even if the principal has no
direct connection with or influence
7
over the agent's deviant misconduct.'
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that those agency
principles did not apply to the facts in Henderson.'8 Instead, the supreme
court affirmed the jury's verdict, concluding that the agent's fraud and
intentional conduct did not occur within the course of his agency. 9
5. See William A. McNab, Minnesota Loss Payable Clauses in FireInsurance Policies:Falling
Short of the Minimum Coverage Requirements, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 557, 561-62; Howard
Griffin, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 409 So.2d 1262, 1262-64 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
6. See infra Part H.
7. Henderson v. W. Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 1845 WL 1452 (La. 1845).
8. Id.at *1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11.

Id.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Because the innocent firm was not responsible for the deviant agent's
beyond-the-agency willful, malicious, and unauthorized acts, the court
ordered Western to indemnify the commercial firm for the losses resulting
from the fire.2 °
Once more, the Henderson decision is dated, as it was delivered nearly
165 years ago; however, Henderson is still good law in Louisiana.' Yet,
whether innocent co-insured fiduciaries may collect insurance proceeds
after deviant co-insureds destroy community property or other property
interests still generates lawsuits in Louisiana.2 2 Interestingly, some very
recent Louisiana cases have rejected the decision in Henderson and
concluded that insurers have no duty to indemnify allegedly innocent coinsured fiduciaries.23
Without a doubt, conflicting rulings about whether insurers must
indemnify innocent fiduciaries appear in other community property and
separate property states. 24 To illustrate, compare the facts and ruling in
Erlin-Lawler Enters., Inc. v. Fire Insurance Exchange with those in
Federal Insurance Co. v. Homestore, Inc.25 In both cases, appellate courts
applied California's law and produced very different outcomes. In ErlinLawler, Dan Erlin, James Lawler and Erlin-Lawler Enterprises, Inc., a
California corporation, d/bla Bestways Market #1, were co-insured
fiduciaries under a fire insurance contract.26 Fire Insurance Exchange was
the insurer. 27 A fire destroyed the corporation's equipment, fixtures, and
stock in trade.2 8 The fire also caused business-interruption losses.29
The insured corporation asked the insurer to indemnify. 30 The insurer
refused, asserting that the co-insured fiduciaries, Erlin and Lawler,
deliberately caused the fire.3' In fact, Erlin and Lawler were convicted for

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Crumpler v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. 95-31300, 1996 WL 512065, at *1
(5th Cir. 1996) (citing Louisiana's law and concluding that the insurer had no duty to indemnify the
innocent insured spouse after the insured deviant husband's arson destroyed the couple's house in
Claiborne Parish, Louisiana).
23. See, e.g., McNamara v. Augustino Bros., Inc., No. 2008-CA-1522, 2009 WL 1332311, at *5
(La. App. [4th Cir.] 2009) (concluding that the insurer had no duty to indemnify the innocent co-insured
contractor-under theory of vicarious liability-when for the alleged deviant co-insured employee's
criminal and other intentional acts).
24. The community property states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New
Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See infra Part ll.B. for a brief discussion of
community and separate property laws and statutes.
25. Erlin-Lawler Enters, Inc. v. Fire Ins. Exch., 73 Cal. Rptr. 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Fed. Ins.
Co. v. Homestore, Inc., 144 Fed. App'x. 641 (9th Cir. 2005); see text accompanying notes 26-51.
26. Erlin-Lawler, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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arson. 32 Erlin-Lawler Enterprises sued Fire Insurance Exchange asserting
that it was an innocent co-insured.3 3 Sitting without a jury, the trial court
decided against the corporation. 34 The trial judge concluded that "ErlinLawler Enterprises, Inc., was merely the alter ego of... Dan Erlin and
James H. Lawler," and the corporation appealed. 35 A California Appellate
Court reversed the trial court's ruling, embracing the prevailing rule at the
time: Recovery under a fire-insurance contract is not defeated when an
innocent 36co-insured corporation's agent intentionally burns corporate
property.
In Homestore, the corporation did not prevail. 37 Several indemnity
insurers sold directors and officers (D & 0) insurance contracts to
Homestore, Inc. 38 The co-insured fiduciaries under the D & 0 contracts
were Homestore, the corporation, and Homestore's current and former
directors and officers. 39 During the policy's period, federal officials:
[filed] federal information . . . against Homestore's then-CFO Joseph
Shew, and two former Homestore officers. The information charged that
Mr. Shew conspired to commit securities fraud, in violation of federal law
.... Mr. Shew pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge and admitted that
... he conspired to overstate Homestore's advertising revenue to
artificially inflate
the company's revenues, and [that he] filed false 1OQs
0
with the SEC.
After paying to defend itself and officers in the federal probe,
Homestore asked the insurers to reimburse the expended funds.4 1 Citing
terms under the D & 0 insurance policies, the corporation claimed that the
insurers had a duty to indemnify. 42 The insurers disagreed. 43 They asserted
that Homestore's former CFO signed the four insurance applications and
materially misrepresented information about Homestore's earnings.44

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 183-84.
37. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Homestore, Inc., 144 Fed. App'x. 641, 644 (9th Cir. 2005).
38. Id. The insurers were Genesis Insurance Company, Royal Indemnity Company, Federal
Insurance Company and Clarendon Insurance Company. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 645.
41. See id. at 644.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 644-45.
Homestore submitted a renewal application for D & 0 liability insurance to Genesis ....
The renewal application required that Homestore provide the '[l]atest 10K and 1OQ filed
with the SEC.' The application was signed by then-CFO Joseph Shew. Homestore also
obtained excess D & 0 liability insurance policies from Royal, Federal, and Clarendon for
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Therefore, in light of those material misrepresentations, the insurers
claimed that, as a matter of law, they had a right to rescind all insurance
policies and deny reimbursements for "all insureds. ' '4s
The insurers filed a declaratory judgment action in a federal district
court to determine their obligations under the insurance contracts. 46
Agreeing with the insurers, the district court concluded that the D & 0
insurance contracts unambiguously allowed the insurers to rescind coverage
for "all Insureds" if one or more deviant co-insured fiduciaries signed and
misrepresented material information on the insurance application.47
Refusing to accept that conclusion, the innocent corporation appealed.4
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
summary judgment. 49 The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the clear and
explicit language" of the D & 0 policy permitted the insurers to rescind the
insurance contracts for "all Insureds" based upon the former co-insured
CFO's misrepresentations in the insurance application.5" But even more
importantly, the Ninth Circuit fashioned a new law of the circuit: California
public policy does not prevent insurers from rescinding coverage for
"innocent" directors and officers when deviant directors and officers insert
misrepresentations in insurance applications. 5
Moreover, insured, innocent spouses also sue insurers who fail to
indemnify after an insured, deviant spouse destroys various property

the same coverage period . . . . Section VIII(C) of the Genesis Policy, entitled
'REPRESENTATIONS' provides:
It is agreed that the information and statements contained in the Application for
this Policy, a copy of which is attached hereto, and any materials submitted
therewith (which are on file with the Insurer and shall be deemed to be attached to
and part of the Application as if physically attached hereto), are the basis of this
Policy and are to be considered as incorporated into and constituting a part of this
Policy.
By acceptance of this Policy the Directors and Officers and the Company agree:
(1) That the statements in the Application and in any materials submitted
therewith are their representations, that they shall be deemed material to the
acceptance of the risk or hazard assumed by the Insurer under this Policy, and that
this Policy is issued in reliance upon the truth of such representations; ....
Homestore's filings with the SEC disclosed growth in advertising revenues throughout the
period. On December 21, 2001, however, Homestore announced that its Board of Directors
was conducting a review of the company's financial statements, and that it would be making
restatements of historical earnings at the conclusion of the review ....As a result of the
financial restatements, multiple securities claims and shareholder derivative suits were filed.
Id.
45. Id. at 644.
46. Id. at 642.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 647.
49. Id. at 648.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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interests.52 In fact, innocent spouse cases comprise the largest category of
all innocent co-insured disputes.53 Like disagreements between insurers
and other co-insureds, innocent co-insured spouses sue insurers in both
separate and community property states. 54 Also, among innocent co-insured
spouse cases, about one-third of the disputes concern whether insurers have
a duty to indemnify innocent spouses fully or partially when deviant
spouses destroy community property.5 5 However, the greater majority of
innocent co-insured spouse controversies concern whether insurers have a
duty to indemnify innocent spouses when deviant spouses destroy jointly
owned property or property that spouses hold as tenants by entirety or
tenants in common. 6
Innocent fiduciary disputes generally, and innocent co-insured spouse
actions in particular, generate a lot of conflicting rulings and outcomes
within and between state and federal judiciaries.5 7 More significant, even
after state supreme courts have issued "definitive" innocent co-insured
rulings, intra- and interstate splits continue among state courts. 58 Similarly,
intra- and inter-circuit conflicts also persist among the federal circuits.5 9
Even more relevant, some legislatures in community property states enacted
52.
refd.).
53.

See Jones v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1952, writ
See Table 1, infra at note 692.

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Compare Norman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 804 F.2d 1365, 1366 (5th Cir. 1986)
(stressing that denying deviant co-insureds a benefit is the single most important consideration and
declaring that the co-insured innocent spouse could not recover any proceeds because there was a
possibility that the deviant co-insured spouse might benefit), and Webster v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
953 F.2d 222, 223 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a post-fire divorce between the innocent and deviant
co-insured spouses, which awarded half of the insurance proceeds on the destroyed community property
to the innocent spouse as separate property, still did not permit the innocent spouse to recover insurance
proceeds for a pre-divorce arson fire), with Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 996 S.W.2d 873, 881
(allowing an innocent co-insured to recover insurance money when a deviant co-insured spouse
intentionally destroys community property).
58. Compare McEwin v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 118 S.W.3d 811, 815-16 (Tex. App.-Amarillo,
2003) ("Kathy's status as an innocent spouse does not determine her right to recover from Allstate ....
The series of events encompassing James' intentionally causing loss of the insured home and turning in
a loss report without disclosing that the loss was due to his intentional acts comprised perpetration of
fraud on Allstate relating to the insurance, even had James not made false statements in his later
examinations under oath. Because of James' fraud, the Concealment or Fraud clause voided the policy
as to both James and Kathy") with Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 996 S.W.2d 873, 881 ("We
reaffirm our longstanding public policy [of] preventing an arsonist from benefitting from fraud by
denying recovery of his or her own one-half interest in the claim against the insurer. We conclude,
however, that such public policy does not overcome an innocent spouse's contractual right to recover
her or his one-half interest in policy benefits.").
59. Compare Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 546 F. Supp. 543, 546
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating rights and obligations under homeowner's insurance policy are several and not
joint. Therefore innocent spouse may recover even though co-insured spouse is at fault), with Cal. Ins.
Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir. 1956) (concluding that an innocent co-insured spouse may not
recover insurance proceeds if the deviant spouse torches community property).
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"innocent spouse" statutes.60 Put simply, those statutes are designed to
protect innocent co-insured spouses' insurable interests after insured
deviant spouses intentionally destroy community property.6 ' Still, in light
of those62statutes, conflicting state and federal court rulings and declarations
persist.

Without doubt, for at least a century and a half, national property
insurers have been selling standardized, or fairly identical, property
insurance contracts in the majority of states and across the federal circuits.63
Yet, whether insurers must indemnify innocent co-insured spouses and
other co-insured fiduciaries under those boilerplate contracts has generated
judicial conflicts nearly as long in both community and separate property
states.64 Assuredly, some commentators and federal judges have recognized
the pervasiveness of the conflicts and tried to explain them. 65 However,
those jurists' and commentators' efforts have fallen short, and the reason is
not complicated. Barring one researcher's efforts, the overwhelming
majority of jurists and scholars have surveyed or analyzed primarily the
following: (1) business-related, innocent co-insured cases; (2) innocent coinsured spouse cases in separate property states; or (3) innocent co-insureds
cases involving arson. 6
60. See infra Part U.
61. See infra Part I.
62. See infra Part H.
63. Cf Willy E. Rice, Commercial Terrorism from the Transatlantic Slave Trade to the World
Trade Center Disaster: Are Insurance Companies & Judges "Aiders and Abettors" of Terror?-A
CriticalAnalysis of American and British Courts' Declaratory and Equitable Actions, 1654-2002, 6
SCHOLAR 1, 63-66 nn.287-300 (2003) (reviewing the evolution and sale of marine and other forms of
property insurance in America in the mid-i 700s).
64. See, e.g., Kosior v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 13 N.E.2d 423, 425 (Mass. 1938); Jones v. Fid. & Guar.
Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1952, writ ref'd).
65. See, e.g., Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 73 P.3d 102, 105 (Idaho 2003) (listing majority
and minority decisions vis-a-vis the rights of innocent co-insured spouses); Atlas Assur. Co. of Am. v.
Mistic, 822 P.2d 897, 899-901 (Alaska 1991) (highlighting major conflicts without providing analysis of
the split decisions); Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326 N.W.2d 727, 737-39 (Wis. 1982) (outlining the a
long list of conflicts among courts and presenting plausible explanations); Murphy v. Tex. Farmers Ins.
Co., 982 S.W.2d 79, 80-82 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998) (chronicling the history of conflicting
innocent co-insured decisions among Texas's courts); Cal. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Northland Ins. Co., 56
Cal. Rptr. 2d 434, 442 (Cal. App. [4th Dist.] 1996) (discussing conflicting innocent co-insured
decisions); and Thoele v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 39 F.3d 724, 727-28 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994) (presenting an
extensive list and highlighting various courts' explanations).
66.
See Rachel R. Watkins Schoenig, Property Insurance and the Innocent Co-Insured: Was It
All Pay and No Gainfor the Innocent Co-Insured?43 DRAKE L. REV. 893 (1995); David L. Nersessian,
Penalty by Proxy: Holding the Innocent Policyholder Liable for Fraud by Coinsureds, Claims
Professionals,and Other Agents, 38 TORT TRIAL & INs. PRAc. L.J. 907 (2003); Benjamin M. Parrott,
ForBetter or For Worse? The Iowa Supreme Court's Decision to Compensate the Innocent Coinsured
Spouse in Sager v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 561 (2006); John F.
Dobbyn, Subrogationand the Innocent Spouse Dilemma, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1095 (2004); Ronald S.
Ribaudo, Burning Down the House: Does Limiting the Innocent Spouse's Right To Recover Make
Sense?-DePalma v. Bates County Mutual Insurance Company, 67 MO. L. REV. 77 (2002); Michael J.
Sudekum, Homeowner's Policies and Missouri Law Make Recovery for the Domestic Violence
Victim/Co-Insured an Olympic Challenge, 69 UMKC L. Rev. 363 (2000); Brent R. Lindahl, Insurance
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But, most state and federal courts decide all sorts of innocent coinsureds controversies involving corporations, spouses, partnerships,
trustees, estates, executors, administrators, and other persons simply
residing or doing business in community and separate property states.67 As
of this writing, a fairly comprehensive, theoretical, and empirical analysis
of these decisions has not occurred. Arguably, such an analysis is
warranted. Therefore, this article attempts to fill that gap.
Part II presents a short discussion of selected pairs of persons'
fiduciary duties to each other: Corporations and officers, partners and
partnerships, joint venturers, executors and administrators, and husbands
and wives. 68 Fairly often, innocent contractual parties are victimized when
their deviant co-parties engage in negligent and intentional activities.6 9 In
those situations, and from an insurance perspective, those innocent parties
are first-party victims under various property and casualty insurance
contracts. 70 After innocent first-party victims spend money to become
whole again and ask insurers to indemnify, insurers often refuse. 71 To
defend themselves, indemnity insurers raise the "breach of fiduciary duty"
affirmative defense, by showing that the innocent fiduciaries' first-party
claims are excluded because the innocent or deviant co-insured fiduciary
breached a fiduciary duty.72 Thus, Part II highlights some of those
relationships and fiduciary73 obligations as they appear in separate and
community property states.
Quite often, the following issue is litigated: whether innocent
fiduciaries in a commercial, professional, or familial relationship are
vicariously liable when deviant co-parties destroy third-party victims'
property or person.74 It is relevant here because indemnity insurers often
employ the doctrine of "vicarious liability" to prevent innocent co-insured
fiduciaries from securing insurance proceeds after deviant co-insureds
injure third-parties or destroy the latter's property.7 5 In addition, insurers
Coverage for an Innocent Co-Insured Spouse, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 433 (1997); Michele E.
Randazzo, Innocent Spouse Not Allowed To Recover UnderJoint InsurancePolicy Where Other Spouse
Intentionally CausedLoss-Dolcy v. Rhode IslandJoint ReinsuranceAss 'n, 591 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1991),
26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 556 (1992); Leane English Cerven, The Problem of the Innocent Coinsured
Spouse: Three Theories of Recovery, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. 849 (1983); Jill R. Wilson, Insurance LawInnocent Spouse's Right to Recover in Arson Cases, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1022, 1034 (1981);
Comment, Spouse's Fraudas a Bar to Insurance Recovery, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543 (1979-1980);
D. E. Evins, Fraud,False Swearing,or Other Misconduct of Insured as BarringRecovery on Property
Insuranceby Innocent Coinsured,24 A.L.R.3d 450 (1969).
67. See infra Part lI.
68. See infra Part II.
69. See infra Part II.
70. See infra Part 1I.
71. See infra Part II.
72. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. JDC (America) Corp., 52 F.3d 1575, 1575-78 (11 th Cir. 1995).
73. See infra Part II.
74. See infra Part I.
75. See infra Part II.
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raise the vicarious liability defense when deviant co-insured fiduciaries
or intentionally damage third-parties' property or
either negligently
76
persons.
Therefore, prudent insurance consumers commonly purchase two

types of insurance contracts.77 Some insurance agreements are called "firstparty insurance. 78 First-party insurance covers innocent insureds' person

and property.7 9 The other is labeled "third-party insurance." 80 The latter
covers innocent insureds who might be vicariously liable for deviant coinsureds' negligent or intentional conduct. 8' Unquestionably, there are
major and legally significant differences between the two categories of
insurance. 2 Part III briefly discusses those insurance contracts, since
innocent co-insured spouses and other co-insured fiduciaries commence
legal actions against insurers under both first and third-party insurance
contracts.83
What types of legal actions? Generally, innocent co-insured
fiduciaries and insurers file declaratory judgment actions in both state and
federal courts, asking those tribunals to declare either rights or obligations
Therefore, Part IV
under first and third-party insurance contracts.8
discusses the purpose and scope of declaratory judgment suits under federal
and state declaratory judgment statutes.8 5
Part V presents a discussion of whether insurers have a duty to
indemnify innocent co-insured fiduciaries under first-party insurance
contracts. 86 Part VI critiques whether insurers have a duty to pay claims on
behalf of innocent co-insureds under third-party insurance contracts.8 7
Necessarily, both Parts IV and V will highlight and discuss state and federal
courts' conflicting declaratory judgments.8 8 Those discussions will also
that
outline, compare, and contrast the various legal and equitable doctrines
89
federal and state judges employ to deny or award declaratory relief
Finally, Part VII presents an empirical study and discusses the
disposition of innocent co-insured fiduciary decisions, dating from the
1800s. 90 That theoretical and empirical analysis is designed to find a more
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See infra Part II.
See infra PartII.
See infra PartII.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part 1.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Parts IV, V.
See infra Parts IV, V.
See infra Part VII.
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comprehensive or more plausible explanations for the persistent judicial
conflicts among innocent co-insured cases.9 1 Stated slightly differently, the
presentation in Part VII will attempt to harmonize discordant judicial
judgments which appear to be unexplainable conflicts.92

The article concludes by encouraging state and federal judges to apply
more carefully settled, equitable doctrines to interpret insurance contracts
93
and to award or deny innocent co-insureds petitions for declaratory relief.
Current and past courts have considered illusive public policy to interpret
valid insurance contacts, and that practice helps to generate judicial
conflicts.94

II.

SELECTED FIRST-PARTY FIDUCIARIES' COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

This section discusses selected co-parties' fiduciary obligations to each
other. Insurers have used insured deviant co-parties' breach of fiduciary
duty as an affirmative defense to prevent innocent co-insured fiduciaries
from recovering under indemnity insurance contracts as illustrated in
Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. JDC (Am.) Corp.95 In Lawyers, JDC
America Corporation (JDC) and Brickell Station Towers, Inc. (BST) were
lender/mortgagee and partner/developer, respectively. 96 They formed a
joint venture to develop property, and the venture borrowed $38 million
from JDC.97 As mortgagee, JDC held the mortgages and Lawyers Title
insured the mortgages under two title insurance contracts. 98 "The
development of the property did not proceed as planned." 99
JDC filed a foreclosure action against the joint venture and BST. 00
However, the insurer refused to provide legal representation for JDC in the
foreclosure action.' 0' As a consequence, JDC retained independent
legal
02
representation and settled the foreclosure action with BST.
JDC asked the title insurer to reimburse the funds used to settle the
case and pay attorneys' fees. 0 3 The title insurer refused and filed a
declaratory judgment action to determine whether it had a contractual duty
91. See infra Part V11.
92. See infra Part V11.
93. See infra Part VIII.
94. See infra Part VIII.
95. See generally Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. JDC (Am.) Corp., 52 F.3d 1575 (11th Cir. 1995)
(illustrating how this defense is used).
96. Id. at 1576-77.
97. Id. at 1577.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (neither party could agree on the scope of representation).
101. Id.at 1578-79.
102. Id. at 1579.
103. Id.
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to defend and/or indemnify JDC.' 4 JDC filed an answer to the declaratory
judgment action.105 In addition, the JDC filed a counteraction alleging that
Lawyers Title breached the title insurance contracts by refusing to defend
and indemnify JDC. 1°6
Lawyers Title fashioned a unique and effective affirmative defense to
defend itself against JDC's breach-of-contract action' 0 7 Before JDC and
BST settled the foreclosure action, BST and the joint venture defended
themselves by raising several defenses, such as the breach of fiduciary duty
and the breach of loyalty among partners affirmative defenses' 08 To raise
the breach of fiduciary duty defense effectively, Lawyers Title cited an
exclusion clause in one of the title insurance contracts. 1°9 That clause
excluded "[d]efects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters
.... "110
...created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant
Embracing the district court's conclusion, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the title insurer had no duty to indemnify
and no duty to defend JDC because BST's attacks were matters that JDC
"created, suffered, assumed or agreed to.""' Or stated differently, the title
insurer asserted that it had no duty to indemnify because JDC entered into
an excluded agreement. 12 Again this is an example of the breach of
fiduciary duty affirmative defense, which is very different
from an action
13
that is premised on one's breach of a fiduciary duty."
A. Commercial,Business, andProfessionalPersons'Fiduciary
Obligationsand Relationshipsin Community and SeparateProperty States
Put simply, in both separate and community property states, "[a]
fiduciary relationship arises between two persons when one person [has] a
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.

110.

Id. (quoting Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. JDC (Am.) Corp., 818 F. Supp. 1543, 1546-48 (S.D.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1578.
Id. at 1578 n.5.
Id.at 1580.

Fla. 1993)).
111.
112.

Id.
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp, 52 F. 3d at 1580 (JDC's entered into an adverse fiduciary relationship

in which the "deviant," co-insured BST breached its fiduciary duty).
113. Cf Zakibe v. Ahrens & McCarron, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 373, 384-85 (Mo. App. 2000) ("Plaintiff
asserts that the trial court erred in giving [an instruction] which submitted the affirmative defense of
breach of fiduciary duty... He argues that breach of a fiduciary duty is not a defense to a breach of
contract claim . . . .As an affirmative defense to plaintiff's breach of employment contract claim,
defendant alleged that... plaintiff had breached his fiduciary duty... and defendant was thereby
excused from performing any obligations under the employment contract ....This rule has its source in
agency law."). See Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Adm'rs, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 202 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) ("LcL filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations and raising 28
affirmative defenses, including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties and bad faith.").
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duty to act for or give advice for the benefit of another on matters within the
scope of their relationship."' 14 Although courts in community and separate
property states have fashioned competing definitions of a "fiduciary duty,"
the Minnesota Supreme Court crafted the following definition that
summarizes most: A fiduciary relationship is characterized by a fiduciary
who enjoys a superior position in terms of knowledge and authority
and in
5
whom the other party places a high level of trust and confidence." 1
In certain formal relationships, such as an attorney-client or trustee
relationship, a fiduciary duty arises as a matter of law." 16 In addition, the
Texas Supreme Court recognizes that certain informal relationships may
give rise to a fiduciary duty.1 17 "Such informal fiduciary relationships have
also been termed 'confidential relationships' and may arise 'where one
person trusts in and relies upon another, whether the relation is a moral,
social, domestic or merely personal one."'"18 Even more importantly, as a
matter of law, each person agrees that equity courts' standard of loyalties
will measure the quality of the person's conduct towards the other person
after the fiduciary relationship forms. 19
Courts in both separate and community property states have found
fiduciary relationships between the following pairs of commercial, business
and professional persons: attorneys and clients, executors/administrators
and estates' beneficiaries, trustees and various other beneficiaries, joint
venturers, corporations and directors/officers, partners and partnerships,
120
insurers and insureds, principals and agents, and brokers and clients.
Generally, courts in community and separate property states require parties'
114. F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 704 (N.J. 1997); see also Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d
180, 183 (Tex. 1984) (concluding that the fiduciary duty arises from the relationship of the parties and
not from the terms of a contract).
115. Toombs v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 801, 809 (Minn. 1985); see also Kolodge v. Boyd, Nos.
A10485, A102094, 2004 WL 2669272, at *5 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. Nov. 23, 2004) ("A fiduciary duty may
be described as a cluster of obligations owed by one person, the trustee or fiduciary, toward another, the
'cestui' or beneficiary, with respect to an identified subject matter, known as the 'res' or 'subject of
trust.,").
116. See Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. 2002).
117. See Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1963); see also Crim Truck & Tractor Co.
v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.1992) (reaffirming that an informal fiduciary
relationship exists in a family relationship or otherwise, if one party has become accustomed to being
"guided by the judgment or advice" of the other.).
118. See Crim Truck & Tractor Co., 823 S.W.2d at 594 (quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d
256, 261 (Tex. 1951)).
119. See Texas Bank and Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 508 (Tex. 1980) (citing Johnson v.
Peckham, 120 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. 1938)).
120. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Agro S.A. v. Monsanto Co., 73 F. Supp. 2d 540, 546 (M.D.N.C.
1999) ("Generally, in North Carolina... there are two types of fiduciary relationships: (1) those that
arise from 'legal relations such as attorney and client, broker and client... partners, principal and agent,
trustee and cestui que trust,' and (2) those that exist 'as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on
one side, and the resulting superiority and influence on the other."'); see also Four Bros. Boat Works,
Inc. v. Tesoro Petroleum Co's, Inc., 217 S.W.3d 653, 668-69 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006
pet. denied) (providing a list of various fiduciary relationships).
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comprising commercial, business, and professional relationships to conform
to a very similar or an identical fiduciary standard.
A few examples should support the assertion. First, corporations can
only act through individuals-its officers and directors. 21 Therefore, in
community and separate property states, corporate directors and officers
must discharge their duties as follows: (1) in good faith; (2) in a reasonable
manner that serves the best interests of the corporation; and (3) with care
that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under identical or similar
circumstances. 122 Likewise, courts in separate and community property
states declare that partners and partnerships have fiduciary relationships,
and partners
are held to high standards of integrity when dealing with each
23
other.1
In fact, for decades, and as a matter of common law, the Texas
Supreme Court has declared: "[T]he relationship between... partners... is
fiduciary in character, and imposes upon all the participants the obligation
of loyalty to the joint concern [as well as the duty to exercise] the utmost
good faith, fairness, and honesty in their dealings with each other [vis-a-vis
matters related] to the enterprise.' 24 Furthermore, since a partner is a
fiduciary, Texas's law imposes on a partner the same obligation that it
imposes on a corporate fiduciary: A partner may not usurp corporate
12
opportunities.

Without a doubt, under rules in community and separate property
states, joint ventures and partnerships are not legal twins. Yet, joint venture
and partner relationships are quite similar. For example, under the Texas
Uniform Partnership Act, a partnership or joint venture is an association of
121. See Leitch v. Homsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex.1996).
122. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a) (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(1) (2004) ("A
director shall discharge the duties of the position of director in good faith, in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care [that] an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances."); Malone v. Brincat, 722
A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (reiterating that a director's fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its
shareholders is a triad comprising "due care, good faith, and loyalty".); Tritek Telecom, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (declaring that corporate directors owe a fiduciary
duty of care to the corporation and its shareholders and must serve "in good faith, in a manner such
director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders[.]"); Pierce Concrete,
Inc. v. Cannon Realty & Constr. Co., 335 S.E.2d 30, 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (corporate directors owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation); Int'l Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 577 (Tex.
1963) (stressing that corporate officers or directors have an obligation not to usurp corporate
opportunities for their personal gain, and that corporations may seize directors' and officers' ill-gained
profits).
123. See Appletree Square I Ltd. P'ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
124. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Fitz-Gerald v.
Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256, 264 (Tex. 1951); see also Lipinski v. Lipinski, 35 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Minn. 1949)
(embracing the view that the partners or joint entrepreneurs' relationship are based on mutual trust and
confidence and reiterating that the law imposes upon partners the highest standard of integrity and good
faith in their dealings with each other).
125. See Int'l Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 577 (Tex. 1963).
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two or more persons who have agreed to be co-owners of a for-profit
business or enterprise. 126 "[A] partnership consists of an express or implied
agreement containing four required elements: (1) a community of interest in
the venture; (2) an agreement to share profits; (3) an agreement to share
losses; and (4) a mutual right of control or management of the
enterprise. ' ' 127 Thus state courts128employ partnership rules to determine joint
venturers' rights and liabilities.
When joint venturers consummate an agreement, they also create a
fiduciary relationship as a matter of common law. 29 Therefore, for the
benefit of each other, joint venturers must: (1) act in good faith; (2) keep
confidences; and (3) be loyal for the benefit of each other. 130 However,
joint venturers' fiduciary obligations only govern matters within the scope
of the joint endeavor. 131 Furthermore, each member has a duty to act
responsibly and prudently for the benefit of others when matters are clearly
within the scope of the relationship. 132 In addition, when a joint venturer
promotes the venture, the joint venturer is the agent for all members in the
relationship. 33 Each member has a fiduciary duty to disclose completely
all material information that might or could affect the enterprise. 134 Finally,
innocent venturers may sue deviant venturers when the latter's
misrepresentations and fraudulent activities occur within the
scope of the
35
interests.
venturers'
innocent
undermine
and
enterprise
joint
Once more, a fiduciary is a person who does as follows: (1) occupies a
position of "peculiar confidence," (2) has a considerable amount of
"integrity and fidelity," (3) acts in "good faith," and (4) deals fairly for the
benefit of another person.' 36 Therefore, in separate property, community
property, and employment-at-will states, an employee may owe his or her
employer a fiduciary duty under certain circumstances. 137 "When a
126. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 2007).
127. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1997) (citing Coastal
Plains Dev. Corp. v. Micrea, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex.1978)).
128. See, e.g., Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 394 N.E.2d 380, 384 (I11.1979) ("A joint
venture may be established without a specified formal agreement.... A fiduciary relationship exists
between members of the joint venture ....
When a joint venture is found to exist, the legal principles
pertaining to the relationship between partners govern."); but see Warner v. Winn, 197 S.W.2d 338, 342
(Tex. 1946) (holding that parties are not partners in a fiduciary relationship if they carefully defined the
extent of their enterprise in a contract).
129. See Carroll v. Caldwell, 147 N.E.2d 69, 71-72 (Il1.1957).
130. See Ditis v. Ahlvin Const. Co., 97 N.E.2d 244, 250 (111. 1951).
131. See Yokel v. Hite, 809 N.E.2d 721, 728 (111.App. Ct. 2004).
132. See Carroll, 147 N.E.2d at 75.
133. See Stone v. Guthrie, 144 N.E.2d 165, 170 (l. App. Ct. 1957).
134. See Bakalis v. Bressler, 115 N.E.2d 323, 328 (Ill. 1953).
135. See Hagerman v. Schulte, 181 N.E. 677, 684-85 (Ill. 1932).
136. See Daniel v. Falcon Interest Realty Corp., 190 S.W.3d 177, 185 (Tex. App. -Houston [1st
Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
137. See, e.g., Cenla Physical Therapy & Rehab. Agency, Inc. v. Lavergne, 657 So. 2d 175, 177
(La. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing whether employees were acting in the interest of their employer).
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fiduciary relationship of agency exists between employee and employer, the
employee has a duty to act primarily
for the benefit of the employer in
' 38
agency."'
his
with
connected
matters
Furthermore, a fiduciary has a duty to deal openly with his employer
and to fully disclose material information that might affect the employer's
enterprise. 139 An employee commits an actionable wrong when he uses his
employment status to seize business opportunities, which correctly belong
to the employer. 140 Agency principles also prevent an employee from
commencing a for-profit enterprise or business that competes with the
employer's enterprise. 14 1 However, a fiduciary relationship does not
42
prevent an employee from preparing to compete with the employer.
Absent an anti-competition agreement, an employee does not breach his
43
fiduciary obligation when he prepares to compete with his employer.
Even more significant, an employment-at-will employee may properly
plan to compete with their employer, and they may take active steps while
they are still their employer's servant.' 44 Like regular or contract-based
employees, an employment-at-will employee has no general duty to
disclose their plans to their employer. 145 In fact, the employment-at-will
fiduciary may secretly plan a future enterprise with other at-will or regular
employees without violating their fiduciary duty.1 46 To summarize, an
employee's fiduciary obligation is not complicated. More or less, all
employees form a fiduciary relationship with their employers, they have a
fiduciary duty to protect the employers' interests, and they must avoid
47
being their employers' adversaries. 1
138. See Abetter Trucking Co. v. Arizpe, 113 S.W.3d 503, 510 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, no pet.).
139. Daniel, 190 S.W.3d at 185.
140. See Bray v. Squires, 702 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ);
Daniel, 190 S.W.3d at 185; Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 903 (Minn.
1983) (concluding that an employee's misappropriating his employer's secret violated the employee's
duty of confidentiality); Sanitary Farm Dairies, Inc. v. Wolf, 112 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Minn.1961) (finding
that the employee's soliciting an employer's customers before leaving his employment breached
employee's duty of loyalty); Hlubeck v. Beeler, 9 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Minn. 1943) (concluding that an
employee's embezzling employer's fund was a breach of the employee's duty to serve the employer
"faithfully and honestly"); St. Cloud Aviation, Inc. v. Hubbell, 356 N.W.2d 749, 751 (Minn. App. 1984)
(concluding that an employee's referring a customer to the employer's competitor was a breach of the
employee's fiduciary duty).
141. See Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002) (embracing the
proposition that an employee must perform primarily for the benefit of an employer in matters
connected with the agency if a fiduciary relationship of agency exists between the employee and
employer).
142. See Bray, 702 S.W.2d at 270.
143. Id.
144. See Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 415, 419 (Mass. 1991).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See State by McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 858 (Minn. 1985)
(citing Restatement (Second) Agency §§ 1, 2, 13 (1957)).
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The final discussion in this part highlights executors and
administrators' fiduciary duties. Put simply, an executor of an estate is a
148
Moreover, the relationship
fiduciary for the estate's beneficiaries.
between an executor and the estate's beneficiaries creates a fiduciary duty
as a matter of law. 149 Therefore, as a fiduciary, the executor has a duty to
protect the beneficiaries' interest and to do so with candor. 50 More
specifically, under Texas's law, executors have exclusive management
rights; but, executors also owe estates' beneficiaries the highest duties of
good faith, fidelity, loyalty, fairness, and prudence.' 5 ' Other community
property and separate property states also have embraced these general
principles.'52
Additionally, executors and administrators have a duty to fully
disclose all material information that might affect the interests of the
estate's beneficiaries. 5 3 In fact, an executor's administration of a
decedent's estate must conform to the same high fiduciary duties and
standards that govern the conduct of trustees. 54 That an estate's executor
must conform to a higher fiduciary standard should generate little surprise.
An independent or a court-ordered executor is a personal representative
who "stands in [a decedent's] shoes."' 155 Thus, any strained relations
148. See Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. 1984).
149. See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996).
150. See Welder v. Green, 985 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied);
Hawthorne v. Guenther, 917 S.W.2d 924, 934 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, writ denied).
151. See Humane Soc'y of Austin & Travis County v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 574, 577
(Tex.1975).
152. For community property states see, e.g., In re Sanders, 710 P.2d 232, 237 (1985) (declaring
that an executor is a fiduciary, an executor owes an estate's beneficiaries a duty to act with the utmost
good faith, and an executor must refrain from taking unfair advantage of the beneficiaries); In re Larson,
694 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Wash. 1985) (embracing the principle that "[tihe personal representative stands in
a fiduciary relationship to those beneficially interested in the estate"); McKeigue v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co., 110 N.W. 384, 385 (1907) (concluding that executors, in all essential respects, are held to the
standard of a trustee).
For separate property states see, e. g., Mankert v. Elmatco Products, Inc., 84 Conn. App. 456, 460
(2004) ("The executor of an estate has a fiduciary duty to its creditors..."); In re McCool, 553 A.2d
761, 765 (N.H. 1988) (concluding that an executor's fiduciary duty requires the executor to handle an
estate "with that degree of prudence and diligence that a [person] of ordinary judgment would bestow on
his [or her] own affairs of like nature."); In re Pirie, 492 N.E.2d 884, 889 (I11.App. 1986) (reiterating
that an executor of an estate has "a fiduciary duty to act with the highest degree of fidelity and utmost
good faith in handling estate assets.").
153. See Chien v. Chen, 759 S.W.2d 484,495 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
154. See Austin Nat'l Bank, 531 S.W.2d at 577; Evans v. First Nat'l Bank of Beliville, 946 S.W.2d
367, 379 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); and Ertel v. O'Brien, 852 S.W.2d 17, 20
(Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied; see also Slay v. Burnett Trust, 143 Tex. 621, 187 S.W.2d 377,
388 (1945) (concluding that a trustee's duty of loyalty prohibits him from using his status to serve his
interest rather than the interests of his trust and from allowing his interests to conflict with his
obligations as a trustee).
155. See Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 787 (Tex. 2006); see
also Eastland v. Eastland, 273 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008) ("The primary
distinction between an independent administration and a dependent administration is the level of judicial
supervision over.., the executor's power. Executors in a dependent administration and other personal
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between executors and estate's beneficiaries do not lessen executors'
fiduciary duty to disclose fully and protect the beneficiaries' interests. 56
Arguably, from an insurance law perspective, it is commonsensical for
estate executors to have a higher fiduciary duty to protect and settle an
estate, and to protect beneficiaries' interests. 57 To illustrate the point,
consider, Sections 234(b)(4) and (5) in the Texas Probate Code.158 Those
sections outline the general powers of independent executors and
administrators.' 59 In pertinent part, the sections read: "The personal
representative of the estate of any person may... [i]nsure the estate against
liability in appropriate cases... [and] [i]nsure property of the estate against
fire, theft, and other hazards."' 160 Unquestionably, if executors of estates
breach their fiduciary duty and forget to insure beneficiaries' property
interests and various perils destroy those interests, the beneficiaries'
financial losses can be substantial. 16 ' Therefore, requiring executors to
conform to the highest duties of good faith and prudence is warranted.
B. Spousal FiduciaryObligations
1. GeneralSpousal Obligationsin Community and SeparateProperty
States
Generally, in both community and separate property states, "[a]
fiduciary duty exists between spouses"; and it does not terminate until the
marriage dissolves. 162 California's general rule is an excellent
representation of spousal-fiduciary rules across all states:
representatives can perform only a limited number of transactions without seeking a court's permission,
such as paying taxes, voting stocks, insuring property, and releasing liens upon full payment....
Transactions such as the purchase or exchange of property, the compounding of debts due to the estate,
or the compromise or settlement of estate claims in dispute or litigation typically require the executor in
a dependent administration to submit a written application to the court and receive a court order granting
authority to enter into the transaction. . . .Independent executors, in contrast, can enter into any
transactions deemed necessary for the good of the estate without requesting court authority after (1)the
order appointing the independent executor has been signed by the court; and (2) the inventory,
appraisement, and list of claims of the estate has been filed by the independent executor and approved
by the court."); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 234(b) (Vernon 2008).
156. See Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. 1984).
157. See Coulter v. CIGNA Pro. & Cas. Co's., 934 F. Supp. 1101, 1104-05 (N.D. Iowa 1996).

158.

§ 234(b)(4)-(5).

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Cf. Coulter, 934 F. Supp. at 1104-05. In the underlying first-party lawsuit, the estate
beneficiaries filed an insurance-related, breach of fiduciary action against the executor. Id. Allegedly,
the estate and the estate's beneficiaries "lost much of the value of the estate of James Kaster and interest
income" because the executor "fail[ed] to timely sell Kaster Insurance, in harmony with the intent of the
testator, James Kaster, [and failed to] obtain court approval for the continued operation of Kaster
Insurance"). Id.
162. See, e.g., Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 916 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.); Eltzroth and
Eltzroth, 679 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Or. App. 1984) ("Oregon courts have long recognized that a husband and
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[In] transactions between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to
the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the
actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This
confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair
dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the
other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship
subject to
63
the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners. 1

Spouses occupy a "position of peculiar confidence" for the benefit of
each other, and they are "held to the highest standards of good faith and fair
dealing."' 64 Consequently, state courts and statutes impose a considerable
number of mutual obligations on them.' 65 In particular, those obligations
may and often do involve the following: child custody and visitation, child
support, spousal support, support arrearages, division of community
property, separate property,
securing life, health and homeowners'
166
insurance, taxes and debts.
2. Additional Spousal FiduciaryObligationsin Community PropertyStates

Depending on one's source of information or analysis, there are at
least ten community property states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 167 A
wife do not deal at arms' length and have imposed a fiduciary duty of the highest degree in transactions
between them.... Because the fiduciary duty [between husband and wife] is imposed as a result of the
confidential relationship between the parties, it continues while the parties contemplate divorce as long
as the confidential relationship remains intact, and the parties are not dealing at arms' length through
separate agents or attorneys."); Knox v. Knox, 25 N.W.2d 225, 229 (Minn. 1946) (holding that a
relationship between husband and wife is confidential in its nature and fiduciary in its character); Seals
v. Seals, 590 P.2d 1301, 1304 (Wash. App. 1979) (reaffirming that before and during marriage, parties
have a fiduciary duty). See Grossnickle v. Grossnickle, 935 S.W.2d 830, 846 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1996, writ denied) (noting that the fiduciary duty between husband and wife terminates on divorce);
Seals, 590 P.2d at 1304 (reaffirming that before and during marriage, parties have a fiduciary duty to
one another in agreements which have been reached between them and that "[a] fiduciary duty does not
cease upon contemplation of the dissolution of a marriage.").
163. See In re Marriage of Ford, Nos. Al14997, Al 15857, 2008 WL 1801535, at *10 (Cal. App. 1
Dist.).
164. See Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. 1942); see also
Krapfv. Krapf, 786 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Mass. 2003) (concluding that "[p]arties to a separation agreement
stand as fiduciaries to each other, and will be held to the highest standards of good faith and fair dealing
in the performance of their contractual obligations").
165. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West 2003) (stating that the "confidential relationship [of spouses]
imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any
unfair advantage of the other").
166. See In re Marriage of Ross, 2007 WL 1632365, at *3 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.).
167. Alaska has enacted an "elective" community property statute. See ALASKA STAT. 34.77.090
(2009).
(a) A community property agreement must be contained in a written document signed by
both spouses and classify some or all of the property of the spouses as community property.
It is enforceable without consideration.
(b) A community property agreement must contain the following language in capital letters at
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the beginning of the agreement:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE VERY EXTENSIVE,
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, YOUR RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO
CREDITORS AND OTHER THIRD-PARTIES, AND YOUR RIGHTS WITH YOUR
SPOUSE BOTH DURING THE COURSE OF YOUR MARRIAGE AND AT THE TIME
OF A DIVORCE. ACCORDINGLY, THIS AGREEMENT SHOULD ONLY BE SIGNED
AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT
THIS AGREEMENT, YOU SHOULD SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE.

Id.
All property acquired by either husband or wife during the marriage is the community
property of the husband and wife except for property that is: 1. Acquired by gift, devise or
descent[;] 2. Acquired after service of a petition for dissolution of marriage, legal separation
or annulment if the petition results in a decree of dissolution of marriage, legal separation or
annulment.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211(A) (2009).
"Except as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a
married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property." CAL. FAM.
CODE § 760 (West 1994).
All other property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife is community property.
The income, including the rents, issues and profits, of all property, separate or community, is
community property unless the conveyance by which it is acquired provides or both spouses,
by written agreement specifically so providing, declare that all or specifically designated
property and the income, including the rents, issues and profits, from all or the specifically
designated property shall be the separate property of one of the spouses or the income,
including the rents, issues and profits, from all or specifically designated separate property be
the separate property of the spouse to whom the property belongs. Such property shall be
subject to the management of the spouse owning the property and shall not be liable for the
debts of the other member of the community.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906(l) (1980).
The community property comprises: property acquired during the existence of the legal
regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse; property acquired with
community things or with community and separate things, unless classified as separate
property under Article 2341; property donated to the spouses jointly; natural and civil fruits
of community property; damages awarded for loss or injury to a thing belonging to the
community; and all other property not classified by law as separate property.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 2338 (2009).
A. Property acquired during marriage by either husband or wife, or both, is presumed to be
community property.
B. Property or any interest therein acquired during marriage by a woman by an instrument in
writing, in her name alone, or in her name and the name of another person not her husband, is
presumed to be the separate property of the married woman if the instrument in writing was
delivered and accepted prior to July 1, 1973. The date of execution or, in the absence of a
date of execution, the date of acknowledgment, is presumed to be the date upon which
delivery and acceptance occurred.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-12 (West 2009).
All property, other than that stated in NRS 123.130, acquired after marriage by either
husband or wife, or both, is community property unless otherwise provided by:
1. An agreement in writing between the spouses, which is effective only as between them.
2. A decree of separate maintenance issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
3. NRS 123.190.
4. A decree issued or agreement in writing entered pursuant to NRS 123.259.
NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.220 (2009).
See Wilson v. Wilson, 201 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1947) (reaffirming the presumption that property
acquired during marriage is community property).
(a) Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to
be community property.
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careful reading of those states' statutes reveals that the respective
legislatures have codified "mandatory" or "elective" community property
rules.1 68 In addition, a few community property states have enacted so69
called "quasi-community property" statutes. 1
Put simply, these latter statutes govern the division of property
acquired while spouses were living in foreign jurisdictions. 170 State courts
apply forum law to determine whether to divide property that was
accumulated during a spouse's tenure or residence in another state or
country.1 71 Consider Texas's quasi-community property statute, which
reads in relevant part:
[T]he court shall order a division of the following real and personal
property, wherever situated, in a manner that the court deems just and
right... : (1) property that was acquired by either spouse while domiciled
in another state and that would have been community property if the
spouse who acquired the property had been domiciled in this state at the
time of the acquisition; or (2) property that was acquired by either spouse
in exchange for [such] real or personal property[.]

(b) The degree of proof necessary to establish that property is separate property is clear and
convincing evidence.
"rEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 3.003 (Vernon 2006).
Property not acquired or owned, as prescribed in RCW 26.16.010 and 26.16.020, acquired
after marriage or after registration of a state registered domestic partnership by either
domestic partner or either husband or wife or both, is community property. Either spouse or
either domestic partner, acting alone, may manage and control community property, with a
like power of disposition as the acting spouse or domestic partner has over his or her separate
property[.]
WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (2008).
(1) General. All property of spouses is marital property except that which is classified
otherwise by this chapter and that which is described in sub. (8).
(2) Presumption. All property of spouses is presumed to be marital property.
(3) Spouse's interest in marital property. Each spouse has a present undivided one-half
interest in each item of marital property, subject to all of the following:
(a) Terminable interest in deferred employment benefit plan. As provided in s.
766.62(5), the marital property interest of the nonemployee spouse in a deferred
employment benefit plan or in assets in an individual retirement account that are
traceable to the rollover of a deferred employment benefit plan terminates at the
death of the nonemployee spouse if he or she predeceases the employee spouse
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.31 (West 2009).
168. See Property Owned By the Decedent and Jointly Owned Property,SP005 ALI-ABA 37, Aug.
20-22, 2008, at 1.
169. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 63, 125, 2550; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-3-8; and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.002.
170. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 63, 125, 2550; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-3-8; and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.002.
171. ARtz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 63, 125, 2550; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-3-8; and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.002.
172. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.002(a) (Vernon 2007). A similar rule also applies to separate
property. § 7.002(b).
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California and New Mexico, however, apply their respective quasicommunity property
rules only if both spouses are domiciled in their
173
respective states.
Obviously, spouses' property interests are more intertwined, or
commingled, in community property states than in separate property states.
Therefore, in community property states, spouses arguably have an even
greater fiduciary duty not to destroy tangible marital property or waste the
community's intangible assets. But one rule is exceedingly clear: If a
spouse controls or manages community property, that spouse has a
fiduciary duty to protect the community's assets for the benefit of the other
spouse. 174 In fact, in California, a duty to protect community assets extends
beyond the marriage. 7 1 One court declared: "The spouse who controls
community property assets occupies a position of trust which is not
terminated . . .after separation. 'It is the managing spouse's fiduciary
duties to account.., for the community property
when the spouses are
76
negotiating a property settlement agreement.",,1
There is more: "Although a spouse has the right to dispose of
community property under his or her control, he may not dispose of his
spouse's interest in community funds if actual or constructive fraud
exists.' 177 Briefly explained, "fraud on the community" is a judge-made
rule that evolved from the theory of constructive fraud.1 78 Texas's courts
are likely to apply the fraud on the community rule when a deviant spouse
breaches a 79legal or an equitable duty, or violates spousal fiduciary
obligations.1
A presumption of constructive fraud arises when one spouse disposes
of another spouse's interest in community property without the latter's
knowledge or consent.180 However, to prove constructive fraud, one only
has to establish that an offender breached a legal or an equitable duty. 8 '
That breach is fraudulent as a matter of law because the breach violates a

173. See generally Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. Zavecz, No. H028146, 2005 WL 3485656, at *5 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that "a fundamental requirement before common law separate property of
the non-debtor spouse will be treated as quasi-community property is the requirement that both spouses
must have established a California domicile."); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8.
174. See Zieba v. Martin, 928 S.W.2d 782, 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ)
("A fiduciary duty exists between a husband and a wife as to the community property controlled by each
spouse.").

175. See In re Marriage of Koppelman, 159 Cal. App. 3d 627, 634 (1984).
176. Id.
177. Greco v. Greco, No. 04-07-00748, 2008 WL 4056328, at *5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 2008,
no pet.); see Loaiza v. Loaiza, 130 S.W.3d 894, 900-01 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); see also
Mazique v. Mazique, 742 S.W.2d 805, 807-08 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no writ).
178. See Zieba, 928 S.W.2d at 789.
179. Id.
180. See Jean v. Tyson-Jean, 118 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied);
see also Mazique, 742 S.W.2d at 808.
181. See Jean, 118 S.W.3d at9.
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fiduciary relationship.' 8 2 The victim does not have to prove that the
offending party had the intent to defraud.8 3 Similarly, a breach of one's
fiduciary duty in a community property union is not fraud per se, but it can
be fraud on the community.'84 For example, if a spouse wastes community
assets, that conduct qualifies as fraud on the community. 8 5 The
justification for the rule is not terribly complicated. Like actual fraud, fraud
on the community also generates adverse financial and legal consequences
86
for the innocent spouse.
Finally, courts in Texas may weigh a deviant spouse's waste of
87
community assets when deciding to divide the community estate.'
However, although a deviant spouse's fraud on the community may cause a
court to divide the estate unequally, the innocent spouse's remedies in law
are few.188 Put simply, "there is no independent tort cause of action for
wrongful disposition by a spouse of community assets."' 8 9 Consequently,
purchasing first-party insurance and insuring against the perils of a deviant
spouse can be the next best alternative for innocent spouses in community
property states. Securing indemnity insurance could also be the next best
option for victimized innocent spouses, tenants in common or tenants by the
entirety, in separate property states. 90
III. THE LEGAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN FIRST-PARTY AND THIRD-PARTY
INSURANCE CONTRACTS

Deviant fiduciaries-partners, joint venturers, parents and children,
employees, executors, officers and directors, mortgagors, and spousesshare two common characteristics: They often violate their fiduciary duties
negligently or intentionally. 19' In the course of violating their obligations,
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.;
see Zieba v. Martin, 928 S.W.2d 782, 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no
writ).
186. Id.
187. See Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. 1998); Harper v. Harper, 8 S.W.3d 782,
783-84 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
188. See Schlueter,975 S.W.2d at 589; Harper,8 S.W.3d at 783-84.
189. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 589.
190. Cf Donnan v. At. Richfield, 732 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ
denied) (declaring that no fiduciary or agency relationship exists between co-tenants or tenants in
common).
191. See Ashton v. Thompson, 18 N.W. 918, 923 (Minn. 1884) (holding that a guardian stands in a
fiduciary relation to his or her ward); see also Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 257 (Tex. 1962)
(embracing the principle that a parent owes a fiduciary duty to his child). But see Ware v. Ware, 161
P.3d 1188, 1194 (Alaska 2007) (adopting the principle that "[the presence] of a parent-child relationship
does not necessarily create fiduciary duties"); Ahlberg v. Bargo, No. 040085705, 2009 WL 659309, at
*5 (Conn. Super. 2009) (concluding that "[i]n the absence of additional factors, the mere relationship of

parent and child is insufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship"); In re Draper v. Bank of America,
N.A., 205 P.3d 698, 707 (Kan. 2009) ("For purposes of constructive fraud, the mere relationship
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deviant co-fiduciaries often destroy, reduce, or cloud their innocent coparties' pecuniary interests in various forms of shared property-jointly
owned, community, tenancy by the entirety, and tenancy in common
properties.
In the course of
Deviant fiduciaries also share another trait.
intentionally or negligently violating their fiduciary obligations, deviant cofiduciaries destroy or severely damage third-party victims' persons and
property, both tangible and intangible property. When deviant fiduciaries
injure third-parties, the innocent fiduciaries are often vicariously liable. For
example, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is
vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees when the employees
act is within their scope of employment. 192 Also, the fiduciaries in a joint
venture share a community of interest in the venture. 193 They share profits,
losses, and have a mutual right to control or direct the venture. 94 But more
relevant, joint-venture fiduciaries may be jointly195and severally liable for
each other's deviant, negligent, or intentional acts.
As mentioned at the outset, property and casualty insurers sell an array
of insurance services. 96 Arguably, most prudent fiduciaries purchase both
first and third-party insurance because innocent fiduciaries can be victims
of and vicariously liable for their deviant co-fiduciaries' negligence and/or
intentional acts. 197 Again, there are significant legal distinctions between
property and liability insurance, and between first and third-party
insurance.198 Those differences are discussed below.
A. First-partyInsurance Contracts
Marine, fire, general property, life, health, disability, floater,
automobile, and homeowners' insurance contracts are familiar forms of
first-party, residential, and commercial insurance. 99 In fact, first-party
between parent and child or between spouses does not raise a presumption of a confidential and
fiduciary relationship"); Salvner v. Salvner, 84 N.W.2d 871, 875-76 (Mich. 1957); and Hatton v. Turner,
622 S.W.2d 450, 458-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) (concluding that poor health and
evidence of trust may give rise to a confidential or fiduciary relationship between parent and child).
192. See Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998); see also St.
Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 537-38 (Tex. 2002) (concluding that the controlling factor is the
employer's right to direct and control the details of the employee's work if there is uncertainty about
whether the fiduciary was an "employer" for the purposes of vicarious liability).
193. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1997).
194. Id.
195. See Battaglia v. Alexander, 177 S.W.3d 893, 904 (Tex. 2005) (finding two professional
associations providing anesthesia services to a hospital jointly and severally liable because they were
engaged in joint venture).
196. See supra Part 1.
197. See supra Part .
198. See Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 705 (Cal. 1989).
199. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 886 (Cal. 1995) ("[A] first-party
insurance policy provides coverage for loss or damage sustained directly by the insured (e.g., life,
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insurance contracts define coverage in a manner that often confuses
ordinary insurance consumers as well as seasoned judges. 200 First, to be
covered under a property insurance contract, an insured must establish that
a certain enumerated peril(s) in the insurance contract is the "dominant
20 1
efficient cause" or the "efficient proximate cause" of the insured's loss.
If the insured cannot prove that connection, there is no coverage.20 2 Thus,
20 3
the insurer does not have to indemnify.
Quite simply, perils are "fortuitous, active, physical forces such as
lightning, wind, and explosion, which bring about [a] loss. ''2°4 There are
two types of first-party insurance: "all-risk coverage" and "specified-risk
coverage." An all-risk policy covers all risks except those specifically
excluded.20 5 Conversely, under a specified-risk contract, an insurer must

disability, health, fire, theft and casualty insurance)").
200. See Garvey, 770 P.2d at 705.
In recent years, some courts have misinterpreted and misapplied our decisions .... In so
doing, they have allowed coverage in first-party property damage cases... by
inappropriately using the... concurrent causation approach as an alternative to... efficient
proximate cause analysis ....

Such reasoning ignores ...

the important distinction between

property loss coverage under a first-party property policy and tort liability coverage under a
third-party liability insurance policy.
Id.
201. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1971) (reaffirming that
"where a loss occurs under a standard fire, windstorm and extended coverage policy.... and such loss is
contributed to by an excluded risk of the policy, the plaintiff may, nevertheless, recover if plaintiff
proves that the dominant efficient cause of the loss is the covered risk."); see also Freedman v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 300 (Cal. App. [2nd Dist.] 2009) (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Von Der Lieth, 54 Cal. 3d 1123, 1131-32 (1991)) ("Under the efficient proximate cause doctrine,
'[w]hen a loss is caused by a combination of a covered and specifically excluded risks, the loss is
covered if the covered risk was the efficient proximate cause of the loss,' but 'the loss is not covered if
the covered risk was only a remote cause of the loss, or the excluded risk was the efficient proximate, or
predominate cause.' ... The efficient proximate cause of a loss is the 'predominant' or 'most important'
cause of the loss.").
202. See Stroburg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 464 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. 1971) ("[W]e have held that
'proximate cause' as applied in insurance cases has essentially the same meaning as that applied by our
... courts in negligence cases, except that in the former the element of foreseeableness or anticipation of
the injury as a probable result of the peril insured against is not required"); Id. (quoting Fed. Life Ins.
Co. v. Raley, 109 S.W.2d 972, 974 (Tex. 1937)) ("[I]n cases where the insurance policy does not in
express terms so provide ... the insurer becomes liable for a loss unless the loss is proximately caused
by the peril insured against... Moreover ... the term 'proximate cause' as applied in insurance cases
has essentially the same meaning as that applied by our own courts in negligence cases, except that in
the former the element of foreseeableness or anticipation of the injury as a probable result of the peril
insured against is not required.").
203. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 886 (Cal. 1995) (reaffirming
that "[plroperty insurance... is an agreement... in which the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured in
the event that the insured property suffers a covered loss."); Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
784 F.2d 127, 136 (2d Cir.1986) (stating that first-party property insurance policies "provide financial
protection against damage to property").
204. See Garvey, 770 P.2d at 710.
205. Id.; see Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d 1, 7 (W. Va. 1998) ("Under an allrisk policy, recovery is allowed for all losses arising from any fortuitous cause, unless the policy
contains an express provision excluding loss from coverage.").
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indemnify only if a listed peril caused the insured's property loss. 20 6 Each
type of insurance contract may cover residences or commercial
establishments. 20 7 Or alternatively, a single all-risk or specific-risk
insurance contract may cover a variety of property interests simultaneously.
B. Third-partyInsurance Contracts-LiabilityandIndemnity Insurance
Commercial general liability policies, directors' and officers' liability
policies, errors and omissions liability agreements, various types of
automobile policies, some homeowners' policies, professional malpractice
polices, and multi-peril policies are examples of third-party insurance
contracts.20 8 Under these contracts, insurers promise to pay judgments
which the insureds become "legally obligated to pay as damages" after the
insureds injure third-party victims' persons-bodily injury"-or
property.20 9
The Supreme Court of California presented an excellent discussion of
the significant difference between third-party and first-party insurance.2 10
The court wrote:
[T]he right to coverage in the third-party liability insurance context draws
on traditional tort concepts of fault, proximate cause and duty. This
liability analysis differs substantially from the coverage analysis in the
property insurance context, which draws on the relationship between perils
that are either covered or excluded in the contract. In liability insurance,
by insuringfor personal liability,and agreeingto cover the insuredforhis
own negligence, the insurer agrees to cover the insured for a broader
spectrum of risks.211

It is important to note that third-party insurance comes in two forms:
Liability contracts and indemnity contracts.2 12 First, liability insurance
contracts have certain general characteristics: (1) coverage provisions that
outline the "named insureds" and the "risks insured against"; (2) a right-to206. Opera Boats, Inc. v. La Reunion Francaise, 893 F.2d 103, 105 (5th Cir.1990).
207. See TAG 380, LLC v. ComMet 380, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 2008) ("Commercial
property insurance is generally offered in either an all-risk policy or a named-perils policy. ... 'Namedperils' covers only specifically enumerated risks, whereas an 'all-risk' agreement generally covers all
risks of physical loss, except for those perils specifically excluded. Those losses caused by fraud or, in
some cases, by a fortuitous and unforeseen event are likewise excluded."); Ingersoll Milling Machine
Co. v. M/V Bodena, 829 F.2d 293, 307 (2d Cir. 1987) (commercial property insurance generally is
offered in the form of either an all-risk policy or a named perils policy, and under an all-risk policy,
losses caused by any fortuitous peril not specifically excluded under the policy will be covered.).
208. See Montrose Chem. Corp, 913 P.2d at 886.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., LaBatt Co. v. Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 795, 798 (rex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, no pet.).
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settle clause that gives the insurer the exclusive right to settle third-party
claims and causes; (3) a duty-to-defend phrase that requires the insurer to
secure competent legal representation for the insured and pay defense costs;
(4) a duty-to-pay clause that describes the conditions under which the
insurer will pay third-party claims; (5) an exclusion clause that outlines the
risks that the insurer refuses to accept; and (6) a clause that excludes
"intentional conduct," refers to third-party injuries which are "expected or
intended from the perspective of the insured., 213 In a nutshell, liability
insurance precludes insureds from having to use out-of-pocket money to
compensate victims for the insureds' tortious conduct. 21 4 Those out-ofpocket expenses arise when the insureds cause third-party bodily injuries, or
when insureds damage or destroy third-party property.2 15
On the other hand, indemnity insurance contracts require insurers "to
indemnify or make whole the insured after he has sustained [an] actual loss,
meaning after the insured has paid or been compelled to make a payment"
to a third-party claimant.1 6 Generally, those agreements do not require
213. See, e.g., LaBatt Co., 776 S.W.2d at 798. The language of the commercial multiperil liability
insurance contract reads:
The Company [Hartford] will pay on behalf of the insured [LaBatt] all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or
property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence and arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of the insured premises and all operations necessary or
incidental to the business of the named insured conducted at or from the insured premises
and the Company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking
damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations
of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient, but the Company shall not be obligated
to pay any claim or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the
Company's liability has been exhausted by payment ofjudgments or settlements.
Id. (emphasis added). The exclusion clause reads:
It is agreed that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property damage included
within the Completed Operations Hazard or the Products Hazard. The term "products
hazard" is defined on a different page of the policy as follows: "products hazard" includes
bodily injury and property damage arising out of the named insured'sproducts or reliance
upon a representation or warranty made at any time with respect thereto, but only if the
bodily injury or property damage occurs away from premises owned by or rented to the
named insured and after physical possession of such products has been relinquished to
others[.]
Id. (emphasis added); see, e.g., Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 152 S.W.3d 172, 181
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) ("The commercial general liability (CGL) portion of
Admiral's policy covered 'those sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of... bodily injury... caused by an occurrence.' The policy defined 'occurrence' as
Ian accident... which results in bodily injury ...neither expected nor intendedfrom the standpoint of
the Insured."') (emphasis added).
214. See Universal Underwriters Group v. Heibel, 901 A.2d 398, 403 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div.
2006).
215. Id.
216. See Fight Against Coercive Tactics Network, Inc. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1426,
1432-33 (D. Colo. 1996); see also Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 793 (3rd Cir. 1987) ("In
general, under an indemnity policy the insurer is obligated only to reimburse the insured for covered loss
that the insured himself has already paid.").
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insurers to provide a legal defense or to settle third-party claims.2 17 Insurers
sell a variety of indemnity insurance contracts, professional indemnity
plans, hospital indemnity insurance, workers compensation indemnity
plans, excess employers' indemnity policy, and industrial indemnity
insurance. Of course, directors' and officers' policies (D&O) appear to be
the most common and well known indemnity insurance contracts.
IV. THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF FEDERAL AND STATE DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS ACTS

As discussed carefully in succeeding sections, first-party insurers
frequently refuse to indemnify innocent insureds when deviant co-insured
fiduciaries waste, deplete, reduce, or destroy jointly owned or community
property interests. 21 8 Likewise, liability insurers often refuse to settle thirdparty claims on behalf of innocent co-insureds when deviant co-insured
fiduciaries injure third-parties' persons and destroy or diminish thirdparties' property interests. 21 9 Liability insurers also refuse to indemnify
innocent co-insureds after the latter use out-of-pocket funds to defend
deviant co-fiduciaries against third-party lawsuits, or to settle those claims
against deviant co-insured fiduciaries.220
Quite frequently, both property and liability insurers follow a standard
industry-wide legal protocol. First, insurers apply a very effective
procedure that can defeat innocent co-insured fiduciaries' efforts from the
start: Insurers assert that the fiduciaries did not file a notice of loss "as soon
as practicable" which prejudiced the insurers' interests. 22' Of course, if the
co-insureds filed a timely notice and it does not prejudice the interests of
the insurers,
the latter may deny a first or third-party claim on other
22 2
grounds.

217. See, e.g., Coregis Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. at 1430-31.
218. See infra Part V.
219. See infra Part VI.A.
220. See infra Part VI.B.
221. See PA, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 636-37 (Tex. 2008) (holding that "an
insured's failure to timely notify its insurer of a claim or suit does not defeat coverage if the insurer was
not prejudiced by the delay"); Prodigy Comm'ns Corp. v. Agric. Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 288 S.W.3d
374, 382 (Tex. 2009) ("In a claims-made policy, when an insured gives notice of a claim within the
policy period or other specified reporting period, the insurer must show that the insured's
noncompliance with the policy's 'as soon as practicable' notice provision prejudiced the insurer before
it may deny coverage."). But see Fin. Indus. Corp. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 285 S.W.3d 877, 878 (Tex.
2009) (declaring that "under Texas law, an insurer need not demonstrate prejudice from late notice to
avoid coverage on a claims-made policy"). See also F.D.I.C. v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1330 (5th
Cir.1994) (noting that "[t]he notice requirements in claims made policies allow the insurer to 'close its
books' on a policy at its expiration and thus to 'attain a level of predictability unattainable under
standard occurrence policies."' (quoting Bums v. Int'l Ins. Co., 709 F. Supp. 187, 191 (N.D. Cal. 1989),
aff'd, 929 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1991))).
222. See Alaska Nat. Ins. Co. v. Bryan, 104 P.3d 1, 9 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
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After the insurers deny those claims, the companies send reservation
of rights letters to innocent or deviant co-insured fiduciaries. 223 Generally,
those letters state that although the insurers believe they are not liable, they
will conduct a thorough investigation of the first or third-party claims to be
sure. 224 The letters may also state that the insurers will attempt to settle a
claim or indemnify insureds while reserving the insurers' right to challenge
the co-insured fiduciaries' alleged rights under the insurance contracts. 225
How do insurers challenge the co-insured fiduciaries? Put simply, the
liability and property insurers file declaratory judgment actions in federal or
state court.226 The insurers petition those courts to declare insurers and coinsured fiduciaries' respective rights and responsibilities under first and
third-party insurance contracts. 227 Below, a brief discussion highlights the
purpose and scope of a declaratory judgment trial.228 In addition, state and
federal courts employ a variety of equitable doctrines to construct and
interpret rights and obligations under insurance contracts. 229 Therefore, a
brief discussion of those doctrines also appears in this part.
A. Uniform DeclaratoryJudgments Act of 1922 andFederalDeclaratory
Judgments Act of 1934
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Bar Association proposed the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act. 230 The Act's stated purposes are: (1) to give state courts the
"power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations," (2) to unify the
laws of the various states, and (3) "to harmonize... federal laws and
223. See id. ("The purpose of a reservation of rights letter is not to change the contractual
relationship of the parties, but rather it is to identify the insurer's position regarding coverage and serves
to protect the parties by providing a conditional defense to the insured and protecting the insurer from a
bad faith claim if coverage is due."); see also Katerndahl v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 S.W.2d
518, 521 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. ref'd) (.'When an insurer is faced with the dilemma of
whether to defend or refuse to defend a proffered claim, it has four options: (1) completely decline to
assume the insured's defense; (2) seek a declaratory judgment as to its obligations and rights; (3) defend
under a reservation of rights or a non-waiver agreement; and (4) assume the insured's unqualified
defense.' Once a defense is taken under a valid reservation of rights, the insurer may withdraw the
defense when it becomes clear that there is no coverage under the applicable policy. The purpose of the
reservation of rights letter is to permit the insurer to provide a defense for its insured while it
investigates questionable coverage issues.") (quoting Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson,
601 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
224. See Alaska Nat. Ins. Co., 104 P.3d at 9.
225. Id.
226. See infra Part IV.A.
227. See infra Part IV.A.
228. See infra Part IV.A.
229. See infra Part 1V.A.
230. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contractsand JudicialDiscord Over Whether Liability Insurers
Must Defend Insureds' Allegedly Intentional andImmoral Conduct: A Historicaland EmpiricalReview
of Federaland State Courts' DeclaratoryJudgments 1900-1997, 47 AM. U. L REv. 1131, 1142 (June
1998).
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regulations on the subject of declaratory judgment[. ''231 "Any person
interested under a... written contract... or whose rights, status or other
legal relations are affected by a .. .contract[,] may [petition a court to
determine] any question of construction or validity arising under
the.., contract... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal
relations ....,232 Nearly all states adopted the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments3 Act of 1922, and two states enacted substantially equivalent
2
versions.
The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act was enacted in 1934.234 It
reads in relevant part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction... any court in the
United States ... may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration.... Any such declaration shall
have the force and235effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be
reviewable as such.

231. Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act §§ 1, 15.
232. Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act § 2.
233. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-220 to 6-6-232 (1935); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1831 to 12-1846
(1927); ARK. CODE ANN. §§16-111-101to16-111-111 (1953); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-51-101 to 13-51-115 (West 1923); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6501 to 6513 (1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 86.011 to 86.111 (WEST 1943); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-4-1 to 9-4-10 (1945); IDAHO CODE.
§§ 10-1201 to 10-1217 (1933); ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 735, para. 5/2-701 (SMITH-HURD 1945); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 34-4-10-1 to 34-4-10-16 (WEST 1927); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 261 to 269 (WEST 1943); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 202 (1993); LA. CIV. CODE PROC. ANN. arts. 1871 to 1883 (WEST 1948); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 5951 to 5963 (WEST 1941); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-401 to
3-415 (1944); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231A, §§ I to 9 (WEST 1945); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 555.01 to 555.16 (1933); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 527.010 to 527.140 (VERNON 1935); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 27-8-101 to 27-8-313 (1935); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 (1929); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 30.010 to 30.160 (1929); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A :16-50 to 2A:16-62 (WEST 1924); N. M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-6-1 to 44-6-15 (MICHIE 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT.. §§ 1-253 to 1-267 (19331); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 32-23-01 to32-23-13 (1923); OHIO REV. CODE ANN §§ 2721.01 to2721.15
(ANDERSON 1933); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1651to 1657 (1961); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 28.010 to 28.160 (1927); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit.. 42, §§ 7531 to 7541 (1923); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 32, § 59 (1931); R. 1. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-30-1 to 9-30-16 (1959); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-53-10 to
15-53-140 (LAW. CO-OP 1948); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-24-1 to 21-24-16 (1925); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 29-14-101 to 29-14-113 (WEST 1923); TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001 to
37.011 (WEST 1943); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-33-1 to 78-33-13 (1951); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12
§§ 4711 to4725 (1931); V.I. CODE. tit. 5, §§ 1261 to 1272 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-184to
8.01-191 (MICHIE 1922); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.24.010 to 7.24.144 (WEST 1935); W. VA. CODe
§§ 55-13-1 to 55-13-16 (1941); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 806.04 (WEST 1927); and, WYO. STAT.
§§ 1-37-101 to 1-37-115 (1923).
Although some jurisdictions have not adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act of 1922,
parties in those states may commence declaratory judgment actions under local laws. See Alaska-A.S.
22.10.020(g); California-Local Ch. I,Civ. Rule 57; Connecticut-C.G.S.A. § 52-29; Hawaii-H.R.S.
Ch. 632; Kansas-K.S.A. 60-257; Kentucky-K.R.S. § 418.040; Mississippi-M.R.C.P. Rule 57; New
Hampshire-N.H. REV. STAT. § 491:22 and New York-McKinney's CPLR § 3001.
234. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2009).
235. § 2001(a).
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Like state court justices, federal judges have a considerable amount of
discretion under the federal act and must carefully consider an array of
variables before awarding or denying a declaratory judgment.236 For
example, federal judges must weigh the following: (1) whether a
declaratory judgment would settle a dispute; (2) whether a declaration
would clarify legal relations; (3) whether the respective litigants are using a
declaratory judgment suit primarily for "procedural fencing"; (4) whether a
declaratory action would increase friction between federal and state courts;
and (5) whether a more effective legal remedy exists.237
Again, like their counterparts who hear and resolve controversies in
state courts, federal district courts have a lot of discretion to grant or deny
declaratory relief under contracts generally, and under first and third-party
insurance contracts in particular. 238 Federal appellate courts, however, may
not review those declarations unless evidence establishes some measurable
level of judicial abuse.239 Without doubt, federal judges may abuse their
discretion in numerous ways. 240 However, to decrease the likelihood of
abusing their power when litigants petition for declaratory relief, justices
should consider whether a state court occupies a superior position to resolve
a particular controversy between parties in light of the "scope [and nature]
of [a] pending state court proceeding." 24 1 If a pending state court
proceeding is a better forum to settle the issues, the district court should
dismiss the federal action because "it would be uneconomical as well as
vexatious" for the federal court to try the declaratory judgment action.242
236. See Rivet v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 Fed. Appx. 440, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also St.
Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590-91 (5th Cir. 1994) (Some additional relevant factors are:
"l) whether there is pending state action in which all matters in controversy may be fully
litigated,
2) whether plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of lawsuit filed by defendant, 3) whether plaintiff engaged
in forum shopping in bringing the suit, 4) whether possible inequities in allowing declaratory plaintiff to
gain precedence in time or to change forums exist, 5) whether the federal court is a convenient forum for
parties and witnesses, and 6) whether retaining the lawsuit in federal court would serve the purposes of
judicial economy," and 7) "whether the federal court is being called on to construe a state judicial decree
involving the same parties and entered by the court before whom the parallel state suit between the same
parties is pending.").
237. See Rivet, 316 Fed. Appx. at 448-49.
238. See, e.g., Nat'l Council on Comp. Ins. v. Paradis, No. C.A. 92-6230, 1994 WL 930908, at *9
(R.I. Super. 1994) ("Section 9-30-11 in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act gives 'broad discretion'
to this Court to decline to render a declaration of rights as requested by the plaintiff." (citing Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Burman, Inc., 120 R.I. 841, 845 (1978)); Missouri Prop. Ins. Placement Facility v.
McRoberts, 598 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that trial courts have wide discretion
to administer the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to provide relief from uncertainty and to serve
other purposes for which the Act was intended).
239. See, e.g., Huntsville Util. Dist. of Scott County, Tenn. v. Gen. Trust Co., 839 S.W.2d 397,400
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that trial court's declaratory judgment should not be disturbed on appeal
unless the trial court's declaration was arbitrary).
240. See Nat'l Council on Comp. Ins., 1994 WL 930908, at *9.
241. Cf Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491,495 (1942).
242. Id.
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B. Equitable andLegal Doctrinesfor ConstructingandInterpretingFirst
and Third-partyInsuranceAgreements
One purpose of this article is to present a plausible explanation of
federal and state courts' numerous splits over whether property and liability
2 43
insurers have a duty to indemnify innocent co-insured fiduciaries.
Arguably, there should be very few, if any, conflicting declarations because
nearly every state supreme court embraces and applies the same five
equitable doctrines to interpret first- and third-party insurance contracts. 244
More specifically, the highest courts in the overwhelming majority of
community property states have adopted the adhesion doctrine, the doctrine
of ambiguity, the plain-meaning rule, the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, and traditional rules of contract construction and
interpretation. 245 And, barring an extremely few supreme court decisions in
243. See cases infra note 245.
244. See cases infra note 245.
245. See Alaska--West v. Umialik Ins. Co., 8 P.3d 1135, 1138 (Alaska 2000) (concluding that
insurance policies are contracts of adhesion); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 26 P.3d 1074,
1080 (Alaska 2001) ("We interpret ambiguities in insurance contracts in favor of the insured"); Williams
v. Crawford, 982 P.2d 250, 253 (Alaska 1999) (deciding that court may not depart from the plain
language of an insurance contract if the contract language is unambiguous); West v. Umialik Ins. Co., 8
P.3d 1135, 1138 (Alaska 2000) (adopting the doctrine of reasonable expectations because insurance
policies are contracts of adhesion); Stordahl v. Gov't Emp. Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 66 n.7 (Alaska 1977)
(adopting the view that that insurance contracts should be construed according to their entirety.);
Arizona-Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 282-83 (Ariz. 1987) ("Arizona recognizes
that an adhesion contract is a different creature than the traditional bargained-for exchange of terms to
which the courts apply the ordinary meeting-of-the-minds contract rules."); Samsel v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
59 P.3d 281, 284 (Ariz. 2002) (stating that to determine "whether... ambiguity... should be construed
against the insurer, the language should be examined from the viewpoint of one not trained in law or the
insurance business"); Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 534, 647 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Ariz. 1982)
(declaring that insurance contracts must be construed in a manner consistent with their plain and
ordinary meaning); Steams Roger Corp. v. The Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 165, 571 P.2d 659, 662
(Ariz. 1977) (concluding that "[t]he terms of the insurance policy should be given a practical and
reasonable construction which support the intent of the parties."); Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 394-95 (Ariz. 1984) (recognizing the doctrine of reasonable
expectations); California--Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1966) (applying "the
doctrine of the adhesion contract to insurance policies."); Ensign v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 306 P.2d
448, 450 (Cal. 1957) (concluding that "in insurance law that any ambiguity or uncertainty in an
insurance policy is to be resolved against the insurer."); Aller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 900 P.2d 619,
627 (Cal. 1995) ("The rules governing policy interpretation require us to look first to the language of the
contract in order to ascertain its plain meaning or the meaning a layperson would ordinarily attach to
it."); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) (reasserting that "we generally
interpret the coverage clauses of insurance policies broadly, protecting the objectively reasonable
expectations of the insured."); Boyer v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 274 P. 57, 59 (Ca. 1929) (holding that
"[i]nsurance policies are governed by the same general rules which pertain to all contracts. There must
be a meeting of the minds."); Idaho-Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 66 P.3d 242, 245 (Idaho
2003) (repeating that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion); Clark v. Prudential Property and
Cas. Ins. Co., 66 P.3d 242, 245 (Idaho 2003) (reasserting that ambiguities in insurance contract must be
construed most strongly against the insurer); Mut. of Enunclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 912 P.2d 119, 122
(Idaho 1996) (concluding that coverage in insurance contract must be determined, as a matter of law,
according to the plain meaning of the words used where the policy language is clear and unambiguous);
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Ryals v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., I P.3d 803,805 (Idaho 2000) (rejecting the doctrine of
reasonable expectations); Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 766 P.2d 1227, 1233 (Idaho 1988) (holding that
courts must apply the general rules of contract law subject to certain special canons of construction
when interpreting insurance contracts); Louisiana-Duncan v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 747 So. 2d 656,
674 (3d Cir. 1999) (observing that "[i]t is well settled that... insurance policies are generally contracts
of adhesion."); Succession of Farmaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 805 So. 2d 1134, 1138 (La. 2002) (repeating
that "ambiguous contractual provision is construed against the insurer who furnished the contract's text
and in favor of the insured."); Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759,
763 (La. 1994) (holding that the parties' intent must "be determined in accordance with the general,
ordinary, plain and popular meaning of the words used in the policy."); La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate
Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759, 764 (La. 1994) (holding that a court should construe an insurance
contract "to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties in the light of the customs and usages of the
industry" quoting Trinity Industries, 916 F.2d 267, 269 (5th Cir. 1990)); Ledbetter v. Concord Gen.
Corp., 665 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (La. 1996) (holding that 'aln insurance policy is an agreement between the
parties and should be interpreted by using ordinary contract principles"); Nevada-Harvey's Wagon
Wheel, Inc. v. MacSween, 606 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Nev. 1980) (concluding that an insurance contract is
contract of adhesion, requiring courts to interpret it broadly and affording the greatest possible coverage
to the insured); Rubin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 43 P.3d 1018, 1020 (Nev. 2002) (reaffirming
that any ambiguity in an insurance contract must be construed against the insurer and in favor of
coverage for the insured); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Young, 832 P.2d 376, 377 (Nev. 1992) (concluding that
provisions in insurance contracts should be given their plain meaning when they are clear on their face);
Hartford Ins. Group v. Winkler, 508 P.2d 8, 13 (Nev. 1973) (reaffirming that an insurance contract must
be construed according to the ordinary, plain meaning of the terms in the contract); Farmers Ins. Exch.
v. Young, 832 P.2d 376, 379 n.3 (Nev. 1992) (holding that the reasonable expectations doctrine only
applies if the policy is ambiguous); Home Indem. Co. v. Desert Palace, Inc., 468 P.2d 19, 21 (Nev.
1970) (embracing traditional rules of contract construction to interpret insurance contracts); New
Mexico- Pribble v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 501 P.2d 255, 259 (N.M. 1972) (recognizing that insurance
contracts are adhesion contracts); Lopez v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 646 P.2d 1230, 1232 (N.M.
1982) (re-emphasizing that courts must construe ambiguous language in insurance contracts against the
insurers); Wesco Ins. Co. v. Velasquez, 540 P.2d 203, 204-05 (N.M. 1975) (reasserting that courts must
construe unambiguous insurance contracts in their usual and ordinary sense like any other contract
unless the language of the policy requires something different); W. Commerce Bank v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 732 P.2d 873, 875 (N.M. 1987) (embracing the doctrine of reasonable expectation); March v.
Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 687 P.2d 1040, 1042 (N.M. 1984) (concluding that general principles of
contract govern the construction and interpretation of insurance contracts); Texas-- Arnold v. Nat'l
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (concluding without deciding definitively
that insurance contracts are adhesion contracts because they "arise out of the parties' unequal bargaining
power" and they "allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insureds' misfortunes" during
the bargaining process); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex.
1991) (re-emphasizing that ambiguous language in an insurance contract must be construed in favor of
the insured); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 337 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Tex. 1960) (reiterating
that courts must give words appearing in insurance contracts their plain meaning when there is no
ambiguity); Kulubis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986)
("permit[ting] an innocent victim whose property has been destroyed to collect under an insurance
contract for a loss reasonably expected to be covered"); Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132,
145 n. 8 (Tex. 1994) (observing that Texas law does not recognize the doctrine of reasonable
expectation as a basis to disregard unambiguous policy provisions); Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am., 972 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. 1998) (reiterating that insurance contracts are subject to the same rules
of construction as other contracts); Washington--Mendoza v. Rivera-Chavez, 999 P.2d 29, 40 (Wash.
2000) (declaring that insurance contracts "are usually contracts of adhesion"); Vadheim v. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 734 P.2d 17, 20 (Wash. 1987) (declaring that ambiguous clauses must be construed in favor of the
insured, "even though the insurer may have intended another meaning"); Panorama Vill. Condo. Owners
Ass'n Bd. of Dirs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 26 P.3d 910, 915 (Wash. 2001) (reiterating that courts must
interpret the plain meaning of terms in insurance contracts as an average person, rather than as a
technician, would understand or interpret those terms); Keenan v. Indus. Indem. Ins. Co. of the Nw., 738
P.2d 270, 275 (Wash. 1987) (reporting that "[w]e have not adopted a 'reasonable expectations' doctrine
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separate property states, the greater majority have embraced those same
equitable doctrines-adhesion, ambiguity, reasonable expectation and
plain-meaning-along with traditional contract principles to declare rights
and obligations under insurance contracts.246
with respect to insurance policies"); Jeffries v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Am., 283 P.2d 128, 130 (Wash. 1955)
(reiterating that courts must construe insurance contracts using the general rules that apply to other
contracts); Wisconsin--Katze v. Randolph & Scott Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 341 N.W.2d 689, 691
(Wis. 1983) (refusing to declare that all insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion); Badger Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Schmitz, 647 N.W.2d 223, 234 (Wis. 2002) (reiterating that courts construe ambiguous terms in
insurance against the insurer); Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 351 N.W.2d 156, 163
(Wis. 1984) (re-emphasizing that courts must interpret an insurance contract according to its plain and
ordinary meaning as understood by a reasonable insured); Taylor v. Greatway Ins. Co., 628 N.W.2d 916,
920 (Wis. 2001) (reiterating that "the interpretation of language in an insurance policy should advance
the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage"); Wisc. Label Corp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 607 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Wis. 2000) (reiterating a settled principle that contracts of insurance "are
governed by the same rules that govern interpretation of contracts in general").
246. See Alabama--Travelers Ins. Co., Inc. v. Jones, 529 So. 2d 234, 239 (Ala. 1988) (embracing
the view that "[i]nsurance contracts continue to be contracts of adhesion under which the insured is left
little choice beyond electing among standardized provisions offered to him."); Arkansas-Parker v. S.
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 935 S.W.2d 556, 567 (Ark. 1996) (reaffirming that "[i]nsurance contracts
are adhesion contracts in the truest sense of the word."); Colorado--Huizar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 952
P.2d 342, 344 (Colo.1998) (embracing the principle that insurance policies are essentially adhesion
contracts); Delaware-State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345, 347 (Del. 1974)
(declaring that an insurance contract is an adhesion contract); Florida--Firemans Fund Ins. Co. of S.F.,
Cal. v. Boyd, 45 So. 2d 499, 501 (Fla. 1950) (declaring that "a contract of insurance prepared and
phrased by the insurer [an adhesion contract] is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and
strictly against the insurer."); Georgia--First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Am. Sandblasting Co., 477 S.E.2d 390,
392 (Ga. App. 1996) (observing that "insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, drawn by the legal
draftsman ofthe insurer."); Hawaii-State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fermahin, 836 P.2d 1074, 1077
(Haw. 1992) (embracing the proposition that "insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion.");
Illinois--Cramer v. Ins. Exch. Agency, 675 N.E.2d 897, 906 (Ill. 996) (reaffirming that insurance
contracts are contracts of adhesion); Indiana--Huff v. Travelers Indem. Co., 363 N.E.2d 985, 993 (Ind.
1977) (deciding that insurance contracts are adhesion contracts); lowa-Bankers Life Co. v. Aetna Cas.
& Surety Co., 366 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Iowa 1985) (reaffirming that an insurance policy is a contract of
adhesion); Kansas--W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Budig, 516 P.2d 939, 941 (Kan. 1973) (declaring that "[a]n
insurance contract is the prime example of an adhesion contract possessing the distinctive characteristics
of unequal bargaining strength between the . . . insurer and insured"); Kentucky--Woodson v.
Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 743 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Ky. 1987) (embracing the proposition that
insurance contracts are adhesion contracts); Maine--Ouellette v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 495 A.2d
1232, 1235 (Me. 1985) (recognizing that an insurance contract is typically a contract of adhesion);
Maryland-Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass'n, Inc., 607 A.2d 537, 539 (Md. 1992) (concluding
that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion when the insurer drafts and supplies the contract
language); Massachusetts-Santos v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 556 N.E.2d 983, 992 (Mass. 1990)
(acknowledging that standardized insurance contracts are adhesion contracts); Michigan-Powers v.
Detroit Auto Inter-Ins. Exch., 398 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Mich. 1986) (reasserting that insurance contracts
are adhesion contracts); Minnesota- Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271,
277 (Minn. 1985) (explaining and adopting the theory that insurance contracts are contracts of
adhesion); Mississippi--J & W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So. 2d 550, 551-52
(Miss.1998) (concluding that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and as such ambiguities are to
be construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer); Missouri--Robin v. Blue Cross
Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. 1982) (declaring that an insurance contract is an adhesion
contract if the insurer offered it on a "'take this or nothing' basis"); Montana--Leibrand v. Nat'l
Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 898 P.2d 1220, 1227 (Mont. 1995) (acknowledging that insurance
contracts are generally adhesion contracts); Nebraska--Milbank Ins. Co. v. Henry, 441 N.W.2d 143,
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148 (Neb. 1989) (reasserting that insurance contracts are adhesion contracts); New HampshireMagulas v. Travelers Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 608, 609 (N.H. 1974) (adopting the proposition that insurance
contracts are adhesion contracts); New Jersey--Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Florham Park v. Utica Mut.
Ins. Co., 798 A.2d 605, 610 (N.J. 2002) (reaffirming that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion);
New York-Allstate Ins. Co. v. Furman, 444 N.E.2d 996, 998, (N.Y. 1982) (emphasizing that insurance
policies are contracts of adhesion); North Carolina-Barker v. Ins. Co., 85 S.E.2d 305, 307; (N.C.
1955) (declaring that insurance policies are essentially contracts of adhesion); North Dakota-Cont'l
Cas. Co. v. Kinsey, 499 N.W.2d 574, 578 (N.D. 1993) (embracing the adhesion doctrine a one of several
theories to interpret insurance contracts); Ohio-Hounshell v. Am.States Ins. Co., 424 N.E.2d 311, 314
(Ohio, 1981) (adopting the proposition that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion);
Oklahoma-Dodson v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 812 P.2d 372, 376 (Okla. 1991) (reiterating that an insurance
policy is a contract of adhesion); Oregon-Knappenberger v. Cascade Ins. Co., 487 P.2d 80, 83 (Or.
1971) (acknowledging that an insurance contract is a contract of adhesion); Pennsylvania-Standard
Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 574 (Pa. 1983) (holding that insurance
contracts are generally contracts of adhesion); Rhode Island- Pickering v. Am. Employers Ins. Co.,
282 A.2d 584, 593 (R.I. 1971) (recognizing that most insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion,
which insurers offer to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis); South Carolina--Johnston v.
Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n of Am., 131 S.E.2d 91, 94-95 (S.C. 1963) (recognizing that
insurance contracts are primarily contracts of adhesion); South Dakota-Cheney v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 370 N.W.2d 569, 573 (S.D. 1985) (applying the doctrine of adhesion to interpret an insurance
contract); Tennessee-Bill Brown Constr. Co., Inc. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 818 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tenn.
1991) (concluding that "fa]n insurance policy is a contract of adhesion drafted by the insurer");
Utah-U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993) (declaring that "an insurance
policy is a classic example of an adhesion contract"); Vermont-State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Roberts, 697 A.2d 667, 672 (1997) (embracing the view that insurance contracts are "largely adhesive in
nature, often contain[ing] boilerplate terms that are not bargained for, not read, and not understood by
the insureds"); Virginia-Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Cassell, 1988 WL 626029, at *9 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988)
(embracing the view that "insurance agreements are classic examples of contracts of adhesion"); West
Virginia-Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495 n. 6 (W.Va. 1987)
(embracing the doctrine of adhesion to interpret insured's contractual rights and expectations); and,
Wyoming-St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255, 1258
(Wyo. 1988) (declaring that insurance policies represent contracts of adhesion where the insured has
little or no bargaining power to vary the terms).
See Alabama--Ala. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Magic City Trucking Serv., Inc., 547 So. 2d 849, 855
(Ala., 1989) (declaring that "ambiguities are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and against
the insurer, in order to provide the maximum coverage for the insured."); Arkansas--Smith v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 10 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Ark. 2000) ("It is also a cardinal rule of insurance
law that a policy of insurance is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the
insurer."); Colorado- Simon v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 842 P.2d 236, 239 (Colo.1992) (holding
ambiguity in the policy language must be construed against the drafter of the document and in favor of
the insured."); Connecticut--Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 203 Conn. 305, 309-10 (1987) (holding
that ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer when the contract language is unclear);
Delaware--Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chem. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Del. 1992)
(declaring that to the extent an ambiguity exists, courts must employ the doctrine of contra proferentum,
and construe policy language most strongly against the insurer which drafted it); District of
Columbia-Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1127 (D.C. 2001) ("[A]mbiguities in
an insurance policy are construed against the insurer ....");Florida-Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Cartmel, 100 So. 802, 803 (Fla. 1924) (holding that ambiguities in insurance contracts "must be liberally
construed in favor of the insured"); Georgia--Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 299 S.E.2d 561, 563 (Ga.
1983) ("Any ambiguities in the contract are strictly construed against the insurer as drafter of the
document ....");Hawai--Sturla, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 684 P.2d 960, 964 (Haw. 1984)
(restating that ambiguities in insurance contract are resolved against the insurer); Illinois--Healey v.
Mut. Accident Ass'n, 25 N.E. 52, 53 (IlI. 1890) ("[fIn all cases [ambiguities] must be liberally construed
in favor of the insured ....
");Indiana=--Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ind. 1996)
("Where there is ambiguity, insurance policies are to be construed strictly against the insurer.");
lowa-Gen Cas. v. Hines, 156 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1968) (holding that ambiguous terms in

100

ESTATE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 2:63

insurance contracts will be accorded a construction most favorable to the insured); Kansas-Nat'l
Inspection & Repair, Inc. v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 807, 817 (Kan. 2002) (declaring that
ambiguities must be decided in favor of the insured); Kentucky-St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Powell-Walton-Milward, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Ky. 1994) (holding that all ambiguities in
insurance policies must be construed against the insurer); Maine-Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 891 (Me. 1981) (quoting Westcott v. Allstate Ins., 397 A.2d 156, 167 (Me. 1979))
(declaring that any ambiguity in an insurance contract is construed 'strictly against the insurer and
liberally in favor of the insured ... '); Massachusetts--Cody v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 439 N.E.2d
234, 237 (Mass. 1982) (holding that ambiguous words in insurance contracts must be resolved against
the insurance company that employed them and in favor of the insured); Michigan-State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Enter. Leasing Co., 549 N.W.2d 345, 351 (Mich. 1996) (reaffirming that courts must
construe ambiguities against the insurer); Minnesota-Columbia Heights Motors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn.1979) (reiterating that ambiguities in insurance contracts must be
resolved against the insurer); Mississippi-Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So. 2d 658, 662
(Miss.1994) ("[T]he general rule [is] that provisions of an insurance contract are to be construed
strongly against the drafter."); Missouri--Meyer Jewelry Co. v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 422 S.W.2d 617,
623 (Mo.1968) (embracing the view that ambiguity in an insurance contract should be resolved against
the insurer); Montana-Bauer Ranch v. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 695 P.2d 1307, 1309
(Mont. 1985) (reaffirming that contractual ambiguities are construed against the insurer);
Nebraska-Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb. v. Martinsen, 659 N.W.2d 823, 827 (Neb. 2003) ("[A]n
ambiguous insurance policy will be construed in favor of the insured .... "); New HampshireTrombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of N.H.-Vt., 423 A.2d 980, 985 (N.H. 1980) (adopting the
proposition that an ambiguous insurance policy will be construed in favor of the insured and against the
insurer, but only where there is ambiguity in the contract); New Jersey--Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas.
Ins. Co. of Winterthur, 170 A.2d 800, 803 (N.J. 1961) ("If the controlling language will support two
meanings, one favorable to the insurer, and the other favorable to the insured, the interpretation
sustaining coverage must be applied."); New York-Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
314 N.E.2d 37, 39 (N.Y. 1974) (holding that ambiguities in an insurance policy are to be construed
against the insurer); North Carolina---Williams v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 152 S.E.2d 102, 107
(N.C. 1967) (holding that uncertainty or ambiguous language of an insurance policy must be resolved in
the insured's favor); North Dakota--Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 671 (N.D.
1977) (reasserting that ambiguous policies are construed most strongly against the insurers and in favor
of providing insurance coverage); Ohio-Faruque v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 508 N.E.2d
949, 952 (Ohio 1987) (reiterating that doubtful, uncertain, or ambiguous language in insurance contracts
must be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured); Oklahoma-N.Y.
Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 129 P.2d 71, 73 (Okla. 1942) (holding that ambiguous terms in an insurance
contract must be resolved against the insurer); Oregon--N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 22 P.3d 739, 741
(Or. 2001) (restating that courts must resolve an ambiguous term in insurance contract "by construing
the term against the drafter of the policy"); Pennsylvania-Bateman v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co., 590
A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. 1991) (reiterating that courts must construe ambiguous provisions in insurance
contracts against the insurer and in favor of the insured); Rhode Island-Sjogren v. Metro. Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 703 A.2d 608, 612 (R.I. 1997) (reasserting that courts must construe ambiguous language
in insurance contracts against will be construed against insurers and in favor of the insureds); South
Carolina-Spinx Oil Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins., 427 S.E.2d 649, 651 (S.C. 1993) ("Ambiguous or
conflicting terms in an insurance policy must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly
against the insurer."); South Dakota- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Vostad, 520 N.W.2d 273, 275
(S.D. 1994) (quoting Kremer v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 765, 767-68 (S.D. 1993))
(reiterating that courts must choose an interpretation most favorable to the insured if a provision in an
insurance policy is "fairly susceptible" to different interpretations); Tennessee-Palmer v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 614 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tenn.1981) (reiterating that courts must resolve any
ambiguity and doubt in favor of the insured when interpreting insurance contracts); Utab--Gressler v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 163 P.2d 324, 330 (Utah 1945) (endorsing the principle that ambiguous insurance
policies should "be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer"); Vermont-Noyes v.
Commercial Travelers, 215 A.2d 495, 497 (Vt. 1965) (declaring that ambiguous language in insurance
contracts will be strictly construed against the insurer); Virginia-Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v.
Dervishian, 145 S.E.2d 184, 187 (Va. 1965) (construing ambiguities against the insurer); West
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Virginia--Thompson v. State Auto. Ins. Co., II S.E.2d 849, 850 (W. Va. 1940) ("[A] cardinal rule of
construction [is] that clauses in insurance contracts should be construed liberally [in favor of] the
insured."); and Wyoming--T.M. ex rel. Cox v. Executive Risk Indem. Inc., 59 P.3d 721, 725 (Wyo.
2002) (re-emphasizing that courts must construe ambiguous terms in insurance contracts against the
insurer). But see Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life, 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Md. 1989) ("Maryland does not
follow the [ambiguity] rule, adopted in many jurisdictions, that an insurance policy is to be construed
most strongly against the insurer.").
See Alabama-State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Shady Grove Baptist Church, 838 So. 2d 1039,
1042 (Ala. 2002) ('A contract of insurance, like other contracts, is governed by the general rules of
contracts."' (quoting Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 817 So. 2d 687, 691 (Ala. 2001)));
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 311 (Ala. 1999) (quoting Lambert v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 260, 263 (Ala. 1976)) ("[T]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored ....); Little Cahaba
Coal Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 68 So. 317, 318 (Ala. 1915) ("[P]olicies of insurance, when vague,
ambiguous, or inconsistent, are generally construed with favor to the party indemnified ...[but judges
cannot wrestle] the contract from its plain meaning when reasonably construed upon an examination of
the whole instrument."); Arkansas-- Jordan v. Atl. Cas. Ins. Co., 40 S.W.3d 254, 255-56 (Ark. 2001)
(.'
[W]here terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, the policy language controls, and absent
statutory strictures to the contrary, exclusionary clauses are generally enforced according to their terms.'
...[T]he terms of an insurance contract are not to be rewritten under the rule of strict construction
against the company issuing it so as to bind the insurer to a risk which is plainly excluded .... (quoting
Vincent v. Prudential Ins. Brokerage, 970 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Ark. 1998))); Duvall v. Mass. Indem. &
Life Ins. Co., 748 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Ark. 1988) ("[A]ccident policies should be so interpreted that
provisions of the policies effectuate the reasonable expectations of the purchaser." (quoting Robert
Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law 351 (West Group) (1971))); Colorado-Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Huizar, 52 P.3d 816, 820 (Colo. 2002) ("[I]nsurance policies are contracts, which must be construed
according to their plain meaning and well-settled principles of contract interpretation."); State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Nissen, 851 P.2d 165, 168 (Colo. 1993) (recognizing the "principle of reasonable
expectations as expressed in insurance cases"); Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Colo., 831 P.2d
1307, 1309 (Colo. 1992) (ruling that the terms of an insurance "should be construed in accordance with
general principles of contractual interpretation"); Connecticut--Agosto v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 239
Conn. 549, 552 n.3 (Conn. 1996) (embracing the doctrine of reasonable expectation); Hammer v.
Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 573 A.2d 699, 704 (Conn. 1990) (concluding that courts must interpret
terms in an insurance contract according to their natural and ordinary meaning if the terms are plain and
unambiguous); Weingarten v. Allstate Ins. Co., 363 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Conn. 1975) (stressing that the
terms of an insurance policy are to be construed according to the general rules of contract construction);
Delaware--Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Del.
1992) ("Clear and unambiguous language in an insurance policy should be given its ordinary and usual
meaning."); E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 1985) ("The basic rule
of contract construction gives priority to the intention of the parties."); Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 443 A.2d 925, 927 (Del.1982) (reaffirming the doctrine of reasonable expectation); District of
Columbia-Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1131-32 (D.C. 2001) (restating the
doctrine of reasonable expectation); GLM P'ship v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 995, 998 (D.C.
2000) (reaffirming that rules of contract construction govern the interpretation of contracts); Nichols v.
N.C. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 162 A.2d 499, 501 (D.C. 1960) ("[I]f the language has but one clear meaning
that meaning will be adopted whether favorable to the insured or not." (quoting Belland v. Am. Auto.
Ins. Co., 101 A.2d 517, 518 (D.C. 1953))); Florida - Watson v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 696
So. 2d 394, 396 (Fla. 1997) ("Florida courts commonly adopt the plain meaning of words contained in
legal and non-legal dictionaries" to decipher clear and unambiguous terms in insurance contracts
(quoting Brill v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 1511, 1513 (1lth Cir. 1956))); Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Cartmel, 100 So. 802, 803 (Fla. 1924) ("[Insurance] contracts are subject to the same rules of
construction applied to other contracts ....); Georgia--Boardman Petroleum, Inc. v. Federated Mut.
Ins. Co., 498 S.E.2d 492, 494 (Ga. 1998) ("[C]ontracts of insurance are interpreted by ordinary rules of
contract construction"); Park 'N Go of Ga., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 471 S.E.2d 500, 503 (Ga.
1996) ("[W]hen the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court is to look to the
contract alone to find the parties' intent."); Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 S.E.2d 623,
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625 (Ga. 1995) ("A contract of insurance should be strictly construed against the insurer and read in
favor of coverage in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured."); Hawaii--Park v.
Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 974 P.2d 34, 38 (Haw. 1999) (embracing the position that courts must
construe insurance policy terms in accord with the reasonable expectations of a insured laypersons);
First Ins. Co. of Haw., Inc. v. State, by Minami, 665 P.2d 648, 655 (Haw. 1983) (adopting the position
that insurance policies are subject to the general rules of contract construction, and stating that the
"terms of [an insurance] policy should be interpreted according to their plain, ordinary, and accepted
sense in common speech unless it appears from the policy that a different meaning is intended);
Illinois--Luechtefeld v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 N.E.2d 1058, 1063 (III. 1995) (reaffirming that insurance
contracts be construed and enforced to accord with the objectively reasonable expectations of the
insured); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 N.E.2d 926, 930 (II1. 1991) ("Where a
policy provision is clear and unambiguous, its language must be taken in its 'plain, ordinary and popular
sense"' (quoting Hartford Accident & Idem. Co. v. Case Found. Co., 294 N.E.2d 7, 12 (Ill. 1973)));
Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat'l Bank, 154 N.E.2d 683, 689 (Ill. 1958) (embracing and outlining the
general rules of contract construction and interpretation); Indiana-Colonial Penn. Ins. Co. v. Guzorek,
690 N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ind. 1997) ("Contracts of insurance are governed by the same rules of
construction as other contracts."); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boles, 481 N.E.2d 1096, 1101 (Ind. 1985) ("[A]
contract is clear and unambiguous, the language therein must be given its plain meaning."); Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. 1985) (adopting the doctrine of reasonable
expectation); Iowa-Westfield Ins. Cos. v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 623 N.W.2d 871, 881 (Iowa 2001)
("Under the reasonable expectations doctrine 'the objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and
intended beneficiaries regarding insurance policies will be honored ....' (quoting Krause v. Krause,
589 N.W.2d 721, 727 (Iowa 1999))); Cairns v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 398 N.W.2d 821, 823
(Iowa 1987) (reasserting that "well-established principles" govern the interpretation of insurance
contracts where the intent of the parties control); Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y.,
128 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Iowa 1964) (meaning "[An insurance] contract should be construed as a whole,
and the clear and unambiguous language must be given its plain meaning."); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Horinek, 660 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Kan. 1983) ("The construction and effect of insurance contracts are
questions of law to be determined by the court."); Kansas-Bramlett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
468 P.2d 157, 159 (Kan. 1970) (holding that unambiguous terms in insurance contracts must be
construed according to their plain, ordinary and popular meanings); Kentucky--Kemper Nat'l Ins. Cos.
v. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Ky. 2002) ("We are cognizant of the general
principles of insurance contract construction .. ");
Simon v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210, 212
(Ky. 1986) (embracing the doctrine of reasonable expectation); Weaver v. Nat'l Fid. Ins. Co., 377
S.W.2d 73, 75 (Ky. 1964) ("[C]ourts cannot make a different insurance contract for the parties by
enlarging the risks contrary to the natural and obvious meaning of the existing contract."); Maine-Am.
Prot. Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 814 A.2d 989, 993 (Me. 2003) ("[T]he interpretation of an
unambiguous contract 'must be determined from the plain meaning of the language used ....
' (quoting
Portland Valve, Inc., v. Rockwood Sys. Corp., 460 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Me. 1983)); Baybutt Constr. Corp.
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 914, 921 (Me. 1983) ("The objectively reasonable expectations
of an insured will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have
negated those expectations."); Swift v. Patrons' Androscoggin Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 132 A. 745, 746 (Me.
1926) (holding that an insurance contract, like any other contract, must be construed in accordance with
the intention of the parties by examining the whole instrument); Maryland-ABC Imaging of Wash.,
Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 820 A.2d 628, 633 (Md. 2003) ("Under the objective interpretation
principle, where the language employed in a contract is unambiguous, a court shall give effect to its
plain meaning .. ");Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1383 (Md. 1997) (citing Knowles v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 832 P.2d 394,399 (N.M. 1992)) ("The reasonable expectations of the
insured can be upheld only if the repugnant clause is not given effect."); Pac. Indem. Co. v. Interstate
Fire & Cas. Co., 488 A.2d 486, 488 (Md. 1985) ("An insurance contract, like any other contract, is
measured by its terms unless a statute, a regulation, or public policy is violate thereby.");
Massachusetts-Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576, 583 (Mass. 1990)
(concluding that when interpreting an insurance policy, it is appropriate, to consider "what an
objectively reasonable insured... would expect to be covered" under the contract); Cody v. Conn. Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 439 N.E.2d 234, 237 (Mass. 1982) (concluding that insurance contracts must be construed
like other contracts, "'according to the fair and reasonable meaning of the words in which the agreement
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of the parties is expressed' (quoting MacArthur v. Mass. Hosp. Serv. Inc., 180 N.E.2d 449, 450 (Mass.
1962))); Freelander v. G. & K. Realty Corp., 258 N.E.2d 786, 788 (Mass. 1970) (adopting the view that
words will be given their plain or well established meaning where the language in an insurance contract
is not ambiguous); Michigan-Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keillor, 537 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Mich. 1995) ("A
court must look at the policy language from an objective standpoint and determine whether an insured
could have reasonably expected coverage."); Upjohn Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Mich.
1991) (adopting the traditional rules of contract to interpret insurance contracts and enforcing
contractual terms as written); Kingsley v. Am. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 242 N.W. 836, 836 (Mich. 1932)
(reaffirming the view that terms in an insurance contract must be construed as written when the policy is
plain and easily understood); Minnesota-Kersten v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 N.W.2d 869, 873
(Minn. 2000) ("General contract principles govern the construction of insurance policies and insurance
policies are interpreted to give effect to the intent of the parties. Jenoff, Inc. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 558
N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. 1997) (reiterating that terms in an insurance policy "must be given their plain,
ordinary, or popular meaning" if they are not specifically defined (quoting Smith v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 353 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Minn. 1984))); Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co.,
366 N.W.2d 271, 276-77 (Minn. 1985) (explaining, embracing, and applying the doctrine of reasonable
expectation); Mississippi-Blackledge v. Omega Ins. Co., 740 So. 2d 295, 298 (Miss.1999) (holding
that courts must give terms used in insurance policies their ordinary and popular definition); Sessoms v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 634 So. 2d 516, 519 (Miss. 1993) ("Like all other contracts, insurance policies which
are clear and unambiguous are to be enforced according to their terms as written."); Brown v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Miss., Inc., 427 So. 2d 139, 141 (Miss.1983) ("The objectively reasonable
expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations."); Missouri--Peters v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 853 S.W.2d 300, 301-02 (Mo. 1993)
("[General rules for interpretation of other contracts apply to insurance contracts as well."); Rodriguez
v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. 1991) (holding that the reasonable
expectation doctrine applies only to satisfy insureds' objective reasonable expectations under an
adhesion contract of insurance); State ex rel. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bland, 185 S.W.2d 654, 656
(Mo. 1945) (holding that unequivocal language in an express, written insurance contract must be given
its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning); Montana--Truck Ins. Exch. v. Walter, 828 P.2d 1384, 1386
(Mont. 1992) (holding clear and explicit language governs the interpretation of insurance contracts);
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820, 824 (Mont. 1983) (adopting the doctrine of reasonable
expectations); Anaconda Co. v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 616 P.2d 363, 367 (Mont.
1980) ("The general rules of contract law apply to an insurance policy."); Nebraska-Daehnke v. Neb.
Dept. of Soc. Servs., 557 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Neb. 1996) ("The terms of a contract are to be accorded their
plain and ordinary meaning as ordinary, average, or reasonable persons would understand them.");
Amco Ins. Co. v. Norton, 500 N.W.2d 542, 544 (Neb. 1993) ("[A]n insurance policy is to be construed
as any other contract to give effect to the parties' intentions at the time the contract was made .... ");
Kracl v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 374 N.W.2d 40, 44 (1985) (Neb. 1985) (holding that an insured's
reasonable expectation of coverage must be measured by the clear terms of the insurance contract as
understood by the reasonable, ordinary person); New HIampshire-Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. v.
Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co., 788 A.2d 259, 262 (N.H. 2001) (stressing that terms of an insurance contract
must be accorded their plain meaning as indicated by the words and their relation to each other as a
whole); Magulas v. Travelers Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 608, 609-10 (N.H. 1974) (embracing the view that
courts should take into consideration the reasonable expectations of the insured when interpreting and
enforcing an insurance contract); Stone v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 45 A. 235, 236 (N.H. 1899)
(declaring that courts must employ the same general rules that are applicable to other written contracts
when construing insurance policies); New Jersey---Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 775 A.2d 1262, 1268
(N.J. 2001) (restating that a court must first attribute to the words their plain and ordinary meaning when
interpreting the language of an insurance contract); Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d
22, 26 (N.J. 1961) (adopting the doctrine of reasonable expectation to ensure that courts will construe
insurance contracts liberally in favor of insureds); Kindervater v. Motorists Cas. Ins. Co., 199 A. 606,
608 (N.J. 1938) (concluding that the rule adopted for constructing of other contracts is applicable for
interpreting the language of an insurance contract); New York-Teichman v. Cmty. Hosp. of W.
Suffolk, 663 N.E.2d 628, 630 (N.Y. 1996) (reiterating that courts must give unambiguous terms their
plain and ordinary meaning); Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (N.Y. 1978)
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(declaring that an insurance contract must be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the
construction of any written contract and enforced according to the intent of the parties as expressed in
the language in the contract); Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 120 N.E. 86, 87 (N.Y. 1918)
(declaring that courts must consider the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary business
person when interpreting and enforcing terms of insurance contracts); North Carofina--Great Am. Ins.
Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 279 S.E.2d 769 (N.C. 1981) (adopting the reasonable expectations doctrine
and declaring an insurance contract must be interpreted according to the reasonable expectations of the
insured); Woods v. Ins. Co., 246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (N.C. 1978) ("As with all contracts, the goal of
construction is to arrive at the intent of the parties when the policy was issued."); Walsh v. United Ins.
Co. of Am., 44 S.E.2d 817, 820 (N.C. 1965) ("[W]here the language of an insurance policy is plain,
unambiguous, and susceptible of only one reasonable construction, the courts will enforce the contract
according to its terms."); North Dakota-Aid Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Geiger, 294 N.W.2d 411, 414-15
(N.D. 1980) (holding that plain, ordinary meaning of undefined term must guide courts' interpretation of
insurance contracts); N.W.G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179, 181 (N.D. 1994)
(reaffirming that insurance contracts construed as other contracts to give effect to the mutual intention of
the parties when the parties formed the agreement); Ohio--Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 436
N.E.2d 1347, 1348 (Ohio 1982) (holding that courts should employ general rules of contract
construction and interpretation to interpret insurance contracts); Olmstead v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co.,
259 N.E.2d 123, 126 (Ohio 1970) (holding that courts may not change meaning of terms inan insurance
contract when words have a plain and ordinary meaning, unless the plain meaning would lead to an
absurd result); Oklahoma-Cranfill v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 49 P.3d 703, 706 (Okla. 2002) (reaffirming
that holding that plain, ordinary and popular meanings of unambiguous terms must guide courts'
interpretation of insurance contracts); Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861,
870 (Okla. 1996) (adopting the doctrine of reasonable expectation); Carraco Oil Co. v. Mid-Continent
Cas. Co., 484 P.2d 519, 521 (Okla. 1971) ("A policy of insurance should be construed as every other
contract, that is, where not ambiguous, according to its terms."); Oregon-Botts v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 585 P.2d 657, 659 (Or. 1978) (concluding that an insurance policy should be interpreted
according to the understanding of the ordinary purchaser); Weidert v. State Ins. Co., 24 P. 242, 245 (Or.
1890) ("Contracts of insurance must have effect like all other written contracts. The intention of the
parties must govern and control."); Pennsylvania-Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 813
A.2d 747, 750 (Pa. 2002) ("[C]ourts must give plain meaning to a clear and unambiguous contract
provision unless to do so would be contrary to a clearly expressed public policy."); Madison Constr. Co.
v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999) (adopting "well-settled principles of
contract interpretation" to interpret insurance contracts); Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d
1346, 1351 (Pa. 1978) (holding that courts must assure that insurance consumers' reasonable
expectations are fulfilled when courts interpret insurance contracts); Rhode Island-Am. Commerce
Ins. Co. v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185, 1195 (R.I. 2002) (repeating that courts must read insurance contracts
literally, and give each word its plain and ordinary meaning when terms are not ambiguous);
Colagiovanni v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 190 A. 459, 460 (R.I. 1937) (declaring that insurance contract are
controlled by the same principles of law that are applicable to other contracts); South CarolinaRhame v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 121 S.E.2d 94, 96 (S.C. 1961) (holding that insurance contracts,
like other contracts, must be construed according to the terms which the parties have used, and
reaffirming that unambiguous terms in insurance contracts must be construed according to their plain,
ordinary and popular meaning); South Dakota--Biegler v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 592,
599 (S.D. 2001) (restating that language of an insurance contract must be construed according to the
plain meaning of its terms); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Wyant, 474 N.W.2d 514, 518 (S.D. 1991) (holding
that the interpretation and construction of insurance contracts are controlled by the same rules applicable
to contracts generally); Tennessee-McKimn v. Bell, 790 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tenn. 1990) (reiterating
that insurance policies are subject to the same rules of construction that are used to interpret other types
of contracts); Parker v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 582 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn., 1979)
(reaffirming that courts must employ the usual and ordinary meaning of language to interpret insurance
contracts); Utah-Marriot v. Pac. Nat'l Life Assur. Co., 467 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1970) ("[IUt is proper
to look to the ordinary usage and connotations of words to determine the meaning intended."); Pac.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 161 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1945) ("An insurance
contract like any other contract must be interpreted in the light of the intention of the parties.");
Vermont-State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 697 A.2d 667, 672 (Vt. 1997) (declaring that
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determining the insured's reasonable expectations is important to help determine the scope of coverage
under insurance contracts); Dunsmore v. Coop. Fire Ins. Ass'n of Vt., 298 A.2d 853, 855 (Vt. 1972)
("Words in a[n insurance] contract will be assigned their common meaning and usage where they can be
sensibly applied to the subject matter."); Noyes v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 215
A.2d 495, 497 (Vt. 1965) ("Like other contracts, [insurance contracts] must receive practical,
reasonable, and fair interpretations, consonant with the apparent object and intent of the parties .... ");
Virginia--London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. C.B. White & Bros., 49 S.E.2d 254, 259 (Va. 1948)
(embracing the theory that courts must give words and phrases in an insurance contract their usual and
ordinary meaning); Virginia--Home Ins. Co. v. Gwathmey, 1 S.E. 209, 211 (Va. 1887) (adopting the
principle that insurance policies are contracts whose terms must be interpreted in accordance with
general principles of construction); West Rifle v. Home Finders Assocs., Inc., 517 S.E.2d 313, 318-19
(W. Va. 1999) (adopting the doctrine of reasonable expectations to interpret only ambiguous language in
insurance contracts); McGann v. Hobbs Lumber Co., 145 S.E.2d 476, 481 (W. Va. 1965) ("[L]ike other
contracts, must receive a practical and reasonable interpretation consonant with the apparent object and
intent of the parties."); Stone v. Nat'l Sur. Corp., 125 S.E.2d 618, 619 (W. Va. 1962) (reiterating that
courts must accord unambiguous terms in an insurance contract their plain meaning without attempting
to construct or interpret terms); Wyoming--Gainsco Ins. Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 53 P.3d 1051, 1066
(Wyo. 2002) (reiterating that court must interpret insurance contracts as they interpret other contracts
and use the plain meaning of words "that a person in the position of the insured would understand them
to mean" when courts interpret insurance contracts); see also Oregon-Collins v. Farmers Ins. Co. of
Or., 822 P.2d 1146, 1161 (Or.1991) (Unis, J., dissenting) ("This court has not explicitly adopted the
doctrine of 'reasonable expectation,' at least by name, in any of its forms. Neither has this court
explicitly rejected it. Language in at least two of our recent opinions, however, suggests support for the
doctrine."); Rhode Island-Taft v. Cerwonka, 433 A.2d 215, 218 (R.I. 1981) (recognizing that insureds
have expectation of coverage after paying insurance premiums but failing to explicitly adopt the doctrine
of reasonable expectation); Tennessee--Harrell v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 937 S.W.2d 809, 810
(Tenn. 1996), (recognizing that insureds have some expectations under an insurance policy but failing to
adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectation formally); Virginia--CompareSt. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. S.L. Nusbaum & Co., Inc., 316 S.E.2d 734, 736 (Va. 1984) ("[R]easonable men ... may reach
reasonable, but opposite, conclusions .... [Nevertheless it] was incumbent upon the insurer to employ
exclusionary language clear enough to avoid any such ambiguity ....
"), with Morrow Corp. v.
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 441,451 (E.D. Va. 2000) ("An ambiguous term must be
accorded the meaning that a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have given to the
term and that is consistent with the reasonable expectations of a person in the insured's position, for it is
well-settled in Virginia and in all other jurisdictions that ambiguities in meaning are resolved in favor of
the insured."). But see Florida-Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So.
2d 1135, 1140 (Fla. 1998) (refusing to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectation); Idaho-Casey v.
Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Idaho 1979) (embracing traditional rules of contract
construction instead of reasonable expectation doctrine); Kansas-Halsey v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., Inc., 61 P.3d 691, 700 (Kan. 2003) ("[T]he Michigan court prefaced its analysis by affirming the
reasonable expectations doctrine.., which is not the law in Kansas .. "); North Dakota-RLI Ins. Co.
v. Heling, 520 N.W.2d 849, 855 (N.D. 1994) ("The doctrine of reasonable expectations has yet to be
accepted by a majority of this court .. "); Ohio-Wallace v. Balint, 761 N.E.2d 598, 606 (Ohio 2002)
("[T]here is not yet a majority on this court willing to accept the reasonable-expectations doctrine.");
South Carolina-Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mangum, 383 S.E.2d 464, 467 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (reporting
that the reasonable expectations doctrine "has never been accepted by the Supreme Court of this State");
South Dakota-Dakota, Minn. & E.R.R. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 639 N.W.2d 513, 514 (S.D. 2002)
("'[Tihe doctrine of reasonable expectations has never been adopted by South Dakota .... ' (quoting
S.D. State Cement Plant Comm'n v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 616 N.W.2d 397, 407 (S.D. 2000)));
Utah-Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1992) (rejecting the concept
of the reasonable expectations doctrine); Wyoming--Ahrenholtz v. Time Ins. Co., 968 P.2d 946, 950
(Wyo. 1998) ("We declined to apply the reasonable expectations theory of recovery in insurance
cases."); Gregory T. Lawrence, Sheets v. Brethren Mutual: Maryland's High Court Misconstrues CGL
To Cover Excluded Economic Loss CausedBy Negligent Misrepresentation,27 U. BALT. L. REv. 189,
194 n.24 (1997) (reporting that reasonable expectations that Maryland courts do not apply the doctrine
of reasonable expectations).
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Stated briefly, the adhesion doctrine requires courts to interpret
questionable clauses in first and third-party insurance contracts in favor of
the insureds.24 7 The justification is quite commonsensical.
Courts
generally recognized the following: (1) insurers draft and supply the terms
under various provisions in insurance contracts, which are usually
"boilerplates" or standardized forms; (2) insurers typically offer insurance
on a "take-it-or-leave-it-basis," leaving insurance applicants with no viable
options; and (3) insureds and insurers' bargaining positions are generally
unequal
because insurers occupy the superior positions as a matter of
8
law.

24

Generally, under the doctrine of ambiguity, courts must interpret or
construe ambiguous words and phrases in first and third-party insurance
contracts against insurers and in favor of insureds. 249 But some supreme
courts in community and separate property states require lower courts to
construe insurance contracts "strongly" or "strictly" in favor of insureds.25 °
Moreover, courts must examine and interpret terms in first and third-party
insurance agreements from the perspectives of laypersons, who have not
received any formal legal training or who have no experience in the
insurance industry.2 51 Quite simply, courts must always construe
ambiguous language in favor of an insured and declare that the agreement
covers the insured's property or person, if the insurance agreement's
"controlling language" has two equally plausible interpretations; one that
favors the insured and the other one that favors the insurer.2 52
Courts also will interpret first and third-party insurance contracts quite
broadly to protect the "objectively reasonable expectations of the
insureds.''25 3 For example, Louisiana courts must construe an insurance
contract to satisfy insureds' reasonable expectations by considering and
using customary practices within the insurance industry. 2 4 In Georgia, an
insurance agreement must be read strictly in favor of coverage to satisfy
insureds' reasonable expectations of the insured." 2s5 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court of Maine issued an arguably even more pro-insureds rule,
holding that the insureds' objectively reasonable expectations must be
honored even though painstaking investigation of various contract clauses

247. See supra note 245.
248. See W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Budig, 516 P.2d 939, 941(Kan. 1973); Collier v. MD-Individual
Practice Ass'n, 607 A.2d 537, 539 (Md. 1992); Pickering v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 282 A.2d 584, 593
(R.I. 1971).
249. See supra notes 245 and 246.
250. See supra notes 245 and 246.
251. See Samsel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 59 P.3d 281,284 (Ariz. 2002).
252. See Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co. of Winterthur, 170 A.2d 800, 803 (N.J. 1961).
253. See AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990).
254. See La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759, 764 (La. 1994).
255. See Roland v. Ga.Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 S.E.2d 624, 625 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
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might negate those expectations.25 6 Perhaps the Supreme Court of New
Mexico presents the better summary of the reasonable expectation doctrine:
To determine an insured's reasonable expectation under an insurance
contract, "the test is not what the insurer intended its words to mean, but
what a reasonable person in the insured's position would have understood
257
them to mean.,

When interpreting first and third-party insurance contracts, the
doctrine of plain meaning requires courts to consider and apply the plain,
258
ordinary, and popular meaning of questionable words and phrases.
Stated slightly differently, the doctrine of plain meaning ensures that
insurance contracts are construed as a whole and that courts apply the plain
2 59
meaning to fairly clear or unambiguous language in the contracts.
Finally, in Texas and in all states, insurance contracts are subject to the
same rules of construction as other contracts. 260 Therefore, courts also must
construe first and third-party insurance contracts by examining the entire
contract and weighing the intent of the parties. 6' Simply put, when
interpreting and construing insurance agreements, courts may not ignore
settled common law rules that govern all bargained-for-exchange
contracts.26 2
V. CONFLICTING STATE AND FEDERAL COURT DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS-WHETHER PROPERTY INSURERS HAVE A DUTY TO
INDEMNIFY INNOCENT CO-INSURED FIDUCIARIES UNDER FIRST-PARTY
INSURANCE CONTRACTS

Debatably, since the vast majority of state supreme courts embraced
the same equitable and legal doctrines to construe and interpret first and
third-party insurance contracts, the likelihood of insurers or innocent coinsured fiduciaries receiving fairly predictable rulings or declaratory relief
should not be a major issue. 263 Certainly innocent co-insured fiduciaries'
likelihood of receiving declaratory relief should not correlate in any
meaningful way with, for example: (1) whether those fiduciaries live in
community or separate property jurisdictions; (2) whether they reside in the
Fifth or Ninth Circuit; or (3) whether innocent co-insured fiduciaries are

256. See Baybutt Constr. Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 914, 921 (Me. 1983).
257. See W. Commerce Bank v. Reliance Ins. Co., 732 P.2d 873, 875 (N.M. 1987).
258. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Il1. 1991).
259. See Iowa Nat. Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 128 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Iowa 1964).
260. See infra note 288.
261. See Stordahl v. Gov't Emp. Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 64, 66 (Alaska 1997); see also Steams Roger
Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 571 P.2d 659, 662 (Ariz. 1977).
262. See Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 766 P.2d 1227, 1233 (Idaho 1988).
263. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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husbands and wives, executors and estate's beneficiaries, or some other
combination.2 4
Yet, as revealed in this part, both federal and state courts are seriously
divided over whether national and state-based property and liability insurers
must indemnify innocent co-insured fiduciaries.2 65 These divisions among
federal courts of appeals and state courts have a long history. 266 To be sure,
such conflicts can generate a considerable amount of uncertainty among
insurers and innocent fiduciaries. 267 Furthermore, the duty-to-indemnify
splits reported below arguably reduce significantly innocent co-insured
fiduciaries' abilities to predict their likelihood of success in declaratory
judgment trials. 68 Arguably, that limitation causes fiduciaries to waste
resources needlessly, re-litigating the same duty-to-indemnify question in
state and federal courts.269
A. Whether PropertyInsurersHave a Duty to Indemnify Innocent
Co-InsuredSpouses
1. Conflicting Declarationsand Rulings in Community Property States
Among Texas's courts, conflicting rulings over innocent co-insured
spouses' rights under first-party insurance contracts began more than a half
century ago with the Waco Appellate Court's decision in Jones v. Fidelity
& Guaranty Insurance Corp.270 In Jones, Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance
Corporation (Fidelity) insured Edward and Annie Mae Jones' community
property under a standard fire insurance contract. 271 The insured property
was the co-insured couple's homestead.272
The policy limit was $1,500, and under the terms of the agreement,
Fidelity promised to indemnify the co-insured spouses if fire was the
dominant proximate cause of their destroyed community property.27 3
However, the first-party insurance contract contained several conditions
subsequent.2 74 One condition stated that the insured's "fraud or false
swearing" would void the entire policy. 275 The other stated that Fidelity
would not indemnify if a fire destroyed the spouses' community property
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See discussion supra Part UI.A-B.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See discussion supra Part N.B.
See discussion infra Part V.A.
See discussion supra Part V.A-B.
See discussion supraPart IV.A-B.
Jones v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1952, writ

ref'd).

271. Id. at 282.
272. Id.
273.

Id. at 281.

274. Id.
275. Id.
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"directly or indirectly" and the insured failed "to use
all reasonable means
'
to save and preserve the property at and after a loss. 276
While the community property was insured, Annie divorced her
husband.2" The disposition of the community property, however, did not
appear in the divorce decree. 278 After the divorce, "Edward Jones
feloniously burned the insured building," without Annie Mae's participation
or prior knowledge of the arson.279 Citing her interest in the destroyed
community property, she asked Fidelity to cover her losses. 280 Fidelity
refused, asserting that it had no duty to indemnify
because Edward's
281
criminal act voided or canceled the entire policy.
The Waco Court of Appeals embraced Fidelity's argument and
concluded that the insurer had no contractual duty to indemnify Annie Mae,
the innocent co-insured spouse. 282 To rect
reach that conclusion, the appellate
court conduced an arguably two-step analysis.283 First, citing settled law,
the appellate court observed:
Fraudulent losses are generally [excluded under] fire insurance contracts
upon grounds of public policy and morals. Accordingly, [an insured's]
voluntary and intentional burning of insured property . . . does not
ordinarily give rise to a cause of action for the recovery of loss resulting
from the fire, even though
such loss is not expressly excepted from the
2
coverage of the policy.
For sure, Annie was a co-insured spouse under the fire insurance
contract.285 However, she was totally innocent because she did not torch
the community property.286 Therefore, to hold that she could not recover
under the insurance contract, the Waco Appellate Court had to find a way to
tarnish Annie's innocence with her divorced husband's deviance.287 To
help achieve that end, the court of appeals applied traditional rules of
contract construction and interpretation. 288 First, the court examined the

276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 282.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 281-82.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 281.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 282. "If such was not the clearly expressed intention of the parties as evidenced by the
language used in the policy ....then ... courts in construing the same should look to the situation of
the parties as it existed at the time when the contract was made." Id.
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"clear" language in the contract to determine the insureds' and the insurer's
intent. 89
Second, after concluding that the parties' intentions were mutual, the
Waco Court of Appeals declared that Edward's or Annie's "contingent right
... to recover anything [under the fire insurance contract] ...was a joint
right which inured to the mutual benefit of both [spouses]. ' 90
Consequently, the deviant as well as the innocent spouse had a joint,
contractual obligation "to use all reasonable means to save and preserve the
insured property at and after a loss. 2 9 ' Because innocent Annie breached
her contractual duty to protect the community property from her deviant
husband's destructive activities, the property insurer had no duty to
indemnify her.292
To augment its breach-of-contractual-obligation explanation, the Waco
Court of Appeals also used a property interest analysis to reach the same
conclusion.293 Citing Texas's settled marital property rights rules, the court
of appeals concluded that if Fidelity indemnified either the deviant or
innocent co-insured spouse under the terms of the insurance contract, the
proceeds "would have been community property ... as long as [Edward
and Annie were] husband and wife. ' 294 That fact would remain even if one
were to characterize the insurance proceeds as being a joint, several, or
divisible interest.295 The court of appeals also observed that even after the
probate court granted Annie's request for a divorce without dividing the
community property, the deviant husband still had property rights.296
Therefore, if Fidelity was forced to indemnify Annie for her losses after the
297
divorce, deviant Edward still would have access to the insurance money.
The reason is not complicated. Under settled Texas's marital property laws,
innocent Annie and her deviant husband continued
"to be joint owners of
2 98
common.
in
tenants
as
property...
insured
the

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. "Being husband and wife when they accepted the policy insuring their community
property, each was acting with the other in a joint undertaking for the common benefit of both at the
time they entered into the contract of insurance." Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.

296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. (citing Kirkwood v. Domnan, 16 S.W. 428,429 (Tex. 1891, no writ).
"We think... that the husband's interest in the property can be... only in the divorce suit,
and as a part of the decree of divorce. It not having been... done, the former husband and
wife stood towards each other, after the decree of divorce, as if they had never bome that
relation to each other. They then owned the property as tenants in common, and subject to
all the rules and regulations of strangers bearing to each other that relation."
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After Jones, first-party property insurers and innocent co-insured
spouses presented the same question before two different appellate
courts. 299 Those tribunals reached the same conclusion, although citing
different reasons.) ° In Bridges v. Commercial StandardInsurance Co., the
Eastland Court of Appeals embraced some of the court's reasoning in Jones
and declared that an innocent co-insured spouse may not recover under a
property insurance contract if the deviant co-insured spouse destroys or sets
fire to jointly owned or community property.3 °' In Western Fire Insurance
Co. v. Sanchez, the Tyler Court of Appeals declared that public policy
prevents an innocent insured wife from recovering under a fire insurance

contract after a deviant husband sets fire to a homestead. 0 2
In light of the appellate courts' rulings in Jones, Bridges, and Sanchez,
Texas's law was clear and fairly predictable for nearly thirty-five years:
First-party property insurers had no contractual duty to indemnify innocent
co-insured spouses after deviant spouses destroyed jointly owned or
community property.30 3 However, in 1986, the Texas Supreme Court
decided Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau UnderwritersInsurance Co. without
rejecting any portion of the holdings in Jones, Bridges, and Sanchez.3 4
Briefly, in Kulubis, John and Betty Kulubis were married and lived in
Betty's mobile home.30 5 Betty, the innocent co-insured spouse under the
fire insurance contract, decided to get a divorce and served a divorce
citation to John. 0 6 In a fit of rage, "John set fire to the mobile home,
destroying it and all of the personal property inside. 30 7 Betty asked the
insurer to compensate her for her share of the destroyed property.30 8 The
insurer refused, asserting that it had no duty to indemnify. 309
The Texas Supreme Court ruled against the property insurer.31 0 Citing
Betty's "reasonable expectations," the supreme court declared that she
could recover her share of the insurance proceeds. 3 " In reaching that
conclusion, the court stated "that the proper test to be applied was what a
reasonable person would have understood the fire insurance policy to
299. See W. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 671 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Bridges v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 252 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952,
no writ).
300. Cf Sanchez, 671 S.W.2d at 512 with Bridges, 252 S.W.2d at 669.
301. Bridges, 252 S.W.2d at 512 (citing Jones v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Corp, 250 S.W.2d 281,282 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1952, writ ref'd)).

302. Sanchez, 671 S.W.2d at 669.
303. See, e.g., Sanchez, 671 S.W.2d at 666; Bridges, 252 S.W.2d at 511; Jones, 250 S.W.2d at 282.
304. Kulubis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986, writ
granted).
305. Id. at 954.
306. Id.
307. Id.

308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311.

Id. at 955.
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'
mean."312
Citing public policy, the Kulubis court also held that innocent coinsured 313
Betty had a contractual right to recover her share of the insurance
money.
In dicta, the Texas Supreme Court embellished its reasonable
expectation and public policy rulings by highlighting some commonsensical
observations. 4 First the supreme court noted that Texas Farm Bureau
would be unjustly enriched by avoiding its contractual obligation if the
court barred Betty's recovery.3 15 Second, preventing innocent Betty's
recovery would impute the estranged and deviant husband's wrongdoing to
Betty, the intended and actual victim. 316 Third, the Texas Supreme Court
noted that allowing Betty, a completely innocent co-insured spouse, to
recover would not be "a fraud on the insurance company., 317 Finally, the
supreme court observed that innocent Betty had a separate property interest
in the mobile home, rather than a community property interest.3 18
Consequently, the deviant co-insured and estranged husband would not
have benefitted directly by allowing Betty to recover her share of the
insurance proceeds.3 19
The declaration and five public policy considerations in Kulubis
arguably comprised the settled law in Texas for a while.320 But a careful
review of the entire eleven year period after Kulubis reveals that Texas's
appellate courts were seriously divided over whether deviant spouses'
destruction of community or jointly owned property bars innocent spouses'
recovery of insurance proceeds. 32' During that eleven-year span, the
Corpus Christi and Amarillo Courts of Appeals decided, respectively, Auto.
Insurance Co. of Harford Connecticut v. Davila and Travelers Cos. v.
Wolfe. 322 Both the Davila and Wolf appellate courts concluded that firstparty property insurers have a duty to indemnify innocent co-insured
spouses.323

312.

Id. at 954 (citing Hoyt v. N.H. Fire Ins. Co., 29 A.2d 121, 123 (N.H. 1942)).

313.

Id. at 955.

314.
315.
316.

Id.
Id.
Id.

317.

Id.

318. Id. The mobile home was not community property because Betty's parents had given it to
Betty and her estranged husband. Id. See also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (stating that all property a
spouse acquires by gift shall be the separate property of that spouse).
319. Id.
320. Id. Again, the five policy considerations were as follows: (1) preventing a wrongdoer from
benefitting from wrongdoing; (2) meeting the reasonable expectations of an innocent co-insured;
(3) preventing fraud on the insurance company; (4) preventing the insurance company's unjust
enrichment; and (5) preventing a deviant spouse's criminal acts from being imputed to innocent
victim-the co-insured innocent spouse. Id.
321. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 322-54.
322. Travelers Cos. v. Wolfe, 838 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ); Auto. Ins. Co.
of Hartford Conn. v. Davila, 805 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
323. See Davila, 805 S.W.2d at 911 (upholding the jury's verdict in favor of co-insured spouses

2009]

FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS' DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

113

On the other hand, in Saunders v. Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance
Co. and Chubb Lloyds Insurance Co. of Texas v. Kizer, the courts' rulings
were decidedly different for the innocent co-insured spouses. 324 More
specifically, in Saunders, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the
property insurer had a reasonable basis, as a matter of law, to deny the
innocent co-insured spouse's first-party claim. 325 The insurer had a legal
foundation to support its decision, even though the allegedly deviant coinsured husband was acquitted of setting fire to the spouses' community
property home.32 6
In Kizer, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld the jury's findings
that the co-insured deviant husband torched the home and its furnishings,
and declared, as a matter of law, that the innocent co-insured wife could not
recover insurance proceeds for her share of destroyed community property
or for any part of the house not owned separately. 327 To justify that
conclusion, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals cited Kulubis and focused328on
the types of property interests that were insured in Kulubis and in Kizer.
Again, in Kizer and Kulubis, community property and separate
property interests, respectively, were insured against specified perils under
the first-party insurance contracts. 329 However, in Kulubis, the Texas
Supreme Court allowed the innocent co-insured spouse to recover insurance
proceeds for separate property and expressly left the question of community
property for another day.33° In the wake of that void, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals ruled against the innocent spouse to keep the deviant spouse
from benefitting from the insurance proceeds. 33' The Kizer court of appeals
provided the following justification for the decision:

(1) after the husband allegedly set fire to the house, (2) after the insurer denied the claim, and (3) after
the insurer breached its duty of good faith and the insurance contract); Wolfe, 838 S.W.2d, at 712
(allowing the innocent spouse to recover her separate property interest in the insurance proceeds after
the deviant husband torched the insured community property-a corporation, even though (1) the
deviant co-insured husband was the "named insured" on the insurance contract--doing business as the
corporation, and (2) the deviant husband committed arson and destroyed the community property after
the wife secured her divorce).
324. See Saunders v. Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1996, no writ); see also Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Kizer, 943 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1997, writ denied).
325. See Saunders, 928 S.W.2d at 325.
326. Id.
327. See Kizer, 943 S.W.2d at 953.
328. Id. at 951.
329. See id.
330. See Kulubis, 706 S.W.2d at 955 ("Texas courts are faced with an additional problem in this
situation because we are a community property state. It is not necessary for us to address that particular
.
problem at this time inasmuch as the mobile home in question was ... separate property .
331. See Kizer, 943 S.W.2d at 953.

114

ESTATE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 2:63

Texas community property law is problematic in these circumstances.
Generally, fire insurance proceeds . . . take the place of the destroyed
property .... Thus, any payment of insurance proceeds under a policy

issued to the community, providing coverage for community property, and
paid for by community assets, can only be characterized as community
property. Accordingly, if an innocent spouse is paid a "share" for
destroyed community property, absent any severance of the estate, that
payment itself must be characterized as 332
community property in which the
guilty spouse necessarily has an interest.
Once more, Kulubis was decided eleven years before Kizer, and in the
former case, the Texas Supreme Court stated the following:
We are not to be understood as holding that an innocent spouse is barred
from recovering under an insurance policy covering community property.
We do not have that fact situation before us and therefore do not address
the problem of how to compensate the innocent spouse and yet not permit
benefit to the wrongdoing33spouse. That problem will be addressed when
and if it is presented to us.

?

Thus, the conflicting innocent spouse decisions continued.334 However, the
Texas Supreme Court received an excellent opportunity to settle the
conflict, finally and totally, a decade after its separate property decision in
Kulubis.335
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Texas decided Texas Farmers
Insurance Co. v. Murphy.3 36 The underlying facts in Murphy are simple.33 7
Texas Farmers insured Robert and Daisy Murphy's home against specific
perils under a standard temporary insurance binder.33 8 Seven days later, the
Murphys' home burned down. 33 9 After the fire, Robert sued the insurer to
collect insurance proceeds, Daisy filed for divorce, and she and Robert
executed a partition agreement to divide their community interests if they
received proceeds under the insurance binder.3 40 Ultimately, Robert and
Daisy divorced, and Daisy filed her own claim for the insurance benefits.3 41
Texas Farmers investigated the claim and concluded that Robert
intentionally caused the fire.342 Reserving it rights, the insurer filed a

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

See id. at 952-53.
See Kulubis, 706 S.W.2d at 955.
See discussion infra Part VILA.
See Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 996 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. 1999).
Id. at 882.
See id.
See id. at 875.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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declaratory judgment suit.343 In the complaint, Texas Farmers asserted that
it had no duty to indemnify Robert and Daisy. 344 "Farmers alleged that
public policy prohibits arsonists from recovering for their losses. 3 45 A jury
found that Robert burned down the home. 346 The same jury also found that
Daisy was innocent because she did not have prior knowledge of Robert's
deviant intentions, and she did not participate in the arson.34 7
However, notwithstanding the jury's innocent spouse finding, the trial
348
court issued a take-nothing judgment against both Robert and Daisy.
Innocent Daisy appealed. 349 Applying the traditional rules of contract
construction that govern the interpretation of insurance policies, the Texas
Supreme Court declared that Texas's longstanding public policy against
allowing insureds to benefit from fraud does not prevent an innocent coinsured spouse from recovering her share of property-insurance benefits.35 °
Did the supreme court clearly decide whether property insurers always have
a duty to indemnify innocent co-insured spouses after deviant spouses
destroy community, separate, or partition property? The answer is no. 35'
Therefore, conflicting innocent-spouse decisions remain among
Texas's courts.35 2 Differences also exist between the Texas Supreme
Court's ruling in Murphy and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions
in diversity cases.353 To be sure, these continuing conflicts among Texas'
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. "Farmers further alleged that Robert misstated and willfully concealed material facts,
vitiating coverage under the insurance policy's concealment clause. Robert counterclaimed for breach
of contract and violations of the Texas Insurance Code." Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 881.
351. See id.
352. CompareMcEwin v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 118 S.W.3d 811, 815-16 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003
no pet.) (citing Kulubis, 706 S.W.2d at 955) ("Kathy's status as an innocent spouse .. . does not
determine her right to recover from Allstate . . . . The series of events encompassing James'
intentionally causing loss of the insured home and turning in a loss report without disclosing that the
loss was due to his intentional acts comprised perpetration of a fraud on Allstate relating to the
insurance, even had James not made false statements in his later examinations under oath ....Because
of James' fraud, the Concealment or Fraud clause voided the policy as to both James and Kathy .. "),
with Murphy, 996 S.W.2d at 881 ("We reaffirm our longstanding public policy [of] preventing an
arsonist from benefitting from fraud by denying recovery of his or her own one-half interest in the claim
against the insurer. We conclude, however, that such public policy does not overcome an innocent
spouse's contractual right to recover her or his one-half interest in the policy benefits.").
353. Compare Webster v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 953 F.2d 222, 223 (5th Cir.1992)
(concluding that a post-fire divorce between the innocent and deviant co-insured spouses-which
awarded half of the insurance proceeds on the destroyed community property to the innocent spouse as
separate property--still did not permit the innocent spouse to recover insurance proceeds for a predivorce arson fire), and Norman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 804 F.2d 1365,1366 (5th Cir. 1986)
(stressing that denying deviant co-insureds a benefit is the single most important consideration, and
declaring that the co-insured innocent spouse could not recover any insurance proceeds because there
was a possibility that the deviant co-insured spouse might benefit), and Cal. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d

116

ESTATE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 2:63

courts and between the Fifth Circuit and Texas' courts, are problematic.
Arguably, there should be no conflicts because section 2002.003 of the
Texas Insurance Code is rather clear:
A homeowners' insurance policy or fire insurance policy... may not be
delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed in this state unless the policy
contains the following language: It is understood and agreed that this
policy, subject to all other terms and conditions contained in this policy,
when covering residential community property, as defined by state law,

shall remain in full force and effect as to the interest of each spouse
covered, irrespective of divorce or change of ownership between the
spouses unless excluded by endorsement attached to this policy until the

expiration of the policy or until canceled in accordance with the terms
354
and conditions of this policy.
Of course, whether innocent co-insured spouses may recover benefits
under property insurance contracts also generates a considerable number of
conflicting rulings in other community property states. 355 Generally, for a
variety of reasons, other state courts embraced the proposition that innocent
spouses may recover insurance earnings after deviant co-insured spouses
destroy community property.35 6 Other courts in community property
jurisdictions have found a variety of different reasons to rule against
innocent co-insured spouses.3 57
In particular, whether innocent co-insured spouses may receive all or
half of the insurance proceeds has produced conflicting judicial rulings in
community property states. 358 For example, in Felder v. North River
Insurance Co., the deviant co-insured spouse died as he was destroying
jointly owned property. 359 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals allowed the
innocent spouse to recover all of the insurance money to cover the full

178, 180 (5th Cir. 1956) (concluding that an innocent co-insured spouse may not recover insurance
proceeds if the deviant spouse torches community property); with Murphy, 996 S.W.2d at 881 (allowing
an innocent co-insured to recover insurance money when a deviant co-insured spouse intentionally
destroys community property).
354. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 2002.003 (Vernon 2007) (emphasis added).
355. See discussion infra Part VII.A.2.
356. See State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Raymer, 977 P.2d 706, 711 (Alaska 1999); Atlas Assur. Co.
of Am. v. Mistic, 822 P.2d 897, 901 (Alaska 1991); Nangle v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 73 P.3d 1252,
1257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 73 P.3d 102, 106 (Idaho 2003);
Guillot v. Travelers Indem. Co., 338 So. 2d 334, 337 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Williams v. Fire Ass'n of
Phila., 193 So. 202, 204 (La. Ct. App. 1939); Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 1282, 1285 (N.M.
1980).
357. See, e.g., Crumpler v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 95-31300, 1996 WL 512065, at *2 (5th
Cir. 1986) (citing Louisiana's law); Brown v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 977 P.2d 807, 817 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1998).
358. See discussion infra Part VII.A.2.
359. Felder v. N. River Ins. Co., 435 N.W.2d 263,264 (Wis. Ct. App.1988).
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amount of the innocent spouse's losses. 360 To justify its ruling, the Felder
court stressed that the deviant spouse died in the fire; consequently, the
deviant spouse could never benefit from his destruction of the insured and
jointly owned property.36'
However, in Atlas Assurance Co. of America v. Mistic, the Supreme
Court of Alaska reached a decidedly different conclusion.362 In Mistic, the
husband and wife jointly owned their house as tenants in comMon. 3 63 In
addition, the spouses were co-insureds under a property insurance
contract. 364 Briefly put, the husband set fire to and totally destroyed the
house.365 Shortly thereafter, the innocent wife filed for divorce.366 A
probate judge granted the divorce and concluded:
While there is a presumption that an equal division of marital property is a
just division ... [the husband in this case] willfully destroyed and wasted
substantial marital property and [the wife] is entitled to one-half the value
of the property destroyed in addition
to her share of the marital estate
367
under an equitable distribution.
The insurer refused to compensate the innocent co-insured wife for her
interest in the demolished house.368 Therefore, she sued the insurer,
asserting that she had a contractual right to receive half of the policy limits
under the insurance contract. 369 A different lower court in Alaska found the
following: (1) the estranged husband intentionally caused the fire and
destroyed the jointly owned house; (2) the property insurer had no
contractual duty to indemnify the deviant husband for his losses, since he
intentionally destroyed the insured property; (3) the first-party insurer had a
contractual duty to indemnify the innocent co-insured wife Mistic; and
(4) the innocent spouse was entitled to half the policy limits under the
insurance contract.370 The insurer appealed.37'
First, the Alaska Supreme Court observed that the insurance contract's
policy limit was $42,000.372 However, the innocent co-insured wife's
property losses exceeded that amount.37 3 Her estimated damages were

360. Id. at 266.
361. Id.
362. Atlas Assur. Co. of Am. v. Mistic, 822 P.2d 897, 901 (Alaska 1991).
363. Id. at 898.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 899.
369. Jd. at 900.
370. Id. at 899.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 898.
373. Id.
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$100,000.11 4 Did the insurer have a contractual duty to compensate the

innocent wife for all of her losses? The supreme court said no. 375 To reach
that conclusion, the Supreme Court of Alaska examined the "insurable
interests" clause in the insurance contract.3 76 It read:
Insurable Interest and Limit of Liability. Even if more than one
person has an insurable interest in the property covered, we shall not be
liable:
a. for an amount greater than the interest of a person insured
under this policy; or
377
b. for more than the limit of liability that applies.
The insurance contract clearly limited a co-insured's payment "to the lesser
of the person's interest or the contract limits., 378 When the innocent spouse
submitted her claim to the insurer, her property interest was greater than the
contract limits: $100,000 versus $42,000. 379 Therefore, arguably, she
should have received $42,000 from the insurer.380 However, the Supreme
Court of Alaska declared that the innocent co-insured spouse could recover
only one-half of her total damages or one-half of the contract limits,
whichever was less.38'
Consequently, in Mistic, the innocent spouse recovered only $21,000,
rather than the full amount under the insurance contract.382 Recognizing a
split among courts, the Alaska Supreme Court justified its declaration this
way: "The vast majority of courts which have reached this issue, and...
allowed recovery at all, have held that the innocent coinsured may only
383
recover one-half of the insurance proceeds, up to the policy limits.
Clearly, to resolve the dispute, the Mistic court did not carefully apply any
traditional rules of contract construction and interpretation, such as the
doctrine of plain meaning or the ambiguity doctrine.3M Arguably, that
omission should raise some concern, because the term "one-half' does not
appear in the "insurable interest" clause.38 5

374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 901.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 898.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 901.
382. Id.
383. Id. See also Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 1282, 1234 (N.M. 1980) (another community
property state's supreme court holding that the innocent spouse may collect only one-half of the
insurance proceeds).
384. See Mistic, 822 P.2d at 901.
385. Id.
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2. Conflicting DeclarationsandRulings in SeparatePropertyStates
To be sure, courts in separate property states are seriously divided over
whether first-party insurers must indemnify blameless co-insured spouses
after deviant spouses destroy jointly owned residential or commercial
property. 386 A large group of courts have forced insurers to compensate
innocent co-insured spouses for the latter's share of losses. 387 However, an
equally large number of courts in separate property states have declared that
insurers have no contractual duty to indemnify innocent co-insured
spouses.388 Significantly, the totality of several minor splits has produced
the major split among courts in separate property jurisdictions. 8
386. See discussion infra Part VII.A.2.
387. See Hosey v. Seibels Bruce Group, S.C. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 751, 754 (Ala. 1978); Home Ins.
Co. v. Pugh, 286 So. 2d 49, 51-52 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973); Republic Ins. Co. v. Jemigan, 719 P.2d 331,
333-34 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 402 (Del. 1978); Overton v.
Progressive Ins. Co., 585 So. 2d 445, 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Eddinger,
366 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Fittje v. Calhoun County Mut. County Fire Ins. Co., 552
N.E.2d 353, 357 (Il. App. Ct. 1990); Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Warren, 390 N.E.2d 361, 363-64 (111.
App. Ct. 1979); Fuston v. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 751, 753-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Am. Econ.
Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136,140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Sager v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 680
N.W.2d 8, 16 (Iowa 2004); Jensen v. Jefferson County Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 510 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Iowa
1994); Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Ky. 1993); Baker v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 416 N.E.2d 187, 190 (Mass. 1981); Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d
329, 331 (Me. 1978); Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 60-61 (Mich. 1981); Williams v.
Auto Club Group Ins. Co., 569 N.W.2d 403, 405-06 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Brown v. Frankenmuth
Mut. Ins. Co., 468 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Ramon v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 457
N.W.2d 90, 95 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Lewis v. Homeowners Ins. Co., 432 N.W.2d 334, 337 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988); Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 692 (Minn. 1997); McGory v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d 632, 640 (Miss. 1988); DePalma v. Bates County Mut. Ins. Co., 24 S.W.3d
766, 770 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 240, 244 (N.J. Super. Ct. Div.
1974); Goldner v. Kemper Ins. Co., 544 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Krupp v. Aetna Life
& Cas. Co., 479 N.Y.S.2d 992, 998 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pittman,
348 S.E.2d 350, 351 (N.C. Ct. App., 1986); Maravich v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 504 A.2d 896, 907-08
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); McCracken v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 325 S.E.2d 62, 64 (S.C. 1985); Ryan v.
MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 610 S.W.2d 428, 437 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Error v. W. Home Ins. Co., 762 P.2d
1077, 1080 (Utah 1988); Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 250 S.E.2d 774, 806-07 (Va. 1979); see
also, McFarland v. Utica Fire Ins. Co. of Oneida County, N.Y., No. 93-7936, 1994 WL 16464174, at *7
(5th Cir. 1994) (citing Mississippi's law); Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915, 926
(I th Cir. 1998); Haynes v. Hanover Ins. Cos., 783 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir.1986).
388. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowser, 779 P.2d 1376, 1382 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989);
Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 299 S.E.2d 561, 563-64 (Ga. 1983); Aurelius v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 894 N.E.2d 765, 772-73 (Il. App. Ct. 2008); Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa
1990); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 433 A.2d 1135, 1142 (Md. 1981); Kosior v. Cont'l
Ins. Co., 13 N.E.2d 423, 425 (Mass. 1938); Simon v. Sec. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d 322, 327 (Mich. 1973);
Ijames v. Republic Ins. Co., 190 N.W.2d 366, 369-70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Childers v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 799 S.W. 2d 138, 141-42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Woodhouse v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co.,
785 P.2d 192, 194 (Mont. 1990); Fernandez v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 590 N.Y.S.2d 925, 928
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Samhammer v. Home Mut. Ins. Co. of Binghamton, 507 N.Y.S.2d 499, 503
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Short v. Okla. Farmers Union Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 588, 591 (Okla. 1980);
Knauber v. Cont'l Ins. Cos., 435 A.2d 217, 218-19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); Dolcy v. R.I. Joint
Reinsurance Ass'n, 589 A.2d 313, 316 (R.I. 1991); Coop. Fire Ins. Ass'n of Vt. v. Domina, 399 A.2d
502, 503 (Vt. 1979); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 980 P.2d 685, 689 (Utah 1999); see also Hall
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For example, some courts in separate property jurisdictions decide in
favor of the innocent spouse or indemnity insurers depending on the types
of property interests insured under the contract.3 90 Consider, for example,
cases in which spouses jointly owned their insured property as "tenants by
the entirety."'3 9' The supreme courts of Virginia, Vermont, and Oklahoma
have declared that an innocent co-insured spouse may not recover under a
first-party property insurance contract if a deviant spouse destroys property
of tenancy by the entirety. 392 Conversely, in other tenancy by the entirety
cases, appellate courts in New Jersey and Indiana have decided differently,
ruling in favor of innocent co-insured spouses.39 3
In addition, courts in separate property states are also divided over
whether insurers must compensate innocent co-insured spouses after
deviant spouses destroy tenancy in common property. 94 This type of
property interest allows one to sell one's share or leave it in a will without
the consent of other owners. 395 As an example, if an individual dies without
a will, his share goes to his heirs rather than to the other owners. 396 Of
course, deviant husbands or wives may destroy, and have destroyed,
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 937 F.2d 210, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Mississippi's law); Sales v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 849 F.2d 1383, 1385 (11 th Cir. 1988) (citing Georgia's law.); Spezialetti v.
Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 759 F.2d 1139, 1140 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Pennsylvania's law).
389. See supra text accompanying notes 386-88.
390. See infra text accompanying notes 391-407.
391. See, e.g., Lunnen v. Hunter, 35 A.2d 292, 294 (Pa. 1944) "Tenancy by entireties is a venerable
institution of the common law: it rests upon instincts which form the very warp and woof of our
domestic and social fabric. In such a tenancy each spouse is seized per tout et non per my. There is but
one legal estate, which, by a long course of judicial decisions, has been buttressed against inroads
attempted either by the parties themselves or by their individual creditors." Id.
392. See Short v. Okla. Farmer's Union Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 588, 589 (Okla. 1980) (observing that the
husband and wife owned the fire-damage house "in joint tenancy" and concluding that fraud or false
swearing by either party voids the entire insurance contract); Coop. Fire Ins. Assoc. of Vt. v. Domina,
399 A.2d 502, 503 (Vt. 1979) ("One tenant by entirety cannot sever the tenancy by deed, as a joint
tenant can ....); Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 250 S.E.2d 774, 776 (Va. 1979) (noting that
the legal interest of a married couple with a tenancy by the entirety under the insurance contract was not
severable, but joint).
393. See Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) ("The legal
fiction of the entireties' estate in real estate is designed for the protection of the spouses and the
marriage. It was initially designed to prevent the individual creditors of either spouse from taking the
marital home. The courts generally, and divorce courts in particular, find no difficulty in dividing an
entireties estate. I find it a perversion of this legal fiction, designed to protect the spouses' rights and
marital property, to use it to destroy the property rights of an innocent spouse."); Howell v. Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 240, 242 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (concluding that the husband's fraud was
no bar to the innocent wife's recovery under the policy, but reaching that "result irrespective of whether
the interests of the wife and husband in the tenancy by the entirety, in the personal property, or in the
contract rights under the policy are deemed to be joint or several. The significant factor is that the
responsibility or liability for the fraud--here, the arson-is several and separate rather than joint, and
the husband's fraud cannot be attributed or imputed to the wife who is not implicated therein.").
394. See generally Burbach v. Sussex County Mun. Utils. Auth., 723 A.2d 137, 140 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999) (stating that a "tenant in common by definition has an undivided interest in the whole,
that is, an interest that encompasses the entire property.").
395. See id.
396. See id.
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tenancy in common property before death.397 When such destruction has
occurred, some courts in separate property states have allowed
innocent
398 Other courts have not.399
proceeds.
insurance
spouses to collect
In addition, whether innocent co-insured spouses may recover all or
just half of the proceeds under property insurance contracts also generates a
considerable number of conflicting rulings among courts in separate
property states. 4 00 Reconsider the holding in Mistic: An innocent co-insured
spouse may only recover one-half of the insurance proceeds, up to the
policy limit, after a deviant co-insured spouse destroys jointly owned
property. 4°'
A significant number of courts in separate property states
embraced the Mistic rule. 40 2 But other state courts in those jurisdictions
have permitted innocent spouses to receive a full recovery up to the policy
limits. 3 Like their counterparts in community property states, courts in
separate property states give all sorts of explanations for compelling

397. See Hoyt v. N.H. Fire Ins. Co., 29 A.2d 121, 122-23 (N. H. 1942).
398. See id. The tenants in common have individual interests in the insurance policy because courts
construe an insurance contract according to what a reasonable person would have thought, "not what the
insurance company intended the words of the policy to mean." Id.
399. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Agric. Fire Ins. Co., 18 N.W. 797, 804 (Mich. 1884) (concluding that a
deviant co-insured's attempt to defraud the insurance company by making false affidavits in relation to
loss property is a complete bar to innocent co-insureds' recovery under the policy); see also Klemens v.
Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d 865, 866 (Wis. 1959) (a supreme court in a community property state
embracing the proposition that an innocent joint tenant may not recover proceeds under a fire insurance
contract ifa deviant co-insured joint tenant set fire to the property). But see Watts v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 705-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ("Community property laws exist to protect the
innocent spouse from losing his or her rights due to the individual misdeeds of the other spouse. They
should not be used as a weapon by an insurance company to reap a windfall where one spouse, acting
alone, has violated the terms of the policy and the policy does not explicitly warn that this will be the
outcome. A rule automatically precluding recovery for community property and joint tenancies, but
permitting recovery when the subject property happens to be held separately, seems to bear no rational
relationship to the expectations ofthe parties or the risks involved.") (emphasis added).
400. See, e.g., Atlas Assur. Co. of Am. v. Mistic, 822 P.2d 897, 901 (Alaska 1991).
401. Id.
402. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 546 F. Supp. 543, 547 (D.
Colo. 1982) (applying Colorado's law); Republic Ins. Co. v. Jerigan, 719 P.2d 331, 333 (Colo. Ct. App.
1985); Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 402 (Del. 1978); Econ. Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Warren, 390 N.E.2d 361, 364 (111.App. Ct. 1979); Fuston v. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 751, 754
(Ind. Ct. App. 1982); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 433 A.2d 1135, 1144 (Md. 1981);
Lewis v. Homeowners Ins. Co., 432 N.W.2d 334, 337 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Krupp v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Co., 479 N.Y.S.2d 992, 998 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Winter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 409
N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Lovell v. Rowan Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 274 S.E.2d 170, 174 (N.C.
1981); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 348 S.E.2d 350, 351 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Maravich
v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 504 A.2d 896, 907 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
403. See, e.g., Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Hildebrand
v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329, 332 (Me. 1978) (allowing the innocent wife to recover
fully after co-insured husband set the house on fire because public policy against permitting a
wrongdoer to benefit was not violated by making the insurer pay); Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 327
A.2d 240, 244 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (concluding that the wife was entitled to recover onehalf of the loss of personal property and the entire additional living expenses).
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insurers to pay only one-half or all insurance proceeds within the policy
limits.404
Finally, split decisions also appear between innocent spouse rulings
that originate, respectively, in separate property and community property
state courts. 4°5 Those "between jurisdictions" splits have occurred, even
when (1) the probative facts in the respective controversies were fairly
similar; (2) courts in separate and community states performed reasonably
similar analyses; and (3) community and separate property state courts
applied the same equitable doctrines. 40 6 To illustrate, consider the facts and
outcomes in innocent spouse controversies that were decided in Wisconsin
and Massachusetts. °7
Hedtcke v. Sentry Insurance Co. was decided in Wisconsin, a
community property jurisdiction. 4 08 In Hedtcke, Judith and Ronald Hedtcke
were married and jointly owned the residential property.4 9 Sentry insured
the property and promised to indemnify if and when fire, the peril insured
against, damaged or destroyed the house. 410 During the policy's period, a
fire destroyed the property. 411 Robert was the culprit, and he torched the
property when Judith did not occupy the house.41 2 Judith asked the insurer
to indemnify, the insurer refused, and Judith sued. Ultimately, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in her favor.41 3' To reach its conclusion, the
supreme court declared that permitting an innocent co-insured spouse to
recovery when a deviant co-insured destroys jointly owned property
"preserves the essence of the legal principles.., and produces an equitable
' 414
result.
Now, consider the brief facts and ruling Kosior v. Continental
Insurance Co.415 John and Tofeld Kosior were husband and wife, and they
404. See, e.g., Republic Ins. Co. v. Jernigan, 719 P.2d 331, 333-34 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985)
("Exclusionary clauses in insurance contracts must be interpreted in favor of the insured .... [The
innocent co-insured] may recover up to a one-half interest in the property, i.e., one-half of the value of
the damaged dwelling, other structures, and personal property; limited of course by the total policy
limits."); Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 402 (Del. 1978) ('[Tlhe rights of husband and
wife [are] separate under the contract and ....both logic and justice require that the amount recoverable
be likewise allocated .... [The innocent co-insured wife could recover only] one-half of the damages
within the limits of the contract."); Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136,140 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981) (citing public policy and permitting the innocent co-insured spouse full recovery under the policy
since her husband died in the fire and there was no way to prove he caused it).
405. See discussion supra Part H.
406. See discussion supra Part II.
407. See Kosior v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 13 N.E.2d 423 (Mass. 1938); Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326
N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 1982).
408. Hedtcke, 326 N.W.2d at 729.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 729-30.
412. Id. at 729.
413. Id. at 738-40.
414. Id. at 738.
415. Kosior v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 13 N.E.2d 423 (Mass. 1938).
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owned buildings as tenants in common. 1 6 Continental Insurance Company
(Continental) and two other insurers insured the buildings against fire.4417
18
The Kosiors were co-insured spouses under each insurance contract.
After securing the insurance, John intentionally burned the buildings.419
Although conceding that her husband's deviant act voided the fire insurance
policies, Tofeld still asked Continental to reimburse her for her share of the
loss. 420 Like the insurer in Hedtcke, Continental refused.42'
In response, the innocent co-insured Tofeld commenced an action in
equity "to recover the amount [that Continental] justly and equitably [owed
her under the first-party, property insurance contract]. ' 42 2 Stated slightly
differently, citing the court's equity powers, she asked the lower court to
declare that the insurers had a duty to indemnify her.423 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected Tofeld's claim and reinforced the
lower court's equitable powers and ruling.424 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court concluded that the deviant husband's "burning the insured
buildings was an act of the 'insured,' and as such it was fraud upon the
[insurer and] . . . rendered the policies void in accordance with their
terms. 425
B. Whether PropertyInsurers Have a Duty to Indemnify OtherInnocent
Co-insuredFiduciaries
Like many innocent co-insured spouses, other fiduciaries also submit
claims to property insurers after their deviant co-owners intentionally
destroy or diminish the market value of jointly owned tangible or intangible
property. Quite often, indemnity insurers refuse to compensate those
innocent co-insureds: partnerships, partners, joint venturers, executors and
administrators of estates, corporations, corporate officials, and corporate
directors. 426 As a consequence, "commercial" fiduciaries must spend outof-pocket dollars to cover destroyed or diminished property interests under
their control or supervision. 427 Whether first-party property insurers have a
contractual duty to indemnify innocent co-insured "commercial" fiduciaries
generates a considerable amount of disagreement among state courts

416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

Id. at 424.
Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 424.
Id.
Id.; Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326 N.W. 2d 727, 729 (Wis. 1982).
Kosior, 13 N.E.2d at 424.
Id.
Id. at 425.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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located within and beyond both community and separate property states.428
To illustrate this point, a review of a few cases in which co-insured
corporations asked insurers to indemnify them after various deviant coinsureds destroyed corporate interests might be helpful.42 9
First, consider the controversy in Hoosier Insurance Co. v. North
South Trucking Supplies, Inc. 430 Lisa Shoemaker's husband died in an
automobile accident, and she received approximately $160,000 from the
insurer.431 Later, Scott Casey (Lisa's boyfriend) and Scott's parents (John
Norman (Norman) and Carol Casey), decided to purchase and operate a
business that sold supplies to truck stops. 432 Lisa invested $70,000 in the
enterprise. 43 Norman did not have cash to invest in the business so he
supplied a building.434 They named the new company North South
Trucking Company (North South).
Respectively, Lisa and Norman were president and secretary of North
South. 435 Lisa owned 100 percent of the company's shares, leaving no
other party with any property interest in the corporation.43 6 Lisa knew very
little about the supply business.437 Even more relevant, Norman never
sought Lisa's approval or informed consent before making important
corporate decisions.4 38 He wrote most of the checks, performed the
accounting for the business, monitored the accounts payable and receivable,
determined the types and amount of inventory that North South would
order, and insured North South's inventory for $95,000 under a property
insurance contract. 439 Hoosier Insurance Company (Hoosier) was the
insurer. 440
Less than a month after purchasing the property insurance on behalf of
the corporation, a fire damaged a large portion of the building that
contained North South's inventory. 44 1 The fire damaged a large portion of
the house and the attached block warehouse as well.442 Norman was the
suspected arsonist. 443 He submitted a proof-of-loss form, claiming that the
444
actual cash value of the property at the time of the loss was $101,124.86.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id.
Id.
Hoosier Ins. Co. v. N.S. Trucking Supplies, Inc., 684 N.E.2d 1164 (ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1166-67.
Id. at 1167.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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After an investigation, a certified public account (CPA) concluded that the
inventory's fair market value was $36,000.445 Hoosier denied the claim,
asserting that Norman intentionally set the fire.446 Additionally, the insurer
concluded that Norman and Lisa breached a condition subsequent by
misrepresenting the actual value of the destroyed property.44 7
Ultimately, the case went to trial and a jury returned a verdict in favor
of North South. 44 8 They awarded the innocent co-insured corporation
$36,175. 449 After the judge entered the judgment and denied Hoosier's
motion for judgment on the evidence, Hoosier appealed. 450 Before the
Indiana Court of Appeals, the insurer argued that the trial court committed
reversible error. 45 1 To reach a just result, the court of appeals had to
determine whether the actual or presumed arsonist, Norman, exercised
absolute control over the corporation or whether he would benefit after
torching North South's inventory.452
Based on the evidence, the appellate court concluded that "North
South as a corporation neither explicitly authorized Norman's acts nor
453
implicitly ratified them by allowing him to dominate corporate affairs.,
The Appellate Court of Indiana also embraced the jury's finding that
Norman would "not benefit in any way from North South's recovery of the
insurance proceeds.,454 Thus, in light of the jury's findings, the court
affirmed the lower court's ruling, concluding that the property insurer had a
duty to indemnify the co-insured corporation for its deviant co-fiduciary's
destructive act.455 Also, in Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Co. of N.Y. v.
Queen City Bus & Transfer Co. and in Erlin-Lawler Enters., Inc. v. Fire
Insurance Exchange, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and a
California's appellate court also have embraced the reasoning and holding
in Hoosier.4 56
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. The insurer concluded that Norman and Lisa violated the "Concealment, Misrepresentation
or Fraud" clause in the North South's insurance contract policy. Id. That clause read: "We will not pay
for any loss or damage in any case of: (1) Concealment or misrepresentation of a material fact or,
(2) Fraud committed by an insured at any time and relating to a claim under this policy." Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 1167-68.
452. Id. at 1169.
453. Id. at 1172.
454. Id. ("Lisa was the sole stockholder of the corporation. Norman owned no ownership interest in
the corporation. Moreover, Norman was terminated as secretary of the corporation ....Thus, Norman
will receive no direct or indirect benefit from his wrongdoing.").
455. Id.
456. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Queen City Bus & Transfer Co., 3 F.2d 784 (4th Cir.
1925). A co-insured corporation challenged the trial court's conclusion that it was precluded from
recovering under a fire insurance contract, since the deviant fiduciary, the arsonist and a 50%
stockholder, was the corporation's "alter ego." Erlin-Lawler Enters., Inc. v. Fire Ins. Exch., 73 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 186-87 (1968). The appellate court did not embrace that conclusion. Id. Even though the
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On the other hand, courts in Georgia, Delaware, Illinois, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Jersey, and Oregon have performed a fairly similar
457
"dominance and control" analysis like the one appearing in Hoosier.
Those tribunals have concluded that innocent co-insured corporations may
not recover property insurance proceeds after co-insured fiduciariesshareholders, officers and directors--destroy or diminish the value of
corporate property. 458 To underscore the severity of this particular split
involving the rights of innocent and co-insured corporations, the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Fidelity-Phenix
conflicts with its holding in Kimball Ice
4 59
Co. v. HartfordFireInsurance Co.
As discussed earlier, trustees, executors, administrators, and partners
are fiduciaries; they have a collective duty to protect and preserve assets on
behalf of other persons or fiduciaries. 460 Frequently, they are co-insureds

arsonist stood to benefit up to 50% of the recovery, that single fact apparently was not determinative.
Id.
457. See Sandersville Oil Mill Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 124 S.E. 728, 728-29 (Ga.
App. 1924) (concluding that the insurer is liable under a property insurance contract if negligence rather
than fraud produced a fire that destroyed corporate property, but barring a corporation's recovery if its
innocent stockholders will not actually realize any benefit because of the insolvent state of the
corporation); N. Assurance Co. v. Rachlin Clothes Shop Inc., 125 A. 184, 187-88, 190 (Del. 1924)
(concluding that if an officer or stockholder has absolute control in the conduct of the business of a
corporation, his acts, if he acts on behalf of the corporation, become the acts of the corporation barring it
from recovery even though he is not the dominant shareholder); see also Felsenthal Co. v. N. Assurance
Co., 120 N.E. 268, 271 (I11.1918) ("When ... the beneficial owner of practically all of the stock in a
corporation, and who has the absolute management and control of its affairs and its property,... sets
fire to the property of a corporation or causes it to be done, there is no sound reason to support the
contention... that the corporation should be allowed to recover on a policy for the destruction of the
corporate property by a fire .... ); United Gratiot Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Mich. Basic Prop. Ins., 406
N.W.2d 239, 242 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (finding no reversible error, the court concluded that the jury
properly applied the "dominance and control" test and embraced the jury's finding that a deviant coinsured shareholder destroyed corporate property, thus precluding the innocent corporation's receiving
of insurance proceeds); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Gustav's Stable Club Inc., 317 N.W.2d 734, 740 (Neb. 1982)
(declaring that an innocent co-insured corporation may not recover under a fire insurance contract if the
co-fiduciary incendiarist or arsonist owned half of the stocks and was the dominant manager of
corporate property); Miller & Dobrin Furniture Co. v. Camden Fire Ins. Co. Assn., 150 A.2d 276, 284
(N.J. Super. 1959) (holding that the corporation could not recover where a 50% shareholder, the
secretary-treasurer and director, exercised dominant control over and management of the corporation. In
addition, although the business was being conducted under the guise of a corporation, the court declared
that it was in fact a partnership, and applied partnership rule to reach its conclusion.); Minn. Bond Ltd.
v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 706 P.2d 942, 944 (Or. 1985) (holding that the innocent co-insured
corporation may not recover for arson, which 50% shareholder officer committed, because the cofiduciary's deviant act was excluded under the property-insurance contract and the coverage provision
for employee dishonesty did not apply).
458. See supra note 457.
459. Compare Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. ofN. Y. v. Queen City Bus & Transfer Co., 3 F.2d 784,
785 (4th Cir. 1925) (allowing the innocent co-insured corporation to recover proceeds), with Kimball
Ice Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 18 F.2d 563, 564-66 (4th Cir. 1927) (concluding that the innocent
corporation could not recover proceeds under a fire insurance contract where the allegedly deviant
corporate manager owned one-fourth of the corporate stock and had complete control and management
of the corporation).
460. See supraPart H.
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under property insurance contacts." 1 As a consequence, judicial conflicts
have arisen over whether property insurers have a duty to indemnify
blameless trusts/trustees and partnerships/partners after deviant cofiduciaries intentionally destroy or waste various property interests.46 2 A
brief consideration of multiple rulings involving trusts and partnerships
should illustrate the extent of the conflicts on several dimensions.4 63
First, consider the facts and holding in Giacobetti v. Insurance
Placement Facility of Pennsylvania.464 Louis Manusov owned a building
which was a combination of a home and a grocery store. 46' He conveyed
the building along with the land on which it was situated to seven named
trustees: himself, his sister Freda Kracoff, his brother-in-law Charles
Kracoff, and four nieces and nephews-Harry Kracoff, Doris Kracoff, Sara
Stark, and Nathan Petrushansky (the Manusov Family Trust).4 Under the
terms of a deed of trust, "the Trust [would] terminate upon the death of the
last survivor of the designated trustees, at which time title [would] 'vest
absolutely in fee simple to the children or issue of said467designated Trustees,
share and share alike, per capita, and not per stirpes.',
When the deed of trust was executed, Manusov's brother-in-law,
Charles Kracoff, operated the grocery store under a lease agreement with
Manusov.46 8 About twenty years after the formation of the trust, Louis
Manusov, Freda Kracoff, and Charles Kracoff died. 46 9 Therefore, Harry
Kracoff, Manusov's nephew, assumed all responsibilities and began to
operate the grocery store. 470 Harry Kracoff's father and prior lessee,
Charles Kracoff, owned part of the contents in the grocery store, including
equipment and improvements. 471 The trustees of the trust that Charles
472
Harry
Kracoff identified in his will owned the title to those contents.

461.
462.
463.
464.

See supra Part II.
See infra text accompanying notes 464-547.
See infra text accompanying notes 464-547.
Giacobetti v. Ins. Placement of Pa., 457 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1983).

465.

Id. at 854.

466. Id. Under the terms of the trust, Manusov personally received $200 per month for the rest of
his life. Id. The trust paid $300 per year "[t]o each of the Grantees or their survivors and successors."
Id. The trust also paid up to $50 per week to 'Grantees, Trustees, or their issue or any member of their
respective families... in the event of sickness or need' ... $1,000 as a wedding gift to each trustee's
child who should marry." Id. (quoting the Manusov Family Trust agreement).
467. Id. "Manusov also directed that 'rent, income and profits' from the premises were to be
applied to 'taxes, insurance, cost of maintenance and other expenses in connection with the management
of said property."' Id. (quoting the Manusov Family Trust agreement).
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id. "The trustees were Harry Kracoff, Dora Kracoff, Sara Stark, and Nathan Petrushansky, the
four remaining co-trustees of the Manusov Family Trust." Id.
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Kracoff owned the remainder of the grocery store's contents and
inventories. 473
After he began to operate the store, Harry Kracoff purchased a fire
insurance contract from Insurance Placement Facility of Philadelphia
(IPFP).474 The policy covered the building which housed the grocery store,
and the policy limit was $50,000. 4 7' A separate clause in the insurance
contract covered the contents of the food market.476 Under the latter clause,
IPFP's maximum exposure would be $100,000 if a loss occurred.47 7
A fire destroyed the building and its contents, and Harry Kracoff
submitted timely, sworn proofs of loss. 478 Although Kracoff reported that
the fire's origin was "unknown to insured," IPFP determined that Harry
Kracoff started the fire.479 Consequently, the property insurer refused to
indemnity. 480 Responding to the insurer's rejection, Harry Kracoff, Doris
Kracoff, Sara Stark, and Nathan Petrushansky sued IPFP.4 8' Two claims
appeared in their complaint. 4 2 First, as "Trustees of [the] Manusov Family
Trust," the four complainants asserted that IPFP had a duty to pay $50,000
to cover the destroyed building.48 3 Also, as "Trustees Under the Will of
Charles Kracoff," they argued that IPFP had a contractual obligation to pay
$100,000 to cover the building's destroyed contents. 484 Harry4 85Kracoff also
'
sued individually and on behalf of himself "in his own right.
Shortly before trial, Nathan Petrushansky, one of the co-trustees,
died.486 Even more significant, before the trial commenced, Harry Kracoff
resigned as a trustee of the Manusov Family Trust.487 His resignation was
"effective immediately. 'As 8 Additionally, Harry Kracoff executed a
"Release and Disclaimer" that read as follows: "[I renounce and disclaim]
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 855.
479. Id.
480. Id.
IPFP] filed an answer and new matter, the latter of which averred that in the sworn proofs of
loss Harry Kracoffhad deliberately concealed the true origin of the fire with intent to defraud
[IPFP], in violation of the "Concealment, Fraud" provision of the insurance policy. [IPFP]
further averred that it was not liable for the losses under the "Perils Not Included" clause, and
added that plaintiffs had, "in fact, intentionally and deliberately caused or contributed to the
cause of such fire and any consequent loss."

Id.
481.
482.
483.
484.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

485.

Id.

486.
487.
488.

Id. at 856.
Id. at 855-56.
Id.
at 856.
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'all right[s], title and interest of any kind which I ever had, now have or
may have in the future in said Trust as a beneficiary thereof.' 489 In the
the only remaining and innocent coend, Doris Kracoff and Sara Stark were
49 °
Trust.
Family
Manusov
the
of
trustees
During the bench trial, the court of common pleas rejected Harry
Kracoff's assertion that "an angry outside person" started the fire.4 9'
Instead, the lower court found that Harry Kracoff started the fire. 492
Therefore, imputing Harry Kracoff's deviance to the innocent co-trustees
that
under the Manusov Family Trust, the court of common pleas declared
493
JPFP did not have to indemnify the innocent co-insured trustees.
After they did not prevail, the remaining trustees, Doris Kracoff and
Sara Stark, resigned as trustees.4 94 As a consequence, the Orphans' Court
Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia "granted a petition
for the appointment of a substituted trustee to prosecute an appeal. ' 495 The
496
After an
substituted trustee was Attorney Alexander B. Giacobetti.
to the
appealed
Giacobetti
ruling,
court's
appellate court affirmed the trial
49 7
Court.
Supreme
Pennsylvania
At the outset, Pennsylvania's highest court embraced the lower court's
finding that Harry Kracoff's deviance prevented him "from sharing in the
proceeds of the fire insurance policy.' ' 498 Harry's criminal act also
prevented his "children or issue," beneficiaries under the Manusov Family
Trust, from receiving any insurance proceeds because Harry would benefit
from their bounty.499 On the other hand, the Pennsylvania Supreme rejected
the lower court's conclusion that IPFP had no duty to indemnify the
remaining innocent co-insured trustees and beneficiaries under the Manusov
Family Trust. 5°°

489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. See id.
494. Id.
495. Id. "The petition was filed by John D. Lucey, Jr., Esquire, who had been appointed as
guardian and trustee ad litem to represent minor and unascertained interests in proceedings initiated by
the former co-trustees to terminate the Manusov Family Trust. The record makes no mention of the
status of the proceedings to terminate the Trust." Id. at n.6.
496. Id. at 856.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 856-57. "[IPFP's] right to retain the shares of Harry Kracoff and his 'children or issue' is
in no respect dependent upon [Harry Kracoffs] 'Release and Disclaimer' . . . [on the day] . . he
resigned as trustee. Rather, [IPFP's] right to retain these shares gives full effect to 'the common law
principle that a person will not be permitted to profit by his own wrong, particularly his own crime."'
Id. at 857 (quoting Greifer Estate, 5 A.2d 118, 119 (Pa. 1939)).
500. Id. at 857.
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The Giacobetti court's own words are instructive and they cogently
summarize the court's reason for ruling in favor of the innocent trustees and
beneficiary. 50 1 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote:
[T]he wrongful conduct of Harry Kracoff may not fairly be imputed to the
entire Trust, as nothing in the trust instrument even remotely contemplated
that any portion of the corpus might be deliberately destroyed by fire. Nor
may Harry Kracoff's wrongful conduct fairly be imputed to the other
beneficiaries on the theory that they acquiesced in his assumption of
control over the family's business affairs ....Although over the years of
the administration of the Trust the other trustee-beneficiaries permitted
Harry Kracoff to assume progressively more responsibilities under the
Deed of Trust, including the responsibility to procure insurance on the
trust property ... [IPFP] has failed to establish that Harry Kracoff became
the agent of any of the other beneficiaries for all purposes . . . .The
conduct of Harry Kracoff was wholly 2unilateral and in no way may be
deemed to be an act of the Trust itself.5
Now, consider the facts and holding in Mercantile Trust Co. v. New
York UnderwritersInsurance Co. 50 3 Herman Luer and his wife established
a real estate trust comprising of two lots, a residential house, and other
structures.5 °4 Under the terms of the trust, the residential house was held for
"Mrs. Luer's use during her life and then for the benefit of their son Edward
D. Luer." 50 5 Upon the death of Edward D. Luer, the trust estate was to go
to his descendants.5 °6 In addition, Herman Luer also created an income
trust, under which Edward Luer was the sole intended beneficiary.5 °7 The
Mercantile Trust Company (Mercantile) was the trustee. 0
After the Luers created the trusts, Edward Luer purchased a
homeowner's insurance contract from New York Underwriters Insurance
Company (Underwriters). 5°9 The contract of insurance covered only the
residential house and appurtenances. 5'0 Both Edward Luer and Mercantile,
the trustee, were listed as the "named insureds."5 11 The policy limits under
the contract were $20,000 and $8,000 for the house and its contents,
respectively.51 2 Less than a year after purchasing the insurance, Edward
501. See id.
502. Id. at 857.
503. Mercantile Trust Co. v. N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co., 376 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1967).
504. Id. at 503.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id "On the face of the policy, the insured were shown as 'Mercantile Trust Company, trustee,
under indenture of trust... and Edward D. Luer.'" Id.
512. Id. "Edward Luer (or his wife) purchased the homeowner's policy and paid the premiums...

2009]

FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS' DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

131

Luers moved 75% of his household goods to a storage company in Illinois
and drove to Golden, Colorado.1 3 A few days later, a loud explosion
5 14
occurred in his house and it burned to the ground.
The trustee, Mercantile, asked Underwriters to pay $20,000 to cover
the destroyed house.5" 5 Luer submitted a claim for $8,000, and he asked
Underwriters to cover the household contents which were not transferred to
storage.516 The insurer denied both claims after discovering that Edward
Luer had misrepresented the actual value of the inventory that he moved to
storage before the fire.5 17 Mercantile sued Underwriters. 518 After a bench
trial, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
decided in favor of Mercantile, and the Underwriters appealed.51 9
Before the Seven Circuit Court of Appeals, Underwriters argued that0
52
the district court erroneously entered judgment for Mercantile.
Conversely, the trustee stressed that the co-insured fiduciaries' rights and
obligations under the property insurance contract were divisible. 521 The
trustee admitted that Edward Luer was a deviant co-insured fiduciary.522
But the trustee insisted that Edward's deviancy, fraudulently
misrepresenting the true value of the stored furnishings, should not bar the
trustee's recovery of the $20,000.523
The Seventh Circuit accepted
Mercantile's argument and ordered Underwriters to indemnify the
trustee.524 Applying Illinois's law and citing the New Hampshire Supreme
Court's language in Hoyt v. New Hampshire FireInsurance Co., the federal
court of appeals wrote:
Mercantile's rights should not be defeated by any wrongful acts of Edward
Luer. ... 'The ordinary person owning an undivided interest in property,
not versed in the nice distinctions of insurance law, would naturally
Mercantile... never paid any of the insurance costs." Id.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.at 503-04.
517. Id.
Luer presented an $8,000 claim to Underwriters, enclosing a detailed, handwritten household
inventory showing the total contents of the house as worth $32,105.35. During the course of
investigation of the origin of the fire, Edward Luer told Underwriters' arson investigator that
the only object moved out of the residence before the fire was his son Frank D. Luer's bed.
In an ensuing deposition in California, where Edward Luer [resided], he repeated the
statement that only his son's bed had been moved out of the residence. His deposition was
signed and sworn to before a notary public.

Id.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.

Id. at 503.
Id.
Id. at 504.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 506.
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suppose that his individual interest in the property was covered by a policy
which named him without qualification as one of the persons insured.'...
Mercantile had no control over the property and was unaware of Edward
Luer's misconduct .... Edward Luer had only a beneficial life interest in
the property. We do not think that the Illinois courts would impute his
fraud to the trustee or to his son Frank D. Luer, the innocent
remainderman. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed
with the qualification that none of the proceeds of this Bolicy on the
dwelling house be expended for the benefit of Edward Luer.
That the Mercantile court cited excerpts from the New Hampshire
Supreme Court's decision in Hoyt is significant. 526 In Hoyt, the
527
complaining innocent fiduciaries were partners rather than trustees.
Among partnership cases, Hoyt's innocent fiduciary ruling is the minority
rather than the majority position. Ernest E. Hoyt, Ernest L. Hoyt, and
Walter J. Jacobsen were apparently
co-partners and they owned a certain
528
property as tenants in common.
Six fire insurance contracts listed each partner as a named insured.529
The insurers were several other companies and New Hampshire Fire
Insurance Company, collectively, NHFIC.53 ° While the policies were
current, Ernest L. Hoyt intentionally set fire to the insured property, and the
structure was completely destroyed.5 31 An indictment charged him with
arson and he pleaded guilty. 532 The other two co-insured partners did not
participate in nor had any knowledge of the property destruction.53 3 The
innocent co-insured fiduciaries filed a notice of loss, asking NHFIC to
compensate the innocent partners for their share of the losses.534 The
insurers declined.535
Eventually, the case reached the New Hampshire Supreme Court.536
Before that tribunal, the property insurers admitted that the innocent
partners could have insured their respective separate insurable interests in
525. Id. at 505-06 (citing language in Hoyt v. N. H. Fire Ins. Co., 29 A.2d 121, 122 (N.H. 1942).
See Borman v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 499 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Mich. App., 1993) (A
conservator/administrator of one insured's estate sued the property insurer to recover proceeds under a
homeowner's policy after a deviant co-insured set fire to the property. The court of appeals adopted the
administrator's argument and concluded that-despite the deviant co-insured's fraud or intentional
misconduct-the insurer still had a duty to indemnify the innocent co-insured.).
526. See Mercantile,376 F.2d at 505-06.
527. See Hoyt, 29 A.2d at 122.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 122-23.
535.

Id.

536.

See id. at 122.
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the "common property. 537 The insurers stressed, however, that the
innocent partners did not.5 38 Therefore, from the insurers' collective
perspective, they had no duty to indemnify for several reasons: (1) The
allegedly innocent partners did not insure their individual interests; (2) The
complaining partners were "jointly named" under each policy; and (3) if
one "jointly named" partner breaches a condition subsequent in a policy,
that violation prevents all partners from recovering under the first-party
property insurance contract.539
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, however, did not embrace the
insurers' argument. 540 First, the supreme court observed that the "named
insured" or coverage provision in a property insurance contract creates a
"joint covenant" and is not conclusive. 541 Second, the court stated, "There
is a presumption in this jurisdiction against an intention to create joint
interests ... and if the defendants intended the policies .. to be joint, that
intention should have been clearly expressed." 542 Third, the supreme court
stressed that the innocent co-insured partners insurable interests under the
insurance contract comported with the view that "[A] a contract may be
divisible in some respects and indivisible in others. 54 3
Therefore, in light of those considerations, the Hoyt court concluded
that deviant co-partner's incendiarism did not prevent the innocent partners
from collecting proceeds under the property insurance contracts. 5 " But, to
repeat, there is a split in authorities, and the decision in Hoyt is a minority
position among partners and partnership cases.545 For example,
McCullough v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit applied Nebraska's law and concluded that the insurer
had no duty to indemnity the innocent father-partner after the deviant sonpartner intentionally torched the partnership's videotape rental business.54 6

537. Id. at 122-23.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 123.
540. Id.
541. Id.
While it is essential to the existence of a fire insurance policy that the party insured should
have some interest in the subject matter of the insurance and cases cited. . . , it is not
necessary that the extent of the insured's interest be set forth in the policy .... Thus, 'One
who holds an undivided interest need not specifically describe his share ...but may effect
insurance... in general terms. If it appears that the description was intended to cover and
apply exclusively to the individual interest of the assured, he will recover for such interest as
he has.'
Id. at 122 (citing 3 Joyce, Insurance, 2d Ed., § 1691).
542. Id. at 123.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. See id.
546. McCullough v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 80 F.3d 269,272 (8th Cir. 1996).
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Furthermore, Oklahoma and Wisconsin Supreme Courts as547well as an
appellate court in California have reached the same conclusion.
VI. CONFLICTING STATE AND FEDERAL COURT'S DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS-WHETHER LIABILITY INSURERS HAVE A DUTY TO PAY
THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF INNOCENT

CO-INSURED FIDUCIARIES

Once more, fiduciaries' dealings, along with their corresponding
obligations, may be categorizes as strictly familial or strictly businessrelated fiduciary relationships. Thus, at this juncture, it is necessary to
repeat a few general principles: "All fiduciaries are held to a duty of
fairness, good faith and fidelity. 5 48 Spouses, parents, and adult children
have a mutual obligation to act in good faith, exercise prudence, and be fair
when their transactions evolve from and are based on familial confidential
relations.M9 Similarly, business-related fiduciaries must act in good faith
547. See Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright, 322 P.2d 417, 422 (Okla. 1958) (embracing the rule that
"an innocent partner cannot recover on an insurance policy upon partnership property willfully burned
by his copartner, especially where the policy provides that the insured shall use all reasonable means at
and after a fire to preserve the property"); Bellman v. Home Ins. Co., 189 N.W. 1028, 1028 (Wis. 1922)
("To permit a recovery by either the partnership or the unoffending partner upon a policy of insurance
issued to a partnership, insuring partnership property, where one of the partners has willfully fired the
insured property, is... repugnant to an intuitive sense of justice."); Zemelman v. Boston Ins. Co., 84
Cal. Rptr. 206, 208 (Cal. App. 1970) (In this case, a partner-acting on behalf of the partnership--filed
a claims under the fire insurance contract and fraudulently misrepresented a material fact. The contract
expressly voided the entire policy if--either before or after a loss---the insured willfully misrepresented
a material fact. Accepting the insurers defenses, the court concluding that as a matter of law, the deviant
partner's filing a false claim triggered a denial of coverage for both deviant and innocent co-insured
partners under a fire insurance contracts, because the fraud was a direct fraud upon the insurance
company and a violation of the contract).
548. See In re Honig, 89 A.2d 411, 413 (1952).
549. Nobles v. Hutton, 7 Cal. App. 14, 20-21 (1907) ("[T]he relation of parent and child, where
business transactions are carried on between them, is the source of the very highest considerations of
confidence and trust. Confidence in such a case originates in and proceeds from natural laws, and,
generally speaking, is innate and an essential part of the nature of both, for in whom could a parent
repose a greater degree of confidence than in him to whom has been directly transmitted his own blood,
and over whom he has exercised parental dominion and discipline from infancy to matured manhood.
So, when a son, dealing with his parent with regard to the latter's property, gains an advantage or
obtains title to such property without adequate or any consideration, the transaction should, upon
principles of equity and fair dealing, be scanned with the strictest scrutiny.... The books are full of
cases illustrating the application of the principle as thus stated[.]"). See, e.g., In re Marriage of Young,
No. A114989, 2007 WL 2143007, at*5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 reads: "[fln
transactions between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary
relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This
confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and
neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other .... "); Mizrahi v. Mizrahi, B 191300, 2007 WL
2728329, at*5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) ("Families are held together by mutual trust and rely on that trust
when transacting business with one another. Except in unusual circumstances, adult children owe a debt
and thus a special fiduciary duty toward their elderly parents[.]"); In re Guardianship of Willbanks, 588
P.2d 118, 120 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) ("Family relationships cannot excuse fiduciary's duty to account for
the estate's assets.").
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and protect co-fiduciaries' interest, even if family members or no family
members participate in those confidential and commercial enterprises.550
In light of those principles, courts in separate and community property
states have to address three very different but highly related questions:
(1) whether innocent fiduciaries may purchase liability or indemnity
insurance to insure themselves against the perils of a vicarious liability
action or judgment; (2) whether innocent fiduciaries are vicariously liable
for their deviant co-fiduciaries intentional and negligent acts; and
(3) whether innocent co-insured fiduciaries' may recover proceeds under
third-party insurance contracts after triers of fact conclude that innocent
fiduciaries are vicariously liable for deviant fiduciaries' negligent or
intentional acts. 551
Put simply, there is no serious debate or conflict regarding the first and
second questions. Generally, innocent fiduciaries may purchase liability or
indemnity insurance to cover third-party, personal-injury, or propertydamage claims when innocent fiduciaries become vicariously liable for
their co-fiduciaries' wrongful acts. 52 In fact, general contractors often
require subcontractors to purchase third-party liability or indemnity
insurance which covers general contractors if they become vicariously
liable for workers' injuries.5 3
550. Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 636 F. Supp. 3d 869, 888 (D.
Minn. 2009) ("Under Minnesota law, whether a fiduciary relationship exists is a question of fact. 'A
fiduciary relationship exists 'when confidence is reposed on one side and there is resulting superiority
and influence on the other.' Evidence of business experience disparities, financial control, repeated
assurances and invited confidences may suffice to show a fiduciary relationship") (quoting Toombs v.
Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 801, 809 (Minn.1985); Stark v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 285 N.W. 466,
470 (Minn. 1939); Kennedy v. Flo-Tronics, Inc., 143 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Minn. 1966). See, e.g.,
DiSabatino v. Farrar, No. Civ. A. 95C-02-183-WTQ, 1998 WL 730322, at *5 (Del. Super. 1998).
The court finds there is a valid equitable claim; on the totality of the circumstances, Alfred
reasonably relied upon and trusted his brother Michael to establish somehow a retirement
contribution for him and further that such trust was supported by Alfred's labor for the
family corporations, Alfred's ownership status in Debro, and... by the clear representations
of Michael. There existed both a personal confidential relationship, enhanced by a blood
relationship, and a family business fiduciary relationship between manager-employer and
shareholder-employee.
Id.
551. See infra text accompanying notes 552-56.
552. See, e.g., Frontline Processing Corp. v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 149 P.3d 906, 909 (Mont. 2006).
[T]he policy before us insures Frontline against direct losses caused by the dishonesty of its
employees. Many jurisdictions have construed 'direct loss' or similar language in a fidelity
bond or insurance policy. A fidelity policy, also known as an employee dishonesty policy, is
a form of insurance in which the insurer agrees 'to indemnify an employer against a loss
arising from the lack of integrity or honesty of an employee....' Under a liability policy, by
contrast, the policy holder is insured against or indemnified for, vicarious liability to a thirdparty claimant.
Id. (citation omitted).
553. See, e.g., Seren Innovations, Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., No. A05-917, 2006 WL
1390262, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
Seren Innovations, Inc. Seren was the contractor on a fiber optic cable installation project in
St. Cloud. Seren hired Cable Constructors, Inc. (CCI) to perform the construction and
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Second, courts generally agree that fiduciaries are vicariously liable
for their co-fiduciaries' negligent conduct. 4 Under the "single business
enterprise theory," two corporations are vicariously liable for the each
other's obligations if a single business enterprise exits factually and they
both participate in the enterprise.55 5 Members of joint ventures are
vicariously liable for each other's acts, since a voluntary relationship exists
between or among the members.556 Trustees, executors, administrators, or
conservators may be vicariously liable.557 Additionally, even insurance
carriers are vicariously liable for their local recording agents' affirmative
misrepresentations. 5 8
On the other hand, whether fiduciaries are liable for their cofiduciaries' intentional acts depends on the types of fiduciary relationships
that exist among or between fiduciaries.5 59 For example, under the doctrine
of respondeat superior, employers are vicariously liable for employees'
560
tortious acts when employees latter act within their scope of employment.
installation of the cable. Although Seren had a primary insurance carrier, [with] respondent
Western National Mutual Insurance Company Western National, the construction contract
between Seren and CCI required CCI to purchase additional insurance to indemnify Seren.
In satisfaction of this requirement, CCI purchased policies from . . . Transcontinental
Insurance Company (Transcontinental) and Continental Casualty Co. (Continental). CCI
purchased from Transcontinental a commercial general-liability policy with coverage of $1
million. CCI purchased from Continental a commercial umbrella policy with coverage of $25
million.

Id.
554. Cf St. Anthony's Hosp. v. Whitfield, 946 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, writ
denied) ("Vicarious liability is liability placed upon one for the conduct of another, based solely upon
the relationship between the two.").
555. See S. Union Co. v. City of Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d 74, 86-90 (Tex. 2003).
556. See Adams v. Johnston, 860 P.2d 423,429 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
557. Cf Reynolds v. Schrock, 107 P.3d 52, 57 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (embracing the view that "a
trustee's attorney may be liable for a trustee's breach of the trust if the attorney 'knew or should have
known that he was assisting the trustee to commit a breach of trust"'). But see Murdock v. Murdock,
370 So. 2d 290, 292-93 (Ala. 1979).
The law... is well settled. 'An executor who is a layman has the right to rely upon the
advice and counsel of an attorney . . . . If due care is exercised in the selection and
employment of an attorney or agent, the executor is not absolutely bound by dereliction of
the attorney or agent. . . [A] representative is ordinarily not personally liable for loss
chargeable to his lawyer's negligence, misconduct, or nonfeasance, if due prudence was
exercised in the selection of the lawyer. But the representative may not surrender all the
duties of his trust or delegate all his functions to the attorney without becoming responsible
to the distributees for losses caused by the attorney's conduct.. . .' This rule, by its very
terms, precludes the administrator's vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Liability is not to be imposed upon an imputed negligence or no-fault concept....
With the possible exception of Louisiana, this personal fault-based rule of an administrator's
or executor's liability for dereliction of the fiduciary's lawyer appears to be universally
recognized throughout the United States.
Id. (quoting 31 Am.JuR. 2D EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS § 219).
558. See, e.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex. 1979).
559. See, e.g., Haney v. Kitchen, 690 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa 2005) (providing a list of situations in
which a fiduciary will be held liable).
560. See Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998).
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However, employers may not be vicariously liable when employees commit
56 1
intentional torts on or off the business premises during working hours.
Furthermore, married people are not vicariously liable for each other's
intentional acts simply because they are married.562 Generally, the law
recognizes that spouses are "are still individuals and responsible for their
own acts. 563
Courts in community and separate property states continue to deliver
conflicting rulings surrounding the third question: whether third-party
insurers must reimburse innocent co-insured fiduciaries after the latter
become vicariously liable for their co-fiduciaries' negligent or intentional
acts and the innocent fiduciaries pay third-party claims or judgments. 564 To
be sure, judicial splits appear among decisions in which both familial and
business fiduciaries have asked insurance companies to reimburse out-ofpocket expenditures. 565 Therefore,
this latter question and its ancillary
5 66
issues are discussed in this part.
A. Whether Liability Insurers Have a Duty to Pay Third-partyClaims On
Behalf of Vicariously Liable, Innocent, and Co-InsuredFamilial
Fiduciaries
To begin the discussion, assume that familial fiduciaries are factually
innocent co-insured, and vicariously liable for another familial fiduciary's
wrongful conduct. What factors do courts consider before determining
whether third-party insurers have an obligation to indemnify innocent
fiduciaries after the latter use personal funds to cover third-party victims'
personal injuries or property damage? To help answer this fundamental
question, consider the facts and the courts' conflicting analyses in two,
fairly similar controversies.567
In American States Insurance Co. v. Borbor by Borbor, James and
Isabel Meacham were residents of California where they owned and
operated Isabel's Nursery School.568 Put simply, they were familial and
business fiduciaries. American States Insurance Company (American) is an
Indiana corporation. 69 Under a comprehensive liability policy, American
561. See Scott v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d 327, 329 (La. Ct. App. 1982); see also
Enserch Corp. v. Parker, 794 S.W.2d 2, 6 (Tex. 1990) (concluding that a party is not ordinarily
vicariously liable for an independent contractor's actions, because the latter has sole control over the
means and methods to accomplish a bargained-for-exchange task).
562. See Shearer v. Dunn County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 159 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Wis. 1968).
563. Id.
564. See infra Part VI.A.
565. See infra Part VI.A.
566. See infra Part VI.A.
567. See infra text accompanying notes 568-64 1.
568. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Borbor by Borbor, 826 F.2d 888, 889 (9th Cir. 1987).
569. Id. at 890.
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insured James and Isabel Meacham d/b/a: Isabel's Nursery School. 57 °
James was a pedophile. 571 He took "over 2,000 photographs" of children
who attended the school and "catalogued the slides in a meticulous filing
system., 572 James photographed the children while they were undressing,
touching themselves, and posing in various sexual positions.57 3
James's deviant activities and his conviction occurred while the
liability insurance contract was in force.574 Also, during that same period,
at least twenty-three children and their parents sued James and Isabel
Meacham for the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress,
assault, battery, and fraud. 575 The Meachams asked American to defend
and indemnify them. 576 The liability insurer began a defense under a
reservation of rights.577
Shortly thereafter, American filed a declaratory judgment action in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California.5 78 The
insurer asked the federal district court to determine its rights and obligations
under the Meachams' liability insurance policy. 579 After a bench trial, the
district court found the following: (1) The Meachams were partners in the
nursery school business; (2) James' molestation of the children was
intentional; and (3) as a partner, Isabel was vicariously liable for James'
intentional acts.580
Even more relevant, section 533 of the California Insurance Code
states that "[a]n insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of
the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of
the insured's agents or others." 58 ' Citing section 533, the federal district
court concluded that James' intentional acts "occurred 'in the ordinary
course of business,"' and those violations precluded insurance coverage for
both James and Isabel.582 Therefore, American did not have to indemnify
or defend Isabel.58 3 To help reach that conclusion, the district court
suggested that Isabel might have been slightly acquiescent as a wife and

570. Id. at 889.
571. Id.
572. Id. at 889-90.
573.

Id. at 889.

574. Id.
575. Id. at 890.
576. Id.
577. Id.
578.
579.

Id.
Id.

580. Id.
581. CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1987).
582. Am. States Ins. Co., 826 F.2d at 892 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 15013) (finding that James and
Isabel had equal control over the operation of the nursery school, and that James had apparent and
ostensible authority to be with the children and take them off school premises, the court concluded that
his wrongful acts occurred "in the ordinary course of the business").
583. Id. at 895.
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partner when James was molesting children. 5 Asserting that she was the
innocent wife, partner, and co-insured fiduciary, Isabel Meacham
appealed.585
Before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Isabel admitted that she
was a partner in the nursery school enterprise.8 6 Additionally, citing
partnership rules, Isabel admitted that she was vicariously liable for James'
conduct.587 However, she stressed that she was separately insured under the
American liability insurance contract. 8
Therefore, in light of her
individual coverage, Isabel insisted that American had a duty to indemnify
and defend her against the underlying third-party lawsuit. 589 The court of
appeals agreed with Isabel, rejecting the district court's conclusion that
section 533 of the California Insurance Code barred her recovery under the
third-party insurance contract. 59
First, the Ninth Circuit observed that the federal district court
mistakenly and inappropriately "collapsed two separate considerations into
one." 591 More specifically, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that whether a
partner may be vicariously liable for co-partner's intentional acts is very
different from whether California Insurance Code § 533 requires a liability
insurer to defend or indemnify a totally innocent co-insured partner who is
vicariously liable for a co-partner's conduct.592 In the end, Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declared that American had a duty to
indemnify Isabel.5 93 The federal appellate stressed that "Isabel's liability
for James' acts [must] be distinguished from her ability to insure against

584. Id. at 891-92 ("American States argued at trial that Isabel had aided, abetted, participated in, or
ratified James' criminal acts, the district court found she had not. The court stated: 'I find that at most,
she may have been a knowing bystander. More likely, she closed her eyes to certain facts to deliberately
avoid learning the whole truth."').
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 892.
[Tihe court concluded that Isabel committed no wrongful act which would deprive her of the
policy's coverage. The court determined, however, that Isabel was nonetheless vicariously
liable for James' acts of child molestation because the Meachams operated the nursery school
as a partnership. 'This is true even if Isabel is regarded as innocent as to his wrongdoings, or
merely negligent in her supervision.'
Id. (citations omitted).
588. Id. at 893.
589. Id. at 890.
590. Id.at 892.
591. Id.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 894. "To conclude that Isabel may be indemnified under the American States policy
does no violence to this public policy .... [N]either Isabel's negligence if any, nor her vicarious liability
for James' willful acts precludes insurance coverage under California Insurance Code § 533." Id.
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that liability."' 94 In addition, the Ninth Circuit embraced Isabel's argument
that she was insured separately under the liability insurance contract.5 9 '
In Taryn E.F. by Grunewaldv. JoshuaMC., innocent parents were coinsured fiduciaries along with their child.5 96 However, the insurer did not
have to indemnify the parents after they became vicariously liable for their
child's intentional act.597 Here, Dan and Dawn F. are the parents of Taryn
F., and Michael and Beverly C. are the parents of Joshua C.5 98 On two
occasions, Taryn's parents employed Joshua, then twelve years old, to
babysit three-year-old Taryn and her brother. 9 9 On both occasions, Joshua
sexually assaulted and battered Taryn in various ways. 600 Taryn's parents
against Joshua and his parents seeking
commenced a third-party lawsuit
61
torts.
Joshua's
for
damages
The complaint alleged that Joshua intentionally, willfully, maliciously,
and wantonly sexually molested a female infant.60 2 Dan and Dawn also
alleged that Joshua's parents were vicariously liable for Joshua's act.60 3 A
Wisconsin statute allows third-party victims to impute a deviant child's
intentional acts to the child's innocent parents. 6 4 More specifically,
Section 895.035(2)(a) of the Wisconsin Statute reads in pertinent part:
The parent or parents with custody of a minor child, in any circumstances
where he, she, or they may not be liable under the common law, are liable
for damages to property, for the cost of repairing or replacing property or
removing the marking, drawing, writing, or etching from property... for
injury
the value of unrecovered stolen property, or for personal
6 °5
attributableto a willful, malicious, or wanton act of the child.

Dan and Dawn amended their third-party complaint and listed Michael and
Black Mutual Insurance Company
Beverly's homeowners' insurer, Little
60 6
(Little Black), as another defendant.
Little Black filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the trial
court to dismiss Dan and Dawn's third-party lawsuit.60 7 The insurer argued
594. Id. at 892.
595. Id. at 893. "[Isabel argued that California Insurance Code § 533] does not preclude insurance
coverage for an innocent, albeit perhaps a negligent, co-partner who is a separate insured under a
comprehensive liability policy." Id.
596. Taryn E.F. by Grunewald v. Joshua M.C., 505 N.W.2d 418 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
597. Id. at 419.

598. Id.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 422.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.035(2Xa) (West 2009) (emphasis added).
Taryn E.F., 505 N.W.2d at 419.

Id.
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that the insurance contract excluded coverage for "any insured's intentional,
wanton malicious acts." 60 8 Also citing the exclusion clause, Little Black
maintained that it had no duty to indemnify or defend Joshua and his
parents. 60 9 Little Black asserted that Joshua's liability and his parents'
vicarious liability evolved "directly or indirectly from the actual, alleged or
threatened sexual molestation [of baby Taryn].'6 1°
After reviewing the exclusion clause, the trial court granted the
insurer's motion. 611 The court concluded that Little Black had no duty to
indemnify or defend Beverly and Michael.6 12 More enlightening, the trial
court found that (1) Joshua was a "named insured" under the insurance
contract; (2) the exclusions clause precluded coverage for "any insured";
and (3) coverage for Joshua's alleged acts were excluded under the
intentional-acts and sexual-molestation exclusion clauses. 613 Although
finding that Michael and Beverly were innocent co-insureds, the trial court
concluded
that the contract's severability-of-interests clause did not
614
apply.
On appeal before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Taryn's parents
argued that Little Black had a duty to indemnify Michael and Beverly, so
the latter could secure and transfer the insurance proceeds to Taryn.6 15 In
particular, they argued that the trial court erred because Michael and
Beverly were innocent co-insureds who did not participate in or encourage
Joshua's acts.616 Furthermore, Taryn's parents asserted that Little Black
had a duty to indemnify because Michael and Beverly were insured
separately under the insurance contract's severability-of-interest clause.617
First, the court of appeals concluded that the exclusion clause excluded
coverage for Michael and Beverly's vicarious liability because Joshua's
608.
609.
610.
611.

Id. at 420.
Id.

Id.
The policy exclusions clause read:
INTENTIONAL ACT EXCLUSION

The insurance afforded by this policy shall not apply to any damages to property or for
bodily injury attributable to a willful, malicious, wanton or otherwise intentional act of the
"insured" or performed at an "insured's" direction or for any outrageous conduct on the part
of any "insured" consisting of any intentional, wanton, malicious acts, or, in addition, any act
that would constitute wanton disregard for the rights of others.
SEXUAL MOLESTATION EXCLUSION

This policy does not apply to liability which results directly or indirectly from the actual, alleged or
threatened sexual molestation of a person.
612. Id. at 420.
613. Id.
614.
615.
616.

Id.
See id. at 421.
See id.

617.

See id. at 420.
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tortious acts were excluded. 1 8 Second, the insurance contract's
severability-of-interest clause stated: "Each person listed above is a separate
insured under this policy, but this does not increase our limit of liability
under this policy. '619 Yet Taryn's parents argued that ambiguity arises
when one reads the language in the severability clause in conjunction with
the terms and phrases in the exclusionary clauses. 620 Rejecting this
argument, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated: "Language [in the
exclusion clause] unambiguously denies coverage for all liability incurred
by each and any insured
as a result of certain conduct by any of the persons
62'
policy."
the
by
insured
Without a doubt, the conflicting decisions in Borbor and Taryn are
excellent examples of widespread disagreement among state and federal
courts over the question of whether insurers must indemnify innocent coinsured and vicariously liable fiduciaries when their deviant co-familial
fiduciaries injure third-party victims' persons and property. Many courts
have forced insurers to indemnify innocent but vicariously liable familial
fiduciaries. 62262Numerous other courts have not.623
618. Id.at 422. "Under this insurance contract, coverage for liability resulting from Joshua's acts is
precluded because the contract expressly denies coverage (1) if any insured engages in intentional,
wanton, malicious acts and (2) if liability directly or indirectly results from a sexual molestation." Id.
619. Id. at 420 (emphasis in original).
620. Id. at 420.
621. Id. at 420-21.
Assuming, without deciding, that the severability clause creates separate policies for each
insured, that clause does not render the exclusionary clauses in the policy ambiguous. The
intentional acts exclusion expressly states that '[t]he insurance afforded by this policy shall
not apply to any damages ... attributableto... any outrageous conduct on the part of any
"insured" consisting of any intentional, wanton, malicious acts....
Id.
622. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Sec. Ins. Group, 288 So. 2d 134, 137 (Ala. 1973) (The named insureds
under a liability policy were "Mary Ann and William Cofield d/b/a Lakeview Sandwich Shop."
William shot a patron during a scuffle at the shop. The court held that where innocent co-insured did
not authorize, direct, or commit the assault, the liability policy's intentional injury exclusion did not
apply); Arenson v. Nat'l Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 P.2d 816, 818 (Cal. 1955) (Arenson's minor son
intentionally burned down school property. A state statute imposed liability on a parent for a child's
"willfully" caused damages. The school district secured a judgment against Arenson. Although
Arenson, his spouse, and minor children were all insured under a general liability policy, the insurer
refused to indemnify Arenson because the damage was "caused intentionally by or at the direction of the
insured." The California Supreme Court reversed and stated: "Section 533 of the Insurance Codewhich codifies the general rule that an insurance policy indemnifying the insured against liability due to
his own willful wrong is void as against public policy--has no application to a situation where the
plaintiff is not personally at fault."); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lynette C., 279 Cal. Rptr. 394, 402
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that the foster parents' liability policy-which excluded from coverage
liability for sexual misconduct if insured acted with actual lasciviousness or immoral purpose and
intent-covered an innocent co-insured foster mother who negligently failed to protect foster child from
the foster father's sexual molestation); Safe Auto Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 856 N.E.2d 156, 162
(Ind. App. 2006) ("Although Badillo is excluded from coverage under the terms of Duran's insurance
policy, Indiana Code section 27-1-13-7 requires Safe Auto to insure Duran for vicarious liability arising
from the negligence of a permissive user, even those otherwise excluded. In addition, Duran's
misrepresentation at the time of her application for the policy does not affect Safe Auto's obligation to
provide coverage for vicarious liability arising from the permissive use of the insured vehicle.");
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But there is more. In Taryn, Joshua's parents stressed that the
insurance contract contained a "severability of interests" clause.624 Under
such clauses, the named insureds' insurable interests are severable and not
joint.625 Therefore, before refusing to indemnify, insurers have a duty to
read an exclusion clause in light of the "separation of insureds" clause.626
Essentially, the "separation of the insureds doctrine" requires insurers to
apply an exclusion clause to each insured separately.62 7
Arguably, when courts compare severability and exclusion clauses,
those tribunals must decide which clause is superior.628 There is no
universal test to determine which clause controls. 629 However, courts have
fashioned some generally severability rules to govern disputes involving
property insurance contracts. First, innocent co-insured fiduciaries may not
recover proceeds under a property insurance contract if the innocent and

Shearer v. Dunn County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 159 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Wis. 1968) (rejecting an invitation
to fashion a vicariously liability doctrine that imputes an insured deviant spouse's action to the insured
innocent spouse and prevent the innocent spouse from recovering the insurance contract. "The marriage
relationship should not be used as a basis for such a law. Married people are still individuals and
responsible for their own acts. Vicarious liability is not an attribute of marriage."); Smith v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 531 N.W.2d 376, 382 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that the insurer had to
indemnify the innocent co-insured fiduciary because the deviant co-insured's negligence could not be
imputed to the innocent fiduciary); Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 752 (Colo.
1990) (declining to follow the minority ofjurisdictions, holding that "any insured" denies coverage only
to the culpable party, and recognizing that "an insurance policy is a contract between the parties which
should be enforced in a manner consistent with the intentions expressed therein"); Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Nemetz, 135 Wis. 2d 245, 400 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that the exclusionary
clauses precluded coverage for the insured who committed the excludable acts, but not for the innocent
insured because the insurers did not adequately draft the policy to exclude coverage for both insureds
based on the excludable acts of one insured).
623. George v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 721 So. 2d 573, 575-77 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding
that household exclusion bars a tort-based indemnity claim against an insured who is vicariously liable);
Worcester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mamell, 496 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Mass. 1986) (concluding that the insurer had
no duty to indemnify innocent co-insured and vicariously liable familial fiduciaries); McPhee v. Tufty,
623 N.W.2d 390, 394, 409 (N.D. 2001) (concluding that evidence supported the lower court's
application of the family car doctrine which made the father vicariously liable for the driver's
negligence but also concluding that the policy did not cover the third-party, vicarious-liability claim
since the car was not "used"); Knoblock v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 615 A.2d 644, 646-47 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (declaring that the insurance contract's exclusion clause bars third-party tortbased indemnity claim against an insured who is vicariously liable because the claim was derived solely
from the third-party's bodily injury claim); see J.G. & R.G. v. Wangard, 753 N.W.2d 475, 495-96 (Wis.
2008) (Butler, J., dissenting) ("[To the extent that the majority appears to view the intentional acts
exclusion clause as unambiguously imputing Steven's intentional acts to his wife's negligent acts, such
an imposition of vicarious liability violates the rule of law we have generally established against
imputing one spouse's conduct to another in an insurance coverage contract"). (citing Shearer v. Dunn
County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 159 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Wis. 1968)).
624. Taryn E.F. v Joshua M.C., 505 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
625. Id.
626. See, e.g., Michael Carbone, Inc., v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 937 F. Supp. 413, 416 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
627. Id.
628. See id.
629. See id. at 417.
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deviant co-insureds interests in tangible or intangible property are joint or
inseparable.630 On the other hand, if the innocent and offending coinsureds' interests in the property are divisible or severable, innocent coinsureds may recover under a property-insurance contract.63'
However, it is important to stress: In Borbor and Taryn the respective
controversies concerned whether innocent and co-insured fiduciaries,
although vicariously liable, could recover under liability insurance
contracts.6 32 Therefore, courts must perform a slightly different analysis.63 3
A court must determine whether the co-insureds' contractual obligations are
joint or severable under the liability insurance contracts. 634 Arguably,
liability insurers should indemnify innocent co-insured fiduciaries if the
latter's contractual obligations are severable and if innocent co-insured
fiduciaries factually breached coverage, exclusions, or conditions clauses.635
Furthermore, this arguably sound rule should apply even when
innocent fiduciaries are vicariously liable for their co-fiduciaries'
intentional, criminal, or negligent acts.6 36 However, courts are also
seriously divided over this "severability of obligation" issue.637 Some
courts do not force liability insurers to indemnify vicariously liable,
innocent co-insured fiduciaries.63 8 Generally, those courts conclude that the
"any insured" language in an exclusion clause bars coverage for deviant,
innocent, or vicariously liable co-insured fiduciaries if "any insured"
violates the exclusion clause, and those tribunals apply this arguably
639
draconian rule even if liability policies contain severability clauses.
630. See, e.g., Short v. Okla. Farmers Union Ins. 619 P.2d 588, 590 (Okla. 1980); see also Morgan
v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 829, 830 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
631. See, e.g., Hosey v. Seibels Bruce Group, S.C. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 751, 754 (Ala. 1978); and
Hoyt v. N.H. Fire Ins. Co., 29 A.2d 121,123 (N.H. 1942).
632. See discussion supraPart VI.A.
633. See discussion supraPart VI.A.
634. See discussion supra Part VI.A.
635. See discussion supra Part VI.A.
636. See discussion supra Part VI.A.
637. See infra notes 630-40.
638. See id.
639. Michael Carbone, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 937 F. Supp. 413, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding that an exclusion phrased "any insured" precluded coverage despite a severability clause); see
McCauley Enters. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Conn. 1989) (holding that an exclusion
referencing "any insured" barred recovery of losses by an innocent co-insured); Chacon v. Am. Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 752 (Colo.1990) (holding that an exclusion for the intentional acts of "any
insured" precluded a negligent supervision claim despite a severability clause); Oaks v. Dupuy, 653 So.
2d 165, 168 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that a severability clause did not alter the scope of an
exclusion clause phrased in terms of "any insured"); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Copeland-Williams,
941 S.W.2d 625, 629 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ("The use of the phrase 'any insured' makes the exclusionary
clause unambiguous even in light of the severability clause."); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 912
S.W.2d 531, 533-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a severability clause did not negate an exclusion
for damages "arising out of business pursuits of any insured ...by an insured"); Nw. G.F. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179, 180, 184 (N.D. 1994) (holding that an exclusion for sexual molestation by
"an insured, an insured's employee or any other person involved" precluded coverage for a negligent
supervision claim against another insured, notwithstanding a severability clause); Great Cent. Ins. Co. v.
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Conversely, other federal and state courts forced insurers to indemnify even
vicariously liable and innocent co-fiduciaries when insurance contracts
contained severability-of-obligation clauses. 640
B. Whether Liability Insurers Have a Duty to Indemnify or Defend
Vicariously Liable, Innocent, and Co-InsuredBusiness FiduciariesAgainst
Third-party Claims
Finally, liability insurers and business fiduciaries also frequently
litigate whether insurers have a contractual duty to indemnify or defend
factually innocent, yet vicariously liable, co-insured fiduciaries. 64 1
Generally, liability insurers argue that they have no obligation to indemnify
or defend innocent co-insured commercial fiduciaries, when deviant cofiduciaries negligently or intentionally destroy third-parties' lives and/or
property interests. 42 That this disagreement persists among innocent
commercial fiduciaries and liability insurers is somewhat puzzling for one
major reason: Commercial or business fiduciaries know they will, or might
be, vicariously liable for their deviant partners' conduct; therefore, they
purchase liability insurance. 643

Roemmich, 291 N.W.2d 772, 774 (S.D. 1980) (finding no ambiguity in the term "any insured" in an
exclusionary clause, even when interpreted with a severability of insurance provision); Caroff v.
Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 989 P.2d 1233, 1236-37 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that exclusions of
coverage for injury arising out of child molestation by 'any insured' precluded coverage despite general
severability clauses); Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 505 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that an exclusionary clause referencing "any insured" precluded coverage even when read with a
severability clause).; see, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. White, 65 P.3d 449, 457 (Ariz. App. [Div. 1]
2003) (concluding that the exclusion for conviction of "any insured" applied to claims made solely
against parents, regardless of policy's severability clause).
640. W. Am. Ins. Co. v. AV & S, 145 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir.1998) ("[T]he term 'any insured'
in an exclusion clause in a policy that also contains a severability clause does not exclude coverage for
all insureds when only one insured is at fault."); Transp. Inden. Co. v. Wyatt, 417 So. 2d 568, 571 (Ala.
1982) (applying a severability clause and finding the term "any insured" in an exclusion ambiguous);
Premier Ins. Co. v. Adams, 632 So. 2d 1054, 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a severability
clause limited an exclusion for intentional acts by "any insured" to exclude coverage only for the insured
who intentionally caused the injury); Brumley v. Lee, 963 P.2d 1224, 1227-28 (Kan. 1998) (holding that
a severability clause afforded each insured his or her own policy despite an exclusionary intentional act
clause referencing "any insured"); Worcester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marnell, 496 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Mass.
1986) (interpreting a severability clause to nullify a motor vehicle exclusion despite the exclusion's "any
insured" language); Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Estate of Fournelle, 472 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Minn. 1991)
(stating that a severability clause provided for separate coverage to named insureds despite a household
exclusion applying to "any insured").
641. See, e.g., Selander v. Erie Ins. Group, 709 N.E.2d 11661, 1162-1163 (Ohio 1999) ("Glenn and
Eugene Selander were electricians involved in a partnership known as Twin Electric and were working
in the course and scope of their business activities ....
The policy included uninsured/underinsured
motorist coverage in the amount of $300,000 per accident .... Under the specific language of the policy,
'if you are a partnership a non-owned automobile does include any automobile owned by or registered in
the name of a partner, but only while such automobile is being used in your business."').
642. See id.
643. See id.
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Potentially vicariously liable employers also accept the same
realization and purchase third-party insurance. 644 But even more
importantly, federal and state courts recognize that commercial or business
fiduciaries are acting prudently and responsibly when they purchase
liability insurance to cover imputed negligence. Yet, conflicting judicial
rulings and declarations continue to arise over whether third-party insurers
have a duty to indemnify or defend vicariously liable co-insured, business
fiduciaries. 645
To illustrate, consider a few decisions in which federal and state courts
decided whether liability insurers had a duty to indemnify or defend
presumably vicariously liable corporations, partners, and employers.6 46 In
Northern Assurance Co. v. Rachlin Clothes Shop, the Delaware Supreme
Court declared that when officers or stockholders act on behalf of the
corporation, those fiduciaries' conduct become acts of the corporation. 6
Therefore, an insurer does not have to indemnify the innocent corporation
when deviant directors and officers exercise absolute control over corporate
business and harm corporate interests. 64 8 In Western Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Aponaug Manufacturing Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared
that the liability insurer had a duty to indemnify the innocent corporation
after the president and agent of the corporation injured a third-party and the
latter sued the corporation. 649
A split in rulings also exists among partners-partnership decisions.
The Supreme Courts of New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma have
declared that liability insurers have a duty to indemnify and defend innocent
partners when deviant partners injure a third-party and the victim
commences a vicarious liability action against the innocent partners. 650 The
644. Cf Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So. 2d 994, 996 (La. 1996). "An employer is not vicariously
liable merely because his employee commits an intentional tort on the business premises during working
hours. Vicarious liability will attach in such a case only if the employee is acting within the ambit of his
assigned duties and also in furtherance of his employer's objective." Id.(quoting Scott v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d 327, 329 (La. Ct. App. 1982)).
645. See infra text accompanying notes 647-71.
646. See infra text accompanying notes 647-71.
647. N. Assurance Co. v. Rachlin Clothes Shop, 125 A. 184, 187-88, 190 (Del. 1924).
648. Id.
649. W. C. & Sur. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 197 F.2d 673, 674 (5th Cir.1952). The exclusionary
clause provided that 'Assault and battery shall be deemed an accident unless committed by or at the
direction of the Insured;' the court stated: "The clause is without effect as to other persons insured who
neither committed nor directed the commission of the assault and battery." Id.
650. See Malanga v. Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 146 A.2d 105, 110 (N.J. 1958) (finding that although all
partners were liable when one partner committed an assault and battery, the assault and battery
exclusory clause in liability policy did not diminish the other partners rights); Morgan v. Greater New
York Taxpayers Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 112 N.E.2d 273, 275 (N.Y. 1953) ("Where liability is imposed upon
one of the insureds for an assault by another assured in which he took no part, the [innocent partner's
ight of indemnity] should be no different for that which would obtain where the assault was committed
by a person who is not an assured..."); see also Nassau Ins. Co. v. Mel Jo-Jo Cab Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d
813, 815 ( N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) ("Notwithstanding the fact that coverage may, . . .withheld from the
named insured or an omnibus insured actually responsible for the commission of the assault or directing
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals embraced the same rule, even though one
general partnership rule is very clear: "[A]lli partners in a partnership are
bound by the fraud of one or any of them acting within the scope of his
authority in a partnership transaction with an innocent third-party and for all
responsible for the injury occasioned thereby., 651
On the other hand, the decision in Miele v. Zurich U.S. presents the
counterview among partnership cases. 652 In Miele, John and Catherine
Murray filed a complaint against Timothy and Linda Miele.653 The Miele's
couple formed a husband-and-wife partnership in Tennessee, doing
business as Miele Homes. 654 The third-party complaint alleged that the
Mieles poorly constructed the Murrays' house.655 Several causes of action
also appeared in the complaint.6 56 A jury found that the Mieles breached
the construction contract by refusing to make the repairs. 657 In addition, the
jury found that John Miele was negligent and that his actions were
deceptive, unfair, and willful. 65 8 Citing the Tennessee Consumer Protection
Act, the trial court trebled the actual damages and awarded $295,500 to the
third-party complainants.659
Maryland Insurance Group (Maryland Insurance) insured the
partnership and the Mieles under a commercial general liability insurance
contract. 660 The Mieles submitted the Murrays' complaint to Maryland
Insurance.66' Maryland Insurance paid only $40,254.45 of the judgment
it to be committed .... it is illogical to indiscriminately exclude from coverage all insureds whenever
an assault is committed, without distinguishing the responsibility, if any, of the particular insured for
that specific assault."), aft'd, 78 A.D.2d 549, 432 N.Y.S.2d 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Employers
Surplus Lines v. Stone, 388 P.2d 295, 298 (Okla.1963) (partner who personally committed the assault is
precluded from recovering under a liability policy, but co-partner who did not commit the assault should
be indemnified.).
651. Cf Dart Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F.2d 1295, 1297 (9th Cir. 1973) (stressing
that § 533 does not bar coverage where a corporation's liability is based upon respondeat superior.). See
Stout v. Turney, 586 P. 2d 1228, 1231 n. 6 (Cal. 1978); see also Hallett v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 749 P.2d 196, 199 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) ("Given its clear meaning, the provision is not
unreasonable. It provides coverage for the firm and the partners in those situations where the firm and
individual partners are found vicariously liable for the tort of one of the partners while driving his own
auto. It avoids the obviously increased risk of providing individual coverage for the partner who is the
tortfeasor. To construe the policy as providing personal liability coverage for the tortfeasor partner
would amount to providing excess liability insurance coverage for the personal automobile liability of
all of the partners in the firm for $547 per year. The policy language makes it clear that Willhite's
personal liability to Hallett is not covered by the St. Paul policy).
652. Miele v. Zurich U.S., 98 S.W.3d 670,670 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
653. Id. at 674.
654. Id. at 672.
655. Id. at 671.
656. Id. (claiming that plaintiffs were negligent, breached their contract, violated the Tennessee
Consumer Protection Act, used deceptive or unfair practices, and failed to repair poor workmanship).
657. Id.
658. Id. at 674.
659. Id. at 672.
660. Id.
661. Id.
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and refused to pay the additional $254,745.55.662 Shortly thereafter, the
663
Mieles sued Zurich U.S., the successor-in-interest to Maryland Insurance.
The Mieles alleged that Maryland Insurance breached its duty to fully
indemnify the Mieles.6 64
"Under Tennessee's law, partners are liable for the wrongful acts of
their co-partners. ' 665 As a consequence, Mr. Miele's liability is imputed to
Ms. Miele's and both are responsible for the personal injuries of John and
Catherine Murray.66 6 In light of that rule, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
concluded that Linda Miele "was not an innocent co-insured because the
liability imposed on [John] Miele was imputed to [her] as a partner in Miele
Homes. 667 Therefore, the appellate court declared that Zurich U.S. did not
have to indemnify Linda Miele.668
Finally, in employer-employee cases, the Ninth Circuit and the Texas
and Louisiana Courts of Appeals have declared that liability insurers do not
have to indemnify or defend innocent employers who might be vicariously
liable for their deviant employees' intentional or negligent acts. 669 Another
group of courts have embraced or fashioned a pro-employers rule.67 ° In
particular, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, one federal district court, and
appellate courts in North Carolina and Oregon, forced insurers to indemnify
and/or defend factually innocent employers that are vicariously liable.67'
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. Id.at 675.
666. Id.
667. Id.
668. Id. at 675.
669. See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 489, 492-93 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Vons's
policy did not provide coverage for third-party claims. We hold that 'direct' means 'direct' and that in
the absence of a third-party claims clause, Vons's policy did not provide indemnity for vicarious liability
for tortious acts of its employee.") (citations omitted); King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 27 S.W.3d 117, 130
(Tex. App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 2000) (concluding that the insurer had no duty to defend the vicariously
liable employer after finding: (1) the employee's victimization of a third-party was not an "accident" or
and "occurrence" under the policy; and (2) the third-party vicarious liability claim and the employer's
allegedly negligent hiring, training, and supervision of the employee were inextricably related to the
employee's intentional tort); McNamara v. Augustino Bros., Inc., 13 So.3d 736, 743, *6 (La. Ct. App.
2009) (declaring that employees' criminal acts exclusion in policy excluded coverage for employees'
alleged theft; insurer was not required to indemnify contractor under theory of vicarious liability; and
the breach-of-contract exclusion provision in the insurance contract barred coverage from the third-party
victim's negligent breach-of-contract claim).
670. See cases cited infra note 671.
671. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Springfield v. Maryland Cas. Co., 139 F.3d 561, 567 (7th Cir.
1998) (concluding that the liability insurer had a duty to defend Roman Catholic Diocese against the
parent's allegations that a former priest abused their children); Silverball Amusement, Inc. v. Utah
Home Fire Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 1476, 1476 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that under Arkansas the insurer had
a duty to indemnify the employer and defend the employer's allegedly negligent hiring and supervision,
even though the employee intentionally sexually molested a child); Lutheran Benevolent Ins. Co. v. Nat.
Catholic Risk Retention Group, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1506, 1514 (N.D. Okla. 1995) (concluding that under
Oklahoma law the insurer had a duty to indemnify and that the church's alleged negligence in retaining
a priest, after learning the priest had sexually molested a child, was covered event under the church's
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STRATEGY TO HARMONIZE CONFLICTING

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AND RULINGS REGARDING INNOCENT AND
CO-INSURED FIDUCIARIES' RIGHTS UNDER PROPERTY AND LIABILITY
INSURANCE CONTRACTS

As discussed in this article, federal and state courts have employed a
variety of equitable and legal doctrines to decide whether insurers have a
duty to indemnify innocent co-insured fiduciaries. 672 Some courts based
their decisions on whether the fiduciaries' insured property interest was
community property, a tenancy in common, or a tenancy in the entirety.673
Many courts consider whether innocent and deviant co-insured fiduciaries
formed a principal-agency relationship.674 A third group of federal and
state courts consider whether innocent fiduciaries had a contractual
obligation to prevent deviant co-insured fiduciaries from destroying insured
property interests. 675 Several tribunals asked whether the co-insured
fiduciaries' insurable interests and general obligations were joint or
severable under first and third-party insurance contracts.6 76 Another group
of tribunals wanted to know whether the exclusion or the severability clause
in the insurance policy was superior or inferior.677 Still, other courts wanted
liability policy that defined "occurrence" as an accident); Edwards v. Akion, 279 S.E.2d 894, 897 (N.C.
App. 1981) (finding that a city's employee's intentional torts, while acting within the scope of his duties,
were "occurrences" within the meaning of the church's liability policy and the insurer had a duty to
defend the city against the third-party); Albertson's Inc. v. Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co., 732 P.2d 916, 918
(Or. App. 1987) (declaring that under Oregon law the insurer had a duty to defend a retail store against
customer's allegations of tortious conduct because such conduct, when viewed from the standpoint of
the insured employer, could reasonably fall within the definition of "accident" and "occurrence" for
purposes of policy coverage).
672. See discussion supraParts II-IV.
673. See, e.g., Kosior v. Cont'l. Ins. Co. 13 N.E.2d 423, 424-25 (Mass. 1938); Klemens v. Badger
Mut. Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 99 N.W.2d at 867; Cooperative Fire Ins. Ass'n of Vermont v. Domina, 399
A.2d 502, 503 (Vt. 1979); Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 250 S.E.2d 774, 776 (Va. 1979).
674. Cf Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Estate of Wesson, 517 So. 2d 521, 535 (Miss. 1987)
(unless otherwise agreed, a principal is subject to a duty to exonerate an agent who is not barred by the
illegality of his conduct to indemnify him for.., expenses of defending actions by third persons brought
because of the agent's authorized conduct, such actions being unfounded but not brought in bad faith
675. See Hummel, 250 S.E.2d 774, 776 (Va. 1979) (concluding that under joint insurance each
spouse had a "joint obligation to use all reasonable means to save and preserve the property [and that]
"each spouse had the joint duty to refrain from defrauding the insurer"); see also Matyuf v. Phoenix Ins.
Co., 27 Pa. D. & C. 2d 351, 361-63 (1933) (declaring that if either insured spouse violated any
contractual duties, the breach was chargeable to the Named Insured and prevented either spouse from
recovering any amount under the policy).
676. See Ponder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 60, 61 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (concluding that a
policy is void only for the deviant insured and that an innocent insured may still recover); Chacon v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 750 (Colo. 1990) (concluding that the innocent fiduciary
could not recover because contract obligation was joint); see also Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 307
N.W.2d 53, 54-55 (Mich. 1981) (declaring that a statutory standard concealment/fraud clause created
separate obligations).
677. Compare J.G. v. Wangard, 753 N.W.2d 475, 489 (Wis. 2008) (concluding that the
exclusionary clause excluded the innocent spouses recovery even though the severability clause stated

150

ESTATE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 2:63

to determine whether innocent co-insured fiduciaries678were vicariously liable
for their co-fiduciaries' intentional or criminal acts.
Yet, as reported throughout this article, judicial conflicts over whether
insurers have a duty to indemnify innocent co-insured fiduciaries are
continual and widespread. 679 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the
aforementioned equitable and legal doctrines do not explain those
conflicts.68 ° In fact, one could argue that those theories and accompanying
legal analyses serve as nurseries for, if not the exact sources of, the
Therefore, the author
persistent conflicting declaratory judgments. 68 '
hypothesized that extralegal factors might be producing these major and
confusing splits among state and federal courts.
Of course, the author based his hypothesis on a curious and wholly
unexpected discovery during an initial and cursory review of co-insured
fiduciary decisions. Briefly stated, among community property cases, state
and federal courts were more likely force property insurers to indemnify coinsured fiduciaries when the latter were innocent wives.68 2 However, when
co-insured fiduciaries were innocent husbands, courts were more likely to
conclude that property insurers did not have to indemnify the co-insured.68 3
Therefore, in light of that cursory examination and unexpected finding,
the author decided to conduct a full empirical study to determine whether
federal and state courts were allowing extralegal factors, i.e. spouses'
gender, types of insurance contracts, types of innocent and co-insured
fiduciaries, types of insured property interests, fiduciaries' geographic
locations, etc. to influence statistically and significantly, courts'
dispositions on duty-to-indemnify cases. Thus, this part of the article
discusses the empirical study's methodology, reports the statistical findings

that "[c]overage applies separately to each covered person"), with Gulmire v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 674 N.W.2d 629, 640 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that a severability clause required coverage
despite the presence of an exclusionary clause in the policy). See also Michael Carbone, Inc. v. Gen.
Accident Ins. Co., 937 F. Supp. 413, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("[T]he vast majority ofjurisdictions which
have addressed the issue . . . hold that the severability doctrine or a separation of insureds clause
modifies the meaning of an exclusion phrased in terms of 'the insured.' These cases hold that the
exclusion will only be effective if it applies with respect to the specific insured seeking coverage.")
(citing Float-Away Door Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 372 F.2d 701, 708 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 823 (1967); Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 488 P.2d 206, 208 (Colo. App. 1971); Shelby
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schuitema, 183 So. 2d 571, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), affd per curiam, 193 So. 2d
435 (Fla. 1967); Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bierman, 292 A.2d 674, 678-79 (Md.
1972); American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Estate of Fournelle, 472 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Minn. 1991);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 203 N.E.2d 846, 850 (Ohio App. 1964); Commercial
Standard Ins. Co. v. American General Ins. Co., 455 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1970); and Bankers &
Shippers Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 224 S.E.2d 312, 317 (Va. 1976)).
678. See discussion supra Part V.
679. See discussion supra Part V.
680. See discussion supra Parts Il-bV.
681. See supra Part V.
682. See Table 3, infra at note 738.
683. See id.
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in several tables, and discusses the relevance of those findings for courts,
practitioners, and co-insured fiduciaries. 684
A. Source of Data,Sampling Procedures,and Background Characteristics
of Co-InsuredFiduciariesandInsurers
Again, the general hypothesis that propelled this study is simple: No
statistically significant relationship exists between innocent co-insured
fiduciaries' likelihood of winning duty-to-indemnify actions in declaratory
judgment hearing and those fiduciaries background attributes. 685 Therefore,
combing reporters and other legal sources as well as using Lexis-Nexis and
Westlaw, efforts were made to find and read every reported and unreported
duty-to-indemnify and innocent co-insured fiduciary case. Those efforts
produced 201 innocent co-insured fiduciaries decisions.686 Furthermore, a
stratified random sampling generated an additional 329 non-coinsured
fiduciary duty-to-indemnify cases. Therefore, the case study is based on
530 state and federal declaratory judgments and rulings which were decided
between 1845 and 2009.687
1. Demographic CharacteristicsandBivariateRelationshipsBetween the
Dispositionof Duty-to-Indemnify Actions and the Attributes of Co-Insured
Fiduciariesand Other InsuredPersons
1 illustrates some demographic characteristics of co-insured
fiduciaries and other insured persons.688 There are six columns of statistics.
The two far-left columns appear under the heading, Innocent Spouses (N =
115). 6 8 9 The two middle columns appear under the heading, Innocent CoInsureds (N = 86).69o The two far-right columns of statistics appear under
the heading, OtherInsuredPersons (N = 329).691
TABLE

684.

See infra Part VII.A.

685. See supra Part 1.
686. See Table 1, infra note 692.
687. The findings and discussion presented in Part VH are derived from and based on the statistical
analysis of 530 declaratory judgments and rulings. See Willy E. Rice, Destroyed Community Property,
DamagedPersons and Insurers' Duty to Indemnify Innocent Spouses and Co-Insured Fiduciaries-An
Attempt to Harmonize Conflicting Federal and State Courts' DeclaratoryJudgments (an unpublished
working paper and statistical reports-on file with the author). All statistical procedures, reports,
databases and results associated with this presentation are on file with the author.
688. See Table 1, infra note 692.
689. Id.
690. Id.
691. Id.
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190-2009 (N - 530)

Demographics

Innocent Spouses
(N
115)
N

Types of Slates:
Community-Property
California
Louisiana
TC13s

Wisconsin
Other
Separale-Property
Federal Circuits:
Fifth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Other Crcults

inocotent Co-lusure~h
(N=86)

Per cent

N

Per cent

4.5
3.5
13.9 *
11.3
7.0
60.0 "

6
38
2
3
9
28

20.0
12.2
67.8 *

43
II
32

Other Insured Persons
(N = 329)
N

Per cent

7.0

19

5.8

44 .2

**
2.3
3.5
10.5
32.6

24
26
11
15
234

7.3
7.9
3.3
4.5
71.1

50,0 *
12.8
37.2 ***

57
41
231

17.3
12.6
70.2 **

I
22
14
258
34

.3
6.7
4.3
78.4 *
10.3

41-

4)-

4-0329

4)-0100.0

Types of Insurance Contracts:
Fire Insurance
Homeowners' Insurance
Auto insurance
Liability Insurance
Other

88.7
5.2
2.6
2.6
.9

Types Insurable interests:
Property Interests
Jointly-Owned Property
Tenants Entirety & Common
Community Property
Other Insurable Interests
Types of Plaintiffs:
insured Innocent Wives
Insured Innocent Husbands
Partnerships & Joint Ventures
CorporatlonsSmall Business
Trustees & Administrix
Third-Party Plaintiffs
Lenders & Mortgagees
Excess Insurers
Professions & Associations
Educational Institutions
Munitipal Goveroments
Various Other Insureds

*

30

34.**

4
44
6
2

4.6
51.2
7.0
2.3

24
1
-061

27.9
1.2
470.9

41-

4-

I1
13
5
31
31
-0-031
-019

12.8
15.1
5.8
36.0
36.0
.0-036.0
422.1

*

-04)-

-4)-0-

5

1.5

208
2
10
t0
25
II
10
I5
35

63,2
.6
4.4
4.4
7.6
3.3
4.4
4.6
10.6

*** Chi square test statistically significant st p f .0001

692. Willy E. Rice, SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INNOCENT CO-INSUREDS
AND INSURED-INNOCENT SPOUSES WHO COMMENCED DECLARATORY JUDGMENT SUITS AGAINST
INSURERS INSTATE AND FEDERAL COURTS - 1845-2009 [hereinafter Table 1].

*
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Comparing the three columns of percentages reveals some notable findings.
The percentages illustrate the distributions of the three groups of litigants
by Types of States, by Federal Circuits, by Types of Insurance Contracts,
by Types of Insurable Interests and by Types of Plaintiffs. 69 3 First, among
the innocent-spouses and other-insureds cases, the largest proportion of
duty-to-indemnify disputes originated in separate property states. The
reported percentages are 60% and 71.1%, respectively. 694 On the other
hand, among innocent-coinsuredcases, only 32.6% of the cases originated
in separate property states.695 Instead, the overwhelming majority of
innocent-coinsureds disputes evolved in community property states. 696 Of
697
that number, a significant percentage (44.2%) commenced in Louisiana.
Second, among the three groups of litigants, the largest numbers of
disputes involve disputed rights and obligations under very different
insurance contracts. 698 Respectively, innocent spouses, innocent coinsureds, and other insureds were significantly more likely to ask courts to
interpret their rights under fire/property, automobile, and liability insurance
contracts. 699 The respective percentages are 88.7%, 51.2%, and 78.4%. 7 0
Third, Table 1 also illustrates the types of insurable interests under the
various insurance contracts. 7 1 There are two large categories: "property
interests" and "other insurable interests. '70 2 Innocent co-insuredfiduciaries
and other insuredpersons were more likely to purchase insurance contracts
to cover non-property interests. 70 3 The percentages are 70.9% and 100%
respectively. 7°4 Conversely, innocent spouses were more likely to insure
their property interests.70 5 More specifically, innocent spouses insured
jointly owned tenancies in common and/or by the entirety, and community
property in greater numbers than the other two groups of complainants.
70 7
The reported percentages are 38.3%, 25.2%, and 27.8% respectively.
Finally, Table 1 also presents specific descriptions of plaintiffs within
the three large groups of complainants.70 8 Among innocent spouses cases,
co-insured wives and husbands comprised 82.6% and 17.4% of the
693.
694.
695.

See id.

Id.
Id.

696.
697.
698.
699.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
700. Id.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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plaintiffs, respectively. 7°9 Among innocent co-insureds cases, third-parties,
lenders/mortgagees, and educational institutions comprised the bulk of
those cases.710 Individually, those subcategories of plaintiffs comprised
36.0% of the total.7 1' The reported percentages for partnerships,
712
corporations, and trustees are 12.8%, 15.1%, and 5.8%, respectively.
Among other insuredpersons, corporationsand small businesses were the
largest category comprising 63.2% of plaintiffs.713
Table 2 displays co-insured fiduciaries' and other insureds' pleadings
and theories of recovery as well as insurers' affirmative defenses. 1 In
addition, Table 2 identifies the courts where litigants initiated their actions
and reports the disposition of the cases in those courts.71 5

709.
710.
711.
712.
713. Id.
714. See infra Table 2, note 716.
715. Id.
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INNOCT CO-INSURED AND INNOCENT SpeosE LITIGANTS PLEADINGS, THEORIES OF RECO E t AND
SucCEs RATES INCOURTs - 1845-2009 (N - 530)

Demographics

Innocent Spouses
(14=115)
N

Declaratory-Judgmnents Venues:
State Courts

Federal Courts

Innocent Co-Insured Other Insured Persons
(N = 86)
tN = 329)

Per cent

N

Per cent

N

Per cent

107
222

32.5
67.5*

37.2 ...

211
6
34

64.1
1.8
10.3

5
37

5.8
43,0 *

48
30

14.6
9.1

83.5 **
10.4
3.3
2.6

28
9
8
41

'
32.6
10.5
9.3
47.6 --

38.3
61.7

36
50

41.9
58.1

135
194

41.0
59.0

54.4
45.6

43
40

51.8
48.2

142
144

49.7
50.3

96

83.5 *

71

82.6

19

16.5

15

17.4

17

3
9

3.5
10.5

41

14.8
12.1
35.6

32

4
39

3.5
33.9 *

96
12
4
3

44
71

*

Lltlgaonts Proffered Doctrines
of Contract luterpretation
Insureds' Theoies:
Ambiguity Rule
RcasonableExpectution Rate
Public Policy
Insurers' Theories:
Ploin-Meauing Rule
Traditional Contract Rules

14

*

Insurers' Coufract-Based
Affirmative Defenses:
"lntentioual Acts"
"Exclusions"
"Breach of Conditions"
An Assortment of Others
Disposition of Actions Across
All Trial & District Courts:.
Insureds, "Favorable" Outcomes
losurer' "Favorable" Outcomes

Disposition of Actions Across
All Appellate Courts:
Insureds' 'Favorable" Outcomes 56
Insurers' "Favorable" Outcomes 47

4.6
43 *
7.3
53.8 *

*** Chi square test statistically significant at p s .0001
Of the530 litigants, some decided to appeal trial and district courts' adverse ruling. Others did nt. Thus the percentages for
appellate-court outcomes are basedon 472 cases - the number of litigants who decided to appeal.

716. WILLY E. RICE, INNOCENT CO-INSURED AND INNOCENT SPOUSE LITIGANTS PLEADINGS,
THEORIES OF RECOVERY AND SUCCESS RATES IN COURTS - 1845-2009 [hereinafter Table 2].
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First, innocent spouses and innocent co-insured fiduciaries were
significantly more likely to initiate their complaints in state Courts. 17 The
percentages are 83.5% and 82.6%, respectively. 718 On the other hand, other
insured persons were more likely to file their complaints in federal
courts.

7 19

The percentage is 67.5%.720

Second, it is important to remember that both insureds and insurers
may commence declaratory judgment suits and ask courts for relief.
Therefore, by citing public policy as well as the ambiguity and/or
reasonable expectation doctrine, insureds often encourage courts to interpret
duty-to-indemnify clauses in favor of the insureds. Conversely, citing the
doctrine of plain meaning and/or traditional rules of contract construction
and interpretation, insurers make a similar request.
Table 2 presents insureds and insurers' theories of recovery among the
three broad categories of cases. 721 Among innocent spouses and innocent
co-insuredcases, insuredpetitioners were more likely to use a public policy
argument to secure favorable declarations.722 The respective percentages
are 35.6% and 37.2%.723 However, among the same two groups of cases,
insurer-petitionerswere significantly more likely to cite traditionalrules of
contract construction and interpretationto ensure favorable rulings.724 The
reported percentages are 33.9% and 43.0%, respectively. 721 Among cases
entitled "Other Insured Persons," insuredpetitioners commenced the largest
number of actions (64.1%)-listing the ambiguity doctrine as their theory
of recovery. 726 Insurers-petitioners were more likely to cite the plain
meaning doctrine (14.6%) as their theory of recovery.72 7
Arguably, the disposition-of-actionsor outcomes percentages are the
most interesting statistics in Table 2.728 Put simply, those statistics provide
a rudimentary answer to this very general question: Who is more likely to
prevail in declaratory judgment trials-insureds or insurers? The
percentages in Table 2 are clear and consistent. In lower federal and state
courts, insurers are significantly more likely to win among "innocent
729
spouses," "innocent co-insureds" and "other insured persons" cases.

717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.

723.
724.
725.

Id.
Id.
Id.

726.
727.

Id.
Id.

728.
729.

See id.
Id.
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Insurers' respective
percentages across the three groups are 61.7%, 58.1%
0
and 59.0%.73
However, a review of outcomes in federal and state appellate courts
reveals significant reversals. 3 Overall, insureds won more decisions.7 32
Among "innocent spouses," insureds won 54.4% of the decisions, and
among "innocent co-insureds" cases, insureds prevailed in 51.8% of the
actions.73 3 Furthermore, among cases entitled "other insured person,"
insureds and insurers won an equal number of cases in federal and state
appellate courts.734 735
The reported percentages in Table 2 are 49.7% and
50.3%, respectively.
Again, a simple hypothesis was the impetus for this study: No
statistically significant relationship exists between innocent co-insured
fiduciaries' likelihood of winning duty-to-indemnify disputes and those
fiduciaries' background attributes.73 6 To test that very general hypothesis,
several statistics were generated to uncover the bivariate relationship
between five predictor variables and the disposition of cases-win-loss
percentages-in state and federal courts.737
Among other features, Table 3 presents four columns of percentages
that illustrate the bivariate relationships between innocent fiduciaries'
likelihood of winning/losing a case and five background attributes.738 The
latter variables are (1) types of insureds; (2) locations offederal appellate
courts in which all cases originated; (3) locations of federal appellate
courts in which third-party cases originated; (4) names of statescommunity or separate property-in which all disputes originated; and
(5) types of insurable interests
among fiduciaries who resided in just
739
community property states.

730. Id.
731. Id.
732. Id.
733. Id.
734. Jd.
735. Id.
736. See supranote 687.
737. See supranote 687.
738. See Willy E. Rice, THE DISPOSITION OF SEPARATELY INSUREDS AND INNOCENT
CO-INSUREDS'
DUTY-TO-INDEMNIFY ACTIONS BY SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LITIGANTS [hereinafter Table 3].
739. Id.
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Once more, there are four columns of percentages in Table 3 .740 The two
far-left columns of percentages appear under the heading, DISPOSITION OF
ACTIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF ALL INSURED PERSONS. 7 4 ' Even a
cursory review of the two far-left columns of percentages indicates that
generally, insureds were more likely to receive unfavorable rather than
favorable declarations or rulings.742 However, do percentages and reported
statistics at the bottom of Table 3 allow one to reject the null hypothesis?
The answer is yes. A review of the two far-left columns of percentages
show that types of insureds, the locations of federal appellate courts in
which the third-party cases originated,and the types of insurable interests
among fiduciaries who resided in just community property states, "predict"
insureds' likelihood of success.743
Again consider the percentages under the heading, DISPOSITION OF
ACTIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF ALL INSURED PERSONS. The results
indicate that: (1) Insured husbands are significantly more likely to receive
unfavorable rulings than insured wives, 85% versus 56.3%; and (2) Ninth
Circuit plaintiffs who commenced third-party actions against insurers are
significantly more likely to lose (73.6%) than those who sued insurers in the
Fifth Circuit (54.8%) or in other federal circuits (55.4%). 74 4 Also, in
community property states, insureds may insure either community property
or other types of property interests. 745 The percentages show that those who
insured community property were significantly more likely to receive
unfavorable rulings than those who insured other types of property interests,
75% versus 55. 7%. 746
Of course, the distribution of percentages under the heading,
DISPOSITION OF ACTIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF ONLY INNOCENT
SPOUSES AND FIDUCIARIES, shows a very similar pattern.747 Generally,

innocent co-insured spouses and other fiduciaries were significantly more
likely to receive unfavorable rather than favorable outcomes.74 8 However,
among the five predictor variables, two variables produced more
unfavorable outcomes for innocent fiduciaries: (1) innocent co-insured
husbands were significantly more likely to receive unfavorable rulings than
innocent co-insured wives, 85% versus 56.2%; and (2) innocent co-insured
fiduciaries who commenced actions against insurers in Texas were
significantly more likely to receive unfavorable declarations (83.3%) than

740. See id.
741. See id.
742. See id.
743. See id.
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. Id.
747. See id.
748. See id.

160

ESTATE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 2:63

innocent fiduciaries who sued insurers in Louisiana (50.0%) or in other
states (60.3",.
Clearly, these findings answer the general question as to whether
federal and state courts allow extralegal variables to influence the
disposition of duty-to-indemnify cases when innocent co-insured spouses
and fiduciaries sue for declaratory relief. Yes, extralegal factors influence
courts' decisions and some variables are likely to produce significantly
more unfavorable than favorable results for innocent spouses and other
fiduciaries. However, as these bivariate statistics confirm and as discussed
throughout this article, federal and state courts appear to be forever divided
over whether insurers have a duty to indemnify all sorts of innocent coinsured fiduciaries. Therefore, a second question remains: Whether an
analysis of the empirical findings in this study can help jurists to understand
or harmonize contradictory, and apparently unexplainable, duty-toindemnify declarations.
To help answer this final question, consider the percentages and
simple statistics appearing in Table 4.750 That table illustrates the
disposition of separately insured's and innocent co-insured fiduciaries'
duty-to-indemnify actions by insurers' affirmative defenses and by various
doctrines of contract construction and interpretation.

749.

Id.

750. See Willy E. Rice, THE DISPOSITION OF SEPARATELY INSUREDS AND INNOCENT
CO-INSUREDS' DUTY-TO-INDEMNIFY ACTIONS BY INSURERS' AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
AND DOCTRINES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION [hereinafter Table
4].
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Like Table 3, the two far-left columns of percentages in Table 4 appear
under the heading, "DISPOSITION OF ACTIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF
ALL INSURED PERSONS", and the two far-right columns of percentages

appear under the heading "DISPOSITION

OF ACTIONS FROM
PERSPECTIVES OF ONLY INNOCENT SPOUSES AND FIDUCIARIES." 75'

THE

First, consider the doctrines of interpretation that state trial courts and
federal district courts employed to decide whether insurers had a duty to
indemnify. Significantly, when those lower state and federal courts applied
the doctrine of ambiguity, the plain meaning rule, and general rules of
contract interpretation or cited public policy, the insureds under the
heading of "All Insured Persons" were more likely to receive unfavorable,
rather than favorable, declarations.75 2 The percentages for unfavorable
outcomes are 58.4%, 70.0%, 63.2%, and 56.1%, respectively.753
A close examination of the distribution of percentages for "Innocent
Spouses and Fiduciaries" reveals similar outcomes. 754 Innocent co-insured
fiduciaries are significantly more likely to receive unfavorable rulings and
declarations when state trial courts and federal district courts apply the
doctrine of ambiguity, the plain meaning rule, and generalrules of contract
interpretation, or when those lower courts cite public policy.755 The
respective percentages are 65.0%, 77.8%, 59.2% and 61.6%.756 On the
other hand, insureds generally and innocent co-insured fiduciaries
specifically are more likely to received favorable declarations when lower
state and federal courts apply the reasonableexpectation doctrine.75 7 The
percentages for the two groups of insureds are 55.2% and 52.2%
758
respectively.
Without a doubt, that co-insured fiduciaries and insureds generally are
more likely to receive unfavorable decisions when state trial courts and
federal district courts apply the doctrine of ambiguity is somewhat
surprising. 75 9 Briefly put, the rule is clear: A dispute arises about the
meaning of ambiguous terms in an insurance contract's duty-to-pay or dutyto-indemnify clause, courts must construe the language against the insurer
and in favor of the insureds. 760 Arguably, the greater majority of lower
courts in this study did not embrace and apply that rule in favor of the

751. See Table 3, supra note 738; Table 4, supra note 750.
752. Table 4, supra note 750.
753. Id.
754. Id.
755. Id.
756. Id.
757.

Id.

758. Id.
759. See id.
760. See id.
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insureds.76 1 Perhaps that failure generated or contributed to the number of
conflicting decisions overall.
However, the last five rows of percentages in Table 4 strongly suggest
that the documented duty-to-indemnify splits among or between state and
federal courts of appeals may be attributed to those tribunals properly and
consistently applying various doctrines of interpretation.76 2 The evidence in
TABLE 4 is rather compelling. First, consider the doctrines of interpretation
that state and federal appellate courts used to declare whether insurers had a
duty to indemnify. Specifically, when state andfederal courts of appeals
applied the doctrine of reasonable expectation, the doctrine of ambiguity,
and cited public policy, "all insured persons" were more likely to receive
favorable, rather than unfavorable declarations.763 The percentages for
favorable outcomes are 81.5%, 54.6.0%, and 55.7%, respectively. 764 Of
course, when those appellate courts applied the doctrine of plain meaning
and traditional rules of contract construction and interpretations, "all
insured persons" were significantly more likely to lose. The respective
percentages are 78.8% and 53.9%.765
Furthermore, a close analysis the distribution of percentages for
"Innocent Spouses and Fiduciaries" discloses very similar win/loss
patterns. 766 To illustrate, innocent co-insured fiduciaries are significantly
more likely to receive favorable declarations when state and federal
appellate courts applied the doctrine of reasonableexpectation, the doctrine
of ambiguity, and cited public policy.767 The percentages for innocent
fiduciaries' favorable outcomes are 81.8%, 58.8.%, and 57.1%
respectively.7 68 Conversely, innocent co-insured fiduciaries and spouses
were significantly more likely to receive unfavorable declarations when
state and federal courts of appeals again applied the doctrine of plain
meaning and traditional rules of contract construction and
interpretations.769 The respective percentages are 88.9% and 55. 9%.770

761.
762.
763.
764.
765.
766.
767.
768.

See id.
See id.

769.

See id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.

Id.

770. Id.
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2. A Multivariate,Two-Stage ProbitAnalysis-A Review of the Concurrent
RelationshipsBetween Several Predictorsand the Dispositionof Duty-toIndemnify Cases in State and FederalDeclaratoryJudgment Trials
Certainly, Tables 3 and 4 presented some statistically significant,
bivariate relationships between the disposition of controversies and
background variables. 77' However, although those simple statistical
findings are meaningful, they are only descriptive and not predictive. In
addition, simple bivariate statistical procedures do not test for "selectivity
bias," a potential source of error in sample data.772 Also, simple descriptive
statistics do not measure the simultaneous effects of each individual
variable on the disposition of declaratory judgment actions.
Therefore, if a researcher does not employ a statistical procedure to
control for the simultaneous influences of multiple factors on the
disposition of cases, the investigator is precluded from saying anything
conclusive about each variable's unique predictive power. Consequently, a
more powerful or robust statistical procedure is required. A multivariate,
two-staged probit analysis is one statistical procedure that a researcher can
use to measure the simultaneous influences
of multiple factors; that
773
procedure was employed in this study.
771. See Table 3, supranote 738; Table 4, supranote 750.
772. See Willy E. Rice, Judicialand Administrative Enforcement of Individual Rights Under the
National Labor Relations Act and Under the Labor-Management Relations Act Between 1935 and
1990-An Historical and EmpiricalAnalysis of Unsettled Intercircuit and Intracircuit Conflicts, 40
DEPAUL L. REv. 653, 730-34 (1991); Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, "Redlining,'" and The
Discriminatory Access to Loans, Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical Analysis of
Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federaland State Courts, 1950-1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 583, 692-93 (1996). After insurers refuse to indemnify innocent co-insured fiduciaries or any
insured person, some insured fiduciaries might decide not to secure a declaratoryjudgment in a federal
district court or in a state trial court. On the other hand, other insured persons or co-insured fiduciaries
might decide to commence an action. Also, among those deciding to petition a lower court for relief,
some insureds will be successful, but other insureds will not prevail. It is very likely the unsuccessful
insureds would appeal their adverse declarations to a state or a federal appellate court. Briefly stated, a
co-insured fiduciary or any insured person's decision to file the initial action-as well as that person's
decision to appeal an adverse ruling-is called "self selection." Therefore, the statistical error that "self
selection" might produce is called "selectivity bias." A prudent investigator must use a more powerful
statistical procedure that tests for selectivity bias in the sample data. Here is another brief example of
potential selectivity bias: A researcher discovers that courts of appeals are significantly less likely to
award declaratory relief to innocent co-insured husbands and more likely to award relief to innocent coinsured wives. At that point, the researcher might conclude that judges are biased against innocent coinsured husbands. However, the investigator must be certain that the population of innocent co-insured
husbands, those who appealedan adverse declaration,is not statistically different from the population
of innocent co-insured husbands who decided not to appeal an adverse declaration. Just maybe there
could be something extremely "deficient" about the unsuccessful innocent co-insured husbands or about
the merits of their complaints. Judicial bias or prejudice, therefore, would not be the correct explanation
of innocent co-insured husbands' lack of success in courts of appeals or in district or trial courts. In
other articles, the author discusses and presents examples of selectivity bias.
773. The author has discussed and used this statistical procedure to analyze multiple sets of sample
data, and those statistical findings and analyses appear in several published articles. See Willy E. Rice,
Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord Over Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend insureds,
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Table 5 presents the results of a single multivariate model.774 It
includes fifteen predictor variables: Types of Insured Person-two
categories; Types of Insurable Interests-two categories; Types of Property
Insurance Contracts--two categories; Location of State Appellate Courtstwo categories; Location of Federal Courts of Appeals-two categories;
Affirmative Defense- "No Coverage"; Types of Legal Doctrines-three
categories; and a Lambda Term-the test for selectivity bias.775

Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Historical and EmpiricalReview of Federal and State
Courts, DeclaratoryJudgments-1900-1997,47AM. U.L. 1131, 1212 nn.386-87 (1998); Willy E. Rice,
Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance Industry: An Empiricaland HistoricalAnalysis of
Courts, Ineffectual Attempts to Harmonize FederalAntitrust, Arbitration, and Insolvency Statutes with
the McCarran-FergusonAct-1941-1993,43 CATH. U. L. REv. 399, 445-49 nn. 212-19 (1994); Willy E.
Rice, JudicialBias, the Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection: An EmpiricalAnalysis of State
Supreme Courts, Bad-Faith, Breach-of-Contract, Breach-of-Covenant-of-Good-Faith and ExcessJudgment Decisions, 1900-1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 325, 369-77 nn. 157-60 (1992).
774. See Table 5, infra note 776.
775. See Table 5, infra note 776.
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LsURES'1DUTYTOINDEMNIFY CO-INSURED
& SEPARATELY INsseREO
P
ONS: THE SwtLs.TANEOIs
Ey1"s
m OF SutL.CmThPRErDCTOR
VAR AOIJ'.o LITIGAWS' DECISIONS
TO INITIATE DECIARATORYJtDGMstN AcrTo0s LNSTATEANDF"DERAL COURTSANDONtilE CASE' OISPrO tos (N-47)

PREDICTOR
VARIABLES

Decision to Appeal to State &
Federal Appellate Courts

Dispoltion of DeclaratoryJudgment Actions On Appeal

Probit
Coefficients
(Standard
Errors)

Probt
Coemtorlents
(Standard
Errors)

Types of Insured Persons:
Innocent Co-4asoreds

.0067

.634

(.0342)

(.2346)

Innocent Spouses

Types of Insurable Interests:
Community Property
Jointly Owned Property

Property Insurance Contracts:
Homeowners' luussrance
Fire Insurancee

State Courts of Appeals:
New Mexico

Federal Courts of Appeals:
Fifth Circuit
Niuth Circuit

Affrmath'e Defense:
"No Coerage"
Leal DoctrlIn Applied:
Reasonable Expectation Rule
Plain-Mea uog Rule
General Contract Roles

Absolute
Values of
a-Sttities

.27

.0254

.1650

(.002)

(.1169)

-

.0395
(.0912)
.1457

-

(.0456)

(.3359)
-.1813
(.2519)

-. 0625
(.2285)
.0315
(.0467)

-1.0218
(.3139)
.1264
(-3111)

2.70-*

.0839

-1.1551

1.81*

(.21
Texas

Absolute
Values of
z-Stalisics

3889

)

-.0349

(.A371)
-.3186

(.0w2)

(.21135)

.0139
(.0278)
.0114
(.0265)

-.
0468

1.16
.72

Al

1.12

.23

(.2025)
-.0285

.14

(.2011)

.0256

(.019)
.0047
(.1481)
-.0720
(.2255)
-.0206

(.0519)

.1225
(.1456)

.84

.8414
(3110)
-.9182
(.2139)

2-71

-.2186
(.1729)

-1.26

.1366
4.3512)

.40

.1375
(.1086)

1.27

Lambda Term (Test
for Selectivity Bis)

3.50 '

COTANT

.8783
(.2511)

Levels ofstatstical significance:

** p < .0001

4.29 *

* p < .01

776. Willy E. Rice, INSURERS' DUTY TO INDEMNIFY CO-INSURED & SEPARATELY INSURED
PERSONS: THE SIMULTANEOUS EFFECTS OF SELECTED PREDICTOR VARIABLES ON LITIGANTS'
DECISIONS TO INITIATE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS INSTATE AND FEDERAL COURTS AND ON
THE CASES' DISPOSITION [hereinafter Table 5].
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First, the following is worth repeating: The total sample size for this study
is 530 declaratoryjudgments and rulings (N = 530). 7 77 Initially, state trial
courts or federal district courts decided these controversies. However, 472
litigants were dissatisfied with the lower courts' declarations and rulings
(N= 472).778 As a consequence, those unsuccessful insureds and insurers
appealed their adverse declarations and rulings to a federal or a state court
of appeals. 779 Fifty-eight (N = 58) litigants decided not to appeal, for
reasons unknown.780 Most likely, those insureds and insurers were satisfied
with the relief that they received in the state trial courts or in the federal
district courts. 8
Four distributions of probit coefficients, along with standard errors,
and z-statistics are illustrated in Table 5.782 The probit values and zstatistics appearing under the heading, Decision to Appeal to State and
FederalAppellate Courts, answer this question: Whether the multiple and
simultaneous effects of the fifteen variables significantly influence
insureds' or insurers' respective decisions to appeal their adverse
declarations and rulings to state and federal courts of appeals.783 The
answer is no, because the corresponding z-statistics indicate that none of the
probit values are statistically significant.784 Stated differently, neither of
the fifteen predictors had any significant influence on litigants' decision to
appeal or not to appeal lower courts' rulings.785
Of course, there is a more important question: Whether the
simultaneous and multiple effects of the fifteen variables are more likely or
less likely to influence the disposition of duty-to-indemnify disputes in
federal and state courts of appeals.786 The answer to that question may be
found in Table 5 among the distributions of probit values and z-statistics
appearing under Disposition of Declaratory Judgment Actions On
Appeal.787 A careful observation discloses that the Lambda term (1366) is
not statistically significant, suggesting the absence of selectivity bias in the
sample data.788 On the other hand, there are four statistically
significant
78 9
probit values; three of which are negative and one is positive.
777. See supranote 687.
778. See supranote 687.
779. See supra note 687.
780. See supranote 687.
781. Shelly J. White, A. 1, Critique of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1, 57 BAYLOR L. REV.
937, 938 (2005) (explaining that people generally do not seek appeal because they are satisfied with the
judgment of the trial court).
782. Table 5, supranote 776.
783. See id.
784. See id.
785. See id.
786. See id.
787. Id.
788. Id.
789. See id.
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Consider the negative probit values. 790 The first one suggests: When
examining the simultaneous influences all predictor variables, state and
federal courts of appeals are significantly less likely to order property
insurersto indemnify co-insureds or separately insureds who ask appellate
courts to interpret homeowers' insurance contracts.791 The corresponding
probit value is -1.0218.792 The second significant and negative probit value
(-1.1551) strongly suggests that state and federal courts of appeals are
significantly less likely to order insurers to indemnify co-insured fiduciaries
and separately insured persons who reside or commence actions in New
Mexico.793
The third negative probit value (-.9182) suggests that co-insured
fiduciaries and separately insured persons are less likely to receive
favorable declarations in courts of appeals when those tribunals use the
doctrine of plain meaning to interpret various insurance contracts.794
Although the -.2186 probit value near the bottom of Table 5 is not
statistically significant, it lends support to what appears in case law and the
finding in Table 4: Co-insured fiduciaries and separately insured persons
are also less likely to receivefavorable declarationswhen state and federal
appellate courts use general rules of contract to interpret various insurance
agreements.7 95 Furthermore, the positive and statistically significant .8414
probit coefficient also supports a finding that appears in Table 4: Co-insured
fiduciaries and separately insured persons are more likely to receive
favorable declarations when appellate courts apply the reasonable
expectation doctrine.796
Of course, the present analysis would be incomplete if some of the
statistically insignificant probit coefficients in Table 5 were not
discussed.79 7 Consider, therefore, the general variable Types of Insured
Persons and the corresponding two probit values: -.0634 and .1650.798 The
negative value indicates that innocent co-insuredfiduciaries are likely to
lose their duty-to-indemnify actions, but the positive coefficient suggests
that innocent spouses are more likely to win their actions.7 99
In addition, "community property" and "jointly owned property"
appear under the heading, Types of Insurable Interests.800 The two
corresponding probit values, -.3889 and -.1813, are not statistically
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.
800.

See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Table 5, supra note 776; Table 4, supra note 750.
See Table 5, supra note 776; Table 4, supranote 750.
See Table 5, supra note 776.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2009]

FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS' DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

169

significant, suggesting that types of insurable interests are not even
marginally relevant as predictors among multiple predictors. 80 1 However,
the bivariate statistics in Table 4 revealed that co-insured persons were
statistically and significantly less likely to win duty-to-indemnify cases if
they (1) resided in community property states, and (2) insured their
community property. 802
Finally, there is a general impression that the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals is a fairly "conservative court., 80 3 Many have concluded that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is a "liberal court." 8°4 Therefore, one might
conclude that co-insured fiduciaries and other insured persons are more
likely to receive favorable outcomes when those insureds sue insurers in the
Ninth Circuit. 80 5 The converse would be true when co-insured fiduciaries
80 6
Circuit.
and other insureds sue property and liability insurers in the80Fifth
7

A review of Table 5, however, supports neither assumption.
Under the heading Federal Courts of Appeals, the two probit values
appear. 80 8 The first one (-.0468) indicates the effect of litigating a duty-toindemnify action in the Fifth Circuit, and the second one (-.0285) shows the
consequence of litigating in the Ninth Circuit. 8°9 However, coefficients are
statistically insignificant, revealing that the federal courts of appeals'
locations have no effect on whether insureds or insurers win or lose duty-toindemnify disputes. 1 0 On the other hand, since those coefficients are
negative, one could argue that both the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of
801. See id.
802. See Table 4, supranote 750.
803. See, e.g., Garrick B. Pursley, Thinking Diversity, Rethinking Race: Toward A Transformative
Concept of Diversity in HigherEducation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 153, 172-73 (2003) ("Other factors, such as
socioeconomic history, academic background, and extracurricular activities remained legitimate bases
for admissions decisions after Hopwood. Colleges and universities in the Fifth Circuit simply had to
exclude race as one of the factors in their admissions programs. It seems, then, that even the.
conservative Fifth Circuit recognized the value of fostering an educational atmosphere composed of a
variety of experiential backgrounds"); Ruth Colker, Affirmative Protectionsfor People with Disabilities,
Illness and Parenting Responsibilities Under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213, 249
(1997) ("Where [a] leave is foreseeable, the FMLA requires that the employee shall provide the
employer with not less than thirty days' notice, before the date the leave is to begin.... Some courts
have applied this rule stringently, requiring an employee to invoke the words 'FMLA' when requesting
leave in order to evoke statutory coverage. Even the conservative Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, has recognized that such a rule departs from Congress' intent.").
804. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail: The Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 363, 414 (2006) ("Miller v. Reed is a good example of the Ninth Circuit's comparatively
liberal approach to hybrid rights claims."). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Myth of the LiberalNinth
Circuit, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2003) ("On the other hand, people often forget that, for every
liberal on the Ninth Circuit, there is a judge who occupies the exact opposite place on the ideological
continuum.").
805. See supra notes 803-04.
806. See Table 5, supranote 776.
807. See id.
808. Id.
809. Id.
810. See id.
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Appeals would rule against innocent co-insured spouses as well as against
other co-insured fiduciaries and separately insured persons. 8 "
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As discussed earlier, there are several types of fiduciary relationships,
comprising various pairs of co-fiduciaries--estates and trustees, executors
and administrators, professionals and associates, partners and partnerships,
corporations and their officers and directors, employers and employees,
business entities, and independent contractors, joint ventures, mortgagors
and mortgagees, sellers and buyers, parents and adult children, and
husbands and wives.81 2 Again, as a matter of law, each commercial or
and/or
familial fiduciary must act in good faith and protect jointly owned
1 3
fiduciaries."
other
of
benefit
the
for
community property interests
Of course, many fiduciaries breach their fiduciary obligations. 1 4 In
fact, they become deviant fiduciaries, intentionally or negligently violating
public policy as well as criminal and civil laws. As reported above, those
violations often jeopardize, undermine, or destroy innocent fiduciaries'
811
On other occasions, deviant fiduciaries' outrageous
property interests.
actions or inactions partially or totally destroy third-parties' property
interests 16or persons, thereby exposing innocent fiduciaries to vicarious
liability.
Recognizing that co-fiduciaries may engage in deviant and/or
negligent activities, prudent fiduciaries purchase property and/or liability
insurance to cover potentially first and third-party property damages and
personal injuries.8 17 However, based on the research for this article, the
findings are conclusive: Fiduciaries generally purchase standardizedrather
818
than carefully negotiated property and liability insurance contracts.
Without a doubt, standardized or "boilerplate" insurance contracts are
generally replete with archaic, poorly defined, and ambiguous words and
phrases. 819 In addition, coverage and duty-to-indemnify provisions in
811. See id.
812. See supra Part

.

813. See supra Part H.
814. See supra Part III.

815. See supra Partl1.
816. See supra Part HI.
817. See supra Part IlI.
818. See supra Part I.

819. See, e.g., A.M Vann, Annotation, Loss by Heat, Smoke, or Soot Without External Ignition as
Within a StandardFire Insurance Policy, 17 A.L.R.3d 1155 (1968) (discussing the archaic and still
widely recognized legal distinction between a "friendly" fire and a "hostile" fire); Insurance-Clause
Excepting Loss or Frustrationof Venture by Government Restraint Held Inapplicableto Constructive
Loss of Goods, 55 HARv. L. REV. 686, 686 (1942) ('This construction of a standard clause subjects
underwriters to shipping losses accompanying the outbreak of war which they may not have anticipated
in computing premiums. The frustration clause, couched in the archaic phraseology of marine
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standardized property and liability insurance contracts typically contain
long and poorly structured sentences. 2 °
Even the most sophisticated fiduciaries fail to appreciate that liability
and property insurers intentionally insert archaic words, complicated
phrases, and poorly constructed long sentences in contracts for the benefit
of insurers. 821 Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the definition of coverage
under property insurance contracts does not comport with a
commonsensical layperson's definition, and even legally trained fiduciaries
who purchase property insurance contracts fail to understand or appreciate
the distinction.822 Perhaps, what is even more egregious is that otherwise
prudent, intelligent, competent, and seasoned commercial fiduciaries do not
carefully read or understand the major terms and conditions in standardized
property and liability insurance contracts before signing those agreements
and sending periodic premiums to the insurers.
To be sure, such poorly written, confusing, and complicated
boilerplate insurance contracts beg for federal or state courts
interpretations.823 As discussed in this article, state and federal courts have
delivered conflicting declarations after reading and construing identical or
fairly similar words and phrases in standardized insurance contracts.824 To
repeat, for more than 150 years, some federal and state courts have ordered
property and liability insurers to indemnify innocent co-insured
fiduciaries.825 Other courts, however, have declared that first and thirdparty insurers have no contractual duty to indemnify innocent fiduciaries in
the wake of deviant fiduciaries' destructive acts.826
Again, many ordinary and commonsensical laypersons think it is
grossly unfair for insurance companies to benefit from fiduciaries'
deviancies.827 After all, insurers and their agents know early on that
innocent fiduciaries want and expect to be compensated when co-fiduciaries
destroy property and injure persons. 8
Therefore, some jurists and
commentators have tried to explain state and federal courts' numerous and
various conflicting duty-to-indemnify declarations by focusing on the
following: (1) whether the deviant co-insured fiduciaries destroyed
insurance, was adopted following a decision in the last war .. ").See also Kulukundis v. Norwich
Union Fire Ins. Soc'y, I K.B. 2, 34-35 (Eng. C.A. 1937) ("The archaic words of our ancient form of
marine policy.., afford little guidance in the way of description or explanation as to the circumstances
which the insurer agrees shall constitute a loss for which he has to pay.") (Comment of Mr. Justice
Scott).
820. See id.
821. See id.
822. See supra Part IIl. A.
823. See supra Part IV. B.
824. See supra Part IV.B.
825. See supra part V.B.
826. See supra Part V.A.
827. See supra Part V.A.
828. See supra Part V.B.
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community property, a tenancy by the entirety, a tenancy in common or
some other jointly owned property; (2) whether the insurance contract
contained a severability clause; (3) whether liability insurance contracts
covered innocent co-insured fiduciaries' vicarious liability; (4) whether the
property insurance contracts required innocent fiduciaries to protect jointly
owned or community property; or (5) whether the liability insurance
contracts required innocent fiduciaries to protect third-parties from deviant
fiduciaries' destructive intentional and/or negligent acts.829
Yet, after conducting an empirical investigation, the statistical results
revealed that those proffered theories, i.e. property interests, severability-ofinterests, vicarious-liability and duty-to-protect analyses, do not and cannot
explain the conflicts even marginally. 830 On the other hand, several
statistically significant findings clearly revealed that some extralegal
factors, types of property insurance contracts and the locations of state court
proceedings, influence courts' decisions. 83'832 Arguably, those extralegal
variables' effects generate some of the splits.
After conducting a conservative and thorough analysis of the empirical
study's sample data and statistical findings, the author is reasonably
confident that federal and state courts' application of settled insurancerelated doctrines explains the duty-to-indemnify splits. 833 Again, stated
briefly, insurers are more likely to prevail when courts use traditional rules
of contract and the doctrine of plain meaning to interpret duty-to-indemnify,
and innocent co-insured fiduciaries are more likely to win duty-toindemnify controversies when state and federal courts apply the doctrines of
ambiguity and reasonable expectations.834
Finally, spouses, executors, trustees, partners, subcontractors, and
employers are fiduciaries, and fairly often they are legally required to
purchase property insurance to cover jointly owned or community
property.83 5 Under other circumstances, those same fiduciaries must
purchase liability insurance that covers third-party claims.836 Understandably, when first- or third-party losses arise, those legally bound fiduciaries
expect insurance companies to indemnify them rather than finding and
using archaic language in the insurance contract to defeat the fiduciaries'
claims.837

829.
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.
836.
837.

See supra Part V.B.
See supra PartVII.
See supra Part VI.A. 1.
See supra Part VII.
See supra Part VII.
See supra Part VII.
See supra PartVII.
See supra Part VII.
See supra Part IV.
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The essential point, however, is this one: At the very beginning of the
bargained-for-exchange process, fiduciaries help insurers to defeat their
duty-to-indemnify claims during the contract period.838 How? Arguably,
gullible fiduciaries do not invest enough effort or time to understand the
"hidden dangers and pitfalls" in standardized insurance contracts.
Fiduciaries also do not invest time or effort to negotiate ironclad, clearly
written and unambiguous insurance contracts, which will cover fiduciaries'
specific interests and expectations. Until otherwise innocent, highly ethical,
prudent, and business savvy fiduciaries become more proactive during the
formation of insurance agreements, they will continue to be twice
victimized. Deviant co-insured co-fiduciaries will continue to act
irresponsibly and destroy or undermine innocent fiduciaries' various
interests, and property and liability insurers will continue to pitch and sell
adhesionary and inferior insurance contracts to fiduciaries.

838. See supraPart IV.

